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the   conceptual   life  worlds  of  many  of   its   ethnic  nationalities.  While  Myanmar   is   currently
witnessing significant – if still uncertain – political and economic transitions, the Kachin State







settings   long  characterised  by  a   scarcity   of  human and material   resources.   I   argue   that,   in
addition   to   their   explicitly   stated   pedagogical   aims,   these   initiatives   are   serving   particular
visions of social and political development, defined by Christian moralities and ethno nationalist‐
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than   I   could   ever   have   imagined   when   I   first   set   out   on   this   path,   the   trust,
encouragement   and   aid   I   have   received   along   the   way   have   proven   to   be   the
greatest personal lesson. I am deeply grateful to my supervisors, Jonathan Spencer
and Tobias Kelly, whose help through this process has been immense. Their prompt




while   giving   me   lessons   in   style   and   structure   so   vital   for   anthropologists   in
expressing   our   subject   matter.   Perhaps   the   greatest   merit   in   our   working
relationship was the face to face discussions over my invariably  late  and patchy‐ ‐
drafts.   I   remember   always   finding   a   meagre   material   distraction   for   existential
worry as  I  gazed at   the  sparsely populated,  anachronistic  glass  cabinets  outside
Jonathan’s   office.   Yet   if   I   entered   the   room   disheartened   and   lost   in   my   latest
attempts  at  making sense  of   the  Kachin realities,   I  stepped out  encouraged and
motivated   to   pursue   the   search.   It   was   this   profound   pedagogic   skill,   at   once







the  blind  faith  she  put   in  my  talents  at   the  end of  my undergraduate    degree,
through the   long and often errant  years   that   followed,  her  support  has  been of























Kha Lum,  who adopted me in  his  simple  home in  Chiang Mai and tutored me
through his impeccable knowledge of Jinghpaw and English, Biblical stories, and
worldly   wisdom   and   wit.   Charged   with   the   unthinkable   task   of   teaching   me
Jinghpaw, I will never be able to repay those months of unyielding patience spent
under  his  care  and  tutelage.  Kaw  Mai,  who  first  introduced  me  to  my  language






teaching at   the Teachers Training College  in Mai  Ja Yang.  Naw Hkawng whose
courage and enthusiasm helped me traverse the difficult journeys to Laiza time and



















College  Library   in  Nawng Nang was kind enough  to  open  its  doors   to  me  for
research   amid   the   well stacked   shelves.   Not   a   few   times   did   I   owe   it   to     the‐
charitable librarians who kept the doors open for my sake and waited patiently as I
scanned   or   copied   the   volumes   of   Jinghpaw   journals.   The   Kachin     Baptist
Convention   Literature   Committee   and   the   Kachin   Baptist   Convention   Archives
were both open to hold discussions with me on the topics of history and literacy in














  Map 1
Locations of fieldwork sites in the Kachin State, Myanmar and Yunnan Province, China
11
Map 2
Administrative divisions of the Union of Myanmar (left) and approximate domains of KIA brigades (right)
(Adapted from Free Burma Rangers 2012)
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Map 3
Approximate areas across Myanmar controlled by major armed groups in 2008
(Adapted from Kramer 2009, 2)
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Map 4
Election cancellations in the Kachin State 2010 – 2015








roles vis à vis the courts of Ava, Yunnan and Britain. Representations produced by‐ ‐






Chinese   companies   interested   in   politically   stable   environments   for   rampant
extractive   industries  and has   increasingly  shaped portrayal  of   the  Kachin   tribes
across the border. Beyond representations, the lived histories of war in the Kachin
Hills have shaped successive generations and hundreds of thousands of lives. The
extensive   kinship   system  that   retains   its  primacy   in   social   relations   means   that
almost everyone has lost  a relative in the war.  As Véronique Bénéï  notes in her
study of embodied nationalism in Indian schooling, “war has been one of the most




threats.  The  hardy   inhabitants  of  Kachin  hills  and  borderlands,   a  population  of
some   1,2   million   people,   have   found   ways   to   adapt   to   the   pervasive   state   of
exception   and   navigate   the   competing   sovereignties.   Trade   routes   might be
regularly disrupted, but products and produce still find their way to the markets.
The   multifaceted   life   of   Christian   churches   –   a   notable   phenomenon   in   the
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predominantly Buddhist Myanmar – has only intensified and extended through the






most  advanced  educational  apparatus   in   the   colonial  Southeast  Asia,   successive
Socialist   regimes   stifled   academic   freedoms   and   competiveness   in   the   decades
following Burmese independence from Britain. Today, education remains a highly
contested field. On the national level, increasingly vocal teachers’ unions are calling





Asian   Nations   (ASEAN)   and   the   wider   world   have   created   conditions   for   the
emergence of  a younger class  of   intellectuals  commanding academic capital  and
international   networks.   In   the   Kachin   borderlands,   as   in   other   similar   contexts
across   Myanmar,   their   efforts   have   led   to   crucial   beginnings   of   civil   society
interventions and activism. In a word, contemporary northern Myanmar remains a
region   of   extremes.   It   is   torn   between   the   shifting   landscape   of   economic   and
political  reforms,  grassroots  development and partial  democratisation,  while  still
gripped in armed conflicts over ethno nationalist survival, encroachment of foreign‐
extractive industries, and highly corrupt and dysfunctional state institutions.
This   thesis   engages   the   above   context   by   investigating   the   nexus   of   formal
education,  organised   religion,  and  ethno nationalist  politics   in   the  Kachin  State,‐
Myanmar. My primary focus is on the recent emergence of several private schools in
this   territorially   and   ideologically   fragmented   context.   I   am   asking   why   these
initiatives were started at this point in time, and what has motivated their leaders to

















among   other   things,   the   forebears   of   the   Kachin   tribes   likely   enjoyed   relative
autonomy, self determination, and occasional dominion over smaller neighbouring‐




The   dearth   of   published   primary   research   on   the   Kachin   Hills   since   Edmund
Leach’s   (1954)  classic   theoretical   treatise,  still  part  of   the   foundational  canon for
political  anthropology courses   in   the British  tradition,  conveys  something of   the
historical paradoxes of the area. Famously, The Political Systems of Highland Burma all
1 The use of Burma versus Myanmar in academic literature has been been a matter of some controversy. The newer
designation came into official use in July 1989, when the ruling StateLaw and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
changed it on the grounds that Burma was a colonial invention and that the Union of Myanmar would be more
inclusive of the diverse ethnic nationalities inhabiting the country. While the United Nations accepted this change,
it was less well received in the academic and activist circles (e.g. Dittmer 2008; Skidmore 2003). Many argued that
using Myanmar meant recognising an illegitimate regime. Inside the country, too, people largely continued to rely
on Burma out of resistance or habit. While recognising the importance of these debates, I have chosen to follow the
usage of David Steinberg (2007) by referring to Myanmar to designate the period after 1988, and Burma for the






for   good   (R.   Anderson   2007).   Subsequent   developments   inside   the   country
(following the coup of 1962 Burma became an increasingly isolated dictatorship) left
the Kachin State one of the least 'accessible' regions in the world. It was not until the
late  1990s,  and  the   temporary  cessation of  armed hostilities,   that   these   complex
borderlands started  opening  up  to  the  attention  of  social  scientists,  historians,









boundary   as   well   as   resource rich   enclaves   further   inland.   Intricate   borderland‐
economies,   regulated not  by states  but  by  local   relations  of  patronage,  kin,  and
2 Biographical evidence and Leach’s scarce exposition on the design of the Political  Systems suggest that the
interaction between the colonial  state and the Kachin communities  was a  topic with which he was intimately
familiar (R. Anderson 2007). His earlier dissertation for the London School of Economics (LSE) contains insightful
discussions regrettably omitted from his later published work (Leach 1947). In a lecture delivered in 1987, he
admitted that his limited focus on the “indigenous social systems” that entirely erased the wider geopolitical context
had been “a mistake” (R. Anderson 2007, 27).
3 The Panglong Agreement was signed on February 12, 1947, shortly before Burmese independence from Britain,
between the Governor s Executive Council led by Gen. Aung  San and the representatives of Chin, Kachin, Shanʹ
peoples. The conference leading up to it had been one of the preconditions set by the British regime for Burmese
independence as it  tried to appease political  tensions between the Frontier Areas (largely inhabited by various
ethnic  nationalities)  and  the  Bamar  majority.  The  agreement  lay  down  tentative  provisions  for  full  regional
autonomy in internal administration, and was accepted in principle by all parties to the agreement. The agreement
was never honoured by the successive Burmese regimes who took power after Gen. Aung San’s assassination on
July 17, 1947. Today, its contents inform the chief political demands of the Kachin Independence Organisation and
many other bodies representating ethnic nationalities in Myanmar.
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opportunism, supported local militaries while also allowing organisations such as














support   since   the   early   1960s,   the   ‘indigenised’   Christian   organisations   like   the
Kachin Baptist Convention established themselves firmly between the Theravada
Buddhist Myanmar and Communist China, claiming majority conversion across the
Kachin   urban   centres   and   rural   hinterlands   alike,   and   even   embarking   on
evangelical   missions   to   the   tribal   uplands   of   Yunnan.   Today,   the   Christian
organisations command an unprecedented institutional reach through a network of
semi autonomous churches. Their relation to a set of Kachin civil society initiatives‐
that   arose   in   the   post 1994   ceasefire   era   remains   instrumental   and   at   times‐
contradictory.  The  same holds   true   for  clerical   involvement   in   the  wider  public
sphere and local politics across the Kachin society.
Focus on armed conflicts  and political  elites   in  the ethnic borderlands has often
diverted   scholarly   attention   from   the   more   concealed   civilian   institutions   and
processes. Formal schooling constitutes one such field. Widely recognised as one of


























enclave,   the second important enclave of   the Kachin Independence Organisation
(KIO),  we arrived at   the  house  of  Niye s  aunt.ʹ 4  As we parked our  mopeds and
entered the courtyard a peculiar sight caught my eye. Two barefoot boys were busy
arranging brownish stacks on the ground. I could not tell what they were but the




4 Unless noted otherwise, all personal names appearing in this thesis are pseudonyms to protect identities of the
people with whom I worked.
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curling  clumps  of  pulp.  There  were  cardboard  covers  eaten  by  the  purplish
mould,   spines  broken  into   splines,   flyleaves   flapping  in   the  breeze.  There  were
dictionaries,   textbooks,   magazines,   novellas.   An   odd   volume   of   Encyclopaedia
Britannica,   few   catechisms   and   a   thick   leathered   Bible.   Some   pages   were   in







before   I   arrived.   Further   south,   the   political   tensions   between   the   Kachin
Independence   Army   (KIA)   and   Myanmar s   central   command   had   heightened.ʹ
Though people knew little, if anything, beyond rumours, the air was getting thick to






The   library  he  had  painstakingly  assembled   through   the  years  of  previous  war










I   believe   this   impressionistic   fragment   illustrates   the   state   of   education   in
21
contemporary   Myanmar   in   three   ways.   The   first   is   the   state   of   rupture   and
discontinuity.   The   history   of   higher   education   through   the   years   of   Burmese
military   rule   (1962 2011)   could   be   read   as   “closure  and  slaughter”,  not   only  of‐
students but the whole institutional framework as such (Zar Ni 1998, 126). From the
notorious blasting of the student union building on Rangoon University campus on











None of   these  measures  entirely  succeeded  in   their  assimilationist  aims,  despite
decades   of   loss   and   grievances.   The   popular   resistance   that   they   engendered,
assuming   ever   more   complex   institutional   forms,   constitutes   the   second   trait
illustrated   by   the   passage   above.   Powerful   Christian   organisations,   such   as   the
Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC), and armed political groups such as the Kachin
Independence   Organisation   (KIO),   maintained   popular   legitimacy   and   limited
territorial  sovereignty,  despite  persistent  attempts  to stifle   their  base of  support.
Intellectuals  like  Niye’s  uncle,  whose  library  had  met  the  fate  of  so  many  of  the
regime’s opponents, laboured to establish an independent apparatus of schooling
that would serve the aims of political socialisation locally defined.
The   third  metaphor   is   that  of   endemic   failure,  on  either   side  of   the   conflict,   to
establish   sustainable   frameworks   for   institutional   cooperation   or   to   reach
satisfactory political solutions. Despite significant efforts over the past two decades,
the   educational   apparatus   of   the   KIO   remains   underfunded   and   subject   to   the
5 For recollections of this period in the Chin and Karen States that, on the level of assimilationist policies, shared





majority   of   them   remain   both   ideologically   aligned   with   and   institutionally
dependent upon larger organisations within Kachin society and beyond. Yet they
have   also   made   determined   efforts   to   establish   alternate   paths,   past   churches,
government schools and the KIO. These endeavors aim to actualise their visions of
society through the means of formal schooling. Perhaps the most crucial register in
those   visions   is   that   of   ethnicity,   through   which   boundaries   of   the   political
community are constantly being reiterated and imagined.
Conceptualizing ethnicity in the Kachin State
Scholars studying Myanmar have increasingly employed the concept of ethnicity as
an analytical fixture upon which to analyse wider political developments and the
constant resistance  to and by the numerous militaries   in the country (e.g.  South
2008; Callahan 2007; Smith 1991). What Martin Smith (2007) has called Myanmar’s
“ethnic   strife”   has   become   nearly   synonymous   with   politics   in   the   country,
particularly   across   the   former   Frontier   Areas.   Questions   around   ethnicity   are
equally   present   across   academic   discussions,   media   representations,   and   local
popular analyses.  Certainly for the Kachin with whom I worked throughout my
fieldwork, ethnic identification and self preservation constituted the locus ‐ through
which daily  life  acquired much of   its meaning.6  Nowhere was this  truer  than  in
school related work where both distant visions and present grievances drew heavily‐
from   ethno nationalist   identification.   Consequently,   thinking   about   and   through‐
ethnicity   came   to   occupy   a   central   problem   in   my   own   work.   In   order   to
contextualise my use of the concept, and questions that emerge from it, I  shall look
at some of the ways anthropologists have addressed ethnicity in the past.7
6 In referring to ethnic identification, I am following the usage by Véronique Bénéï who notes that the concept lays
a greater emphasis on „processual agency of social actors“ over the more essentialising term identity (2008, 3). This
is in line with my treatment of ethnicity as both self‐ascriptive and open to structural forces (see below). Whenever
using the term identity, I am deliberately referring essentialised local conceptions of certain, traits or qualities.
7 Ethnographic  literature  on ethnic  politics  and minority  relations has  grown tremendously over  the past  two
decades.  The  following  selection  is  representative  though  by  no  means  exhaustive.  For  an  excellent  general
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must essentially be defined from within.  This emphasis has not  lost   its     import
today.   As   I   will   show   in   Chapter   3,   for   example,   ethnicity   among   my   Kachin
informants was perceived as necessarily autonomous from – and often conflicting
with  –   the   classificatory  practices  of   the  Myanmar’s   state  bureaucracy.  Barthian
perspective beckons one to look beyond the given categories, usually ascribed by
formalising and normative apparatuses (e.g. the census, school and media). Yet by
itself,   the   theory   fails   to   account   for   how   such   formalisations   are   internalised,
resisted   and   reinterpreted   by   any   given   group.   By   overtly   emphasising   self‐
ascription and individual behaviour, the Barthian analytical lens remains essentially
subjectivist.
While   identities   such   as   the   Kachin,   Lisu   or   Rawang   have   always   had   a   self‐
ascriptive dimension, and are perceived as such by most of those subscribing to
them, external institutional forces have also influenced their nature and mediated
their   effects   in   social   relations.   Contemporary   notions   of   a   common   Christian
identity  as  an   essential   part   of   being   a  Kachin   are   just  one   example  of   such   a
historical process. Chapters 6 and 7 will show that this contemporary view owes
overview of anthropological studies of ethnicity, see (Eriksen 2002); for ethnicity in Southeast Asia, see (Culas and
Robinne 2009); (Michaud and Ovesen 2000); (Brown 2003); for Myanmar see (South 2008; Callahan 2007; Smith






splitting   within   groups,   on   the   one   hand,   and   the   resulting   re adaptations   to‐
different ecological zones, on the other (Scott 2010, 136). Whether in flight, capture




In   a   similar   vein,   Thomas   Eriksen   has   rightly   criticised   Barthian   theory   for
neglecting historical  processes and  failing  to explain how “initially  homogenous
groups are historically split into two or several distinct ethnic groups” (2002, 79). No
less important, particularly in the context of complex multi ethnic societies, are the‐
opposite  processes  of   integration  and assimilation.  Historically,   these    processes
have   been   closely   related   to   the   rise   of   popular   nationalism   (see,   for   example,
Balcells   2013;   Chilosi   2007).   Apparatuses   of   the   state,   not   least   that   of   formal




Both   political   science   and   conflict   studies   have   traditionally   taken   a   more
primordialist approach to ethnic identities (see Stack 1986; Stack and Hebron 1999).
These   identities  are  seen as  deeply rooted  in   linguistic,   cultural  or  even genetic
makeup of groups and societies. Viewed as essentially static and unchanging, these
mutually  exclusive  natures  are   then  taken as  prime determinants   in   inter group‐


















A different,   somewhat  subtler  approach  has  been  adapted by  scholars  studying
ethnicity   as   a   political   resource,   invoked   in   response   to   particular   political
exigencies (Cohen 1981). Here ethnicity is seen as a latent potentiality, by no means
a static  or  determinant   trait.  Rather,   the  extent   to  which  the   latter  affects   social
relationships   is   determined   by   the   nature   of   these   very   relationships   and   the
prevailing historical  conditions.  Though inherently personal,   this   identity can be
tapped   into   for  political  mobilisation  by  elites.   Initially  developed   to  show that
ethnicity   is   something  deeply  historical   and susceptible   to  external   control,   this








which   a  different   construction   of   the  non Christian  past  was   embedded‐   (Sadan
2013, 402).
Among   contemporary   urbanised   population,   Christian   identity   has   become
practically   interchangeable   with   being   Kachin,   and   Christian   organisations
26
command unprecedented authority in public affairs.  From the perspective of the
present   work,   this   becomes   particularly   relevant   when   looking   at   the   lasting
influence  of   religious  elites   in   the  sphere  of   schooling   in  Chapter  7  and how a
younger generation of school leaders negotiate this in pursuit of their own visions of
ethno national  development   analysed   in   Chapter   2.  In  so   doing,  the ‐   private




There  has  been some recoil   in   recent  years  against   the  primacy  in  Andersonian
analyses   (B.   Anderson   2006)   of   modernity   and   colonial   powers   in   shaping   (or
creating) ethnic politics in Southeast Asia. Frank Proschan (2001), for example, sets
out against what he calls the “appendency theory” of ethnicity. Employing the oral














456).   To   bring   just   one   example,   the   founder   of   the   Konbaung   dynasty,   King
Alaunghpaya   (1714 1760),   was   perhaps   the   greatest   unifying   monarch   of   the‐
Burmese classical period. Though a great universalist, Lieberman argues, the king’s















from earlier conceptions based  in myth  is  the predication that ethnic differences
could be determined through a novel, positivist method (2002, 1164). This is where
Proschan   errs   in   his   denial   of   an   epistemic   shift.   For   with   the   emergence   of
modernising state institutions in Southeast Asia,  it  was precisely the episteme in
Foucauldian   sense   (1980,   197)   that   underwent   significant   alteration.9   Notions
around   personhood,   community   and   territory   gradually   began   assuming   their
modernist   connotations,   appropriating   and   transforming   existing   geographical,
historical   and   religious   imaginaries   (Keyes   2002,   1174;   see   also   Schober   2007;
Winichakul 1994).






9 In fact, this epistemic sphere was one of the central grounds of resistance to early British encroachment. The new
geographical imagination, premised upon a land survey of the Kingdom of Ava completed by the British in 1826,
for  example,  was  essentially  incompatible  with  locally  dominant  cosmologies.  This  can  be  illustrated  by  the




by   the   Soviets   to   territorialise   heterogeneous   populations   were   in   practice   both
value laden and often arbitrary (2005). As I will show in more detail in Chapter 3,‐
Myanmar   has   currently   classified   its   population   into   135   national   races.   This
number and the institutions such as the census that seek to impose it are fiercely
contested on political  grounds.   In   this  contestation,   the  Kachin and other  ethnic
nationality elites employ local readings of history often at odds with the national








identification cannot  be   reduced  to  colonial   legacies  alone  (see  also  Sadan 2013;
Robinne and Sadan 2007). Yet its present modalities were certainly influenced by
those legacies, just as they were shaped by missionary encounters, nationalist ideas
circulating in the university campuses of pre  and post independence Burma, and so‐ ‐
forth.  A significant role was also played by the geopolitical forces   shaping   the
region   through   its   turbulent   recent   history.   In   other   words,   Kachin   ethnic
identification today can neither be reduced to nor separated from the political and
religious   institutions   that  historically  appropriated and accommodated  it.   In   the
contemporary  Kachin State,  ethno nationalist   ideologies  and ethnic   identification‐
continue to act both as drivers  of and resources for change. In the chapters that









It   is  a  matter of  some curiosity  that  social  anthropology would overlook formal
education   for   such   a   long   time,   particularly   since   studies   of   generative   social
principles, life cycles and initiation rites in traditional societies have a long history‐
in   ethnographic   writing.   Historically,   Margaret   Mead’s   (2001   [1928])   work   on
psychosexual development in Samoan adolescents brought a number of important
issues   relating   to   socialisation  and  youth   into   comparative   focus.   In   continental
Europe, Arnold Van Gennep (Gennep 2013 [1909]) established the notion of rites de
passages,   marking   a   person’s   transformation   through   life cycles   and   social   roles‐
within   the   biological   density   of   birth,   maturity   and   death.   Gennep’s   theories,
particularly the concept of liminality, were taken up by Victor Turner to account for
both   the   sacred   and   profane   aspects   of   gradual   socialisation.   Turner   himself










consequences   for   the   theory.   One,   the   regional   focus   remained   largely   on   the
Western industrial societies, concentrating on individual nation states as   ‐   bounded
units. Second, it studied complex, industrialised societies with sizeable populations
and   developed   capitalist   economies.   And   finally,   the   scholarship     privileged
positivist   epistemologies   and   quantitative   methods.   This   left   out   a   number   of
important   issues  anthropologists  normally   brought   to   the   table,   particularly   the
extension   of   the   subject   area   to   colonial   and   post colonial   worlds   of   emergent‐






the   Marxist   tradition,   particularly   through   reconceptualisation   of   the   idea   of
reproduction. In opposition to the classic Deweyan (1998) approach to education
that   saw   schools   as   principal   sites   of   transmission   and   development,   critiques
emerging   in   the   1970s   stressed   that   educational   institutions   not   only   work   to













practical   skills   acquired   in   preparation   for   professional   life,   would   serve   to
reproduce the existing stratification between social classes (ibid.: 134). Having  skills
to   labour   at   the   forge   would   destine   one   to   the   mould,   so   to   speak,   but   also
legitimate and perpetuate such divisions of labour in society by making them look
both   natural   and   necessary.   Another   reason   why   Althusser   saw   in   schools   the
central apparatus of state ideology is that they functioned quietly – an observation









Among  them,  Paul  Willis   (1977),   another  neo Marxist   thinker,   forcefully  argued‐
against   the   Althusserian   primacy   of   impenetrable   ideology.   In   his   study   of   the
schooling of working class “lads” in Hammertown, Willis not only showed, pace‐
Althusser,   that   the   cultural   context   from   which   the   lads   came   disposed   them
towards like paths in life, but that there was more to ideology than reproduction.
Far   from being  uniformly   repressive  or  determined,   the   reproductive  apparatus
contains, in Willis’ verbiage, “deep dysfunctions and desperate   tensions”   (1977,
175). The latter emerge not from structural malfunctions but from social agency. It is




of   ideology   in   service   of   a   repressive   state   remained   too   simplified.   In   the
contemporary   Kachin   areas,   the   highly   nuanced   political   realities   and   their
historical effects on formal schooling confirm a need for more expansive conceptual
language and empirical focus. For example, following Willis' focus, one might ask to







in Socialist  Burma by Zar Ni (1998).  Written under  the supervision of a  leading
Marxist sociologist of education, Michael W. Apple, the work argues that schooling
constituted   the   single   most   important   institution   through   which   the   Burmese
Socialist Programmeme Party (BSPP) sought to legitimate its rule from 1962 through
1988.   Its   essential   project   of   producing   “a   new   social   order”   depended   on   the





(1980).   In  this  conversation,  Williams argued for  a  more  experiential  analysis  of
cultural phenomena, whereas the Hall insisted, echoing Althusser, that individuals
only   live   the   conditions   of   their   existence   through   existing   “classifications   and
frameworks of the culture” (Hall in Zar Ni 1998, 14). While employing Williams’




effect   of   various   counter hegemonic   discourses   opposed   to   the   monopolistic‐
exercise of power by the ruling regime (Zar Ni 1998, 286–287)
In   the   Kachin   context,   my   critique   of   Zar   Ni’s   work   is   that   its   focus   is   rather
narrowly directed at the formal exercise of power through governmental policies.
The   concept   of   ideology   in   Zar   Ni   remains   limited,   glossing   over   individual




reality  on  the  ground”  (Lorch  2008).  This  is  particularly  true  in  regions  like  the
Kachin  State  where,   as   I  argue  in  Chapter  3,   the   legitimacy of   the   central   state
remains highly contested and its infrastructure lags even further behind regional
neighbours than that of lower Myanmar. Thus, the present work seeks to build on
Zar   Ni’s   earlier   insights   but   also   pay   close   attention   to   the   local   effects   and
perceptions of Nay Pyi Daw’s central policies.
In   short,   one   can   hardly   deduce   the   full   logic   of   pedagogic   practice   from   the
officially  prescribed rules,  no matter  how assertive  or  detailed  these may be.   In











that of Leach) could properly accommodate individual  agency (cf.  Reay 2004;  R.
Nash 1990; Harker 1984). For the present purposes, I want to stress the importance
of  conflicts  and deviations  within  institutional  contexts,  not   least   in   the   field  of
education,  as analytical  tools.  As I  am arguing  in Chapter 2,     individual  agency
remains an  important  driver  of  change for   institutional  practices  and discourses
around   schooling   in   the   Kachin   areas,   particularly   in   current   conditions   of
uncertainty and potential institutional realignment. Moreover, the role of agency is
all the more central in the Kachin context where personal patronage tends to be the
norm   across   disparate   organisational   settings,   and   neither   responsibility   nor
authority is shared willingly by individual leaders.
The   ideological   function   of   schooling   stands   in   danger   of   being   overstated   or
simplified. In his  Social  Production of Indifference,  Michael Herzfeld designates the
classroom as the original site where the young are led to extend “familial affect and




often   happens   at   a   much   earlier   stage   in   socialisation   and   can   evolve   quite
independently of institutions of state schooling (Bénéï 2008; Das 2007; Stafford 1992;‐
Malkki   1995).   Or   again,   as   Kathrine   Bowie’s   (1997)   study   of   the   Village   Scout


















across   different   cultural   spectrums   and   continents.   In   many   instances,   religious













fact   that   the   Kachin   Baptist   Convention   (KBC)   has   long   been   the   only   public




11 For a detailed ethnological analysis of nat worship among the Kachin tribes see Leach 1954, 172-182; Hanson






Throughout   their   careers,   both   Foucault   and   Althusser   were   bent   on   finding   a
language to describe heterogeneous institutions of the modern state and how the
latter   appropriated   social   life   and   individual   consciousness.   As   noted   above,
Althusser was   the  first   to   (re)introduce the concept  of  apparatus   to   theorise   the
existence and logic of both symbolic and material structures of the state. He saw the
latter   as   fulfilling   two   respective   functions:   those   of   ideology   and  repression.12
Michel   Foucault,   whose   concerns   lay   more   with   self discipline   and   control,‐
expanded on this concept not so much through explicit definition but by example of












an   interview   dating   from   1977,   and   can   be   summed   up   as   follows.   The
“heterogeneous   set”   that   comprises   an   apparatus   can   include   discourses,
institutions,   architectural   forms,   administrative   and   police   measures,   moral
propositions,   etc.   The   apparatus   itself   is   “the   network”   that   can   be   established
12 The concept of apparatus itself actually originates from the film theory of Jean‐Louis Baudry (2004a [1970];
2004b [1975]),  where the author  uses  it  to  analyse the relationship between ideology and cinema as  a  social
institution. I owe this insight to Olga Bryukhovetska.
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Apparatus   thus  offers  a  multi faceted  tool   for   thinking about   the   institutions  of‐
formal  schooling  in  a  context  of  multiple  competing  sovereignties,  networks  of
religious and secular organisations,  and trans border connections.  Importantly,   it‐
helps   to   transcend   the   overly   state centric   perspective   on   formal   education‐
employed by Marxist critique. What Diane Reay has argued for Bourdieu’s concept
of habitus captures my approach well. “Paradoxically, the conceptual looseness of
habitus  also  constitutes a potential  strength.   It  makes  possible  adaptation rather
than the more constricting straightforward adoption of the concept within empirical
work” (Reay 1995, 357).
What would this  mean  in  educational  contexts? As Bénéï   reminds us,  schooling
always exists in dialogue with different layers of society as a whole (2008). On the
one hand,  schools  are   localised by virtue  of   their  materiality.  But   the    practices
within the spatial constraints thus afforded relate very different social agents and
discourses.   For   example,   language   policies   have   exerted   critical   influence   on
national   schooling   throughout   both   colonial   and   modern   history   of   Myanmar
(Callahan   2003).   As   I   argue   throughout   this   thesis,   it   would   be   impossible   to









13 For the original as well as an alternative refinement see (Agamben 2009, 2–3).
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introducing   novel   policies   prioritizing   student   creativity   over   the   rigorous
rehashing of Confucian classics, something that would have seemed impossible a
short time ago. This introduced not only new texts on the subject but very different
institutional   sets,   ranging   from   professional   training   profiles   to   school
performances.   Complaisant   teachers   soon   found   themselves   pitted   against
considerable resistance, including that by parents who felt the central policies could
endanger  their  children’s  chances of  being competitive   in  their  final  exams,  and
even   by   the   children   themselves.   Woronov   shows   how   the   unintended   but
immediate   effects   of   Beijing’s   “Education   for   Quality”   went   far   beyond   the
controlled settings of classrooms and teachers’ offices, affecting how people thought
of   personal   development,   themselves,   their   children   and   society   in   general.
Discussiing the status hierarchies pervasive in Kachin schooling and their influence
on   institutional   practice   in   Chapter   5,   I   am   starting   from   a   similar   point   of
departure.   The   novel   paradigm   of   learner centred   methods,   introduced   by   a‐
disparate   set   of   actors   including   cross border   NGOs,   educational   reformers   in‐
Myanmar,   and   individual   Kachin   educators,   have   generated   tensions   whose
significance   extends   well beyond   their   didactic   utility   in   classroom   interaction.‐










educational   landscape.   Beyond   the   formal   structures,   one   must   also   seek   an
understanding   of   the   lived   experience   of   the   people   working   and   studying   in
schools.   Over   the   past   two   decades,   anthropology   of   education   has   become
increasingly concerned not only with state projects of socialisation but also the roles
and experiences of the social actors involved. Véronique Bénéï’s  Schooling Passions






(1996).   Distancing   themselves   from   structural   “interpellation”,   these   authors
concentrate instead on “how historical persons are formed in practice, within and
against larger societal forces” inherent in institutions such as schools (1996, 14). The
emphasis  given in my own work to both individual  agency and everyday  lived
realities in the Kachin borderworlds should be read as responding to this emergent
corpus of ethnographies of education.














engagement   with   Christianity   has   been   rife   with   tensions   both   conscious   and
hidden   (Cannell   2006,   Hann,   2007).   Over   the   last   two   decades,   this   uneasy
relationship has seen important re­evaluation. A key factor has undoubtedly been




It   has   been   noted   that   early   anthropologists   labouring   in   the   colonial   settings





of   missionary   contact   in   consistently   negative   light   (e.g.   1947,   624).   When
ethnographers did engage with Christian groups and practices,   the latter  largely
served as secondary objects of analysis. Conversion and worship were taken to be a
symptomatic   of   underlying   social   and   economic   causes,   often   stemming   from
colonial encounters  and uncertainties of modernity (e.g.  Comaroff and Comaroff
1997). Conversely, ethnographies of Europe and the Americas perceived Christian
groups   as   “inappropriately   religious”   cultural   Others   of   secularized   societies





























Coleman 2006,  179­180).   In   this   framework,  modernity   is  propelled as  much by
Judeo­Christian semantics of transcendence as it is by the Protestant ethics (Weber
2001).   One   Christian   ritual   that   resonates   with   ideologies   of   modernity   is
conversion.  As  an  act  of   symbolic   rebirth,   it  not  only   suggests  a  new religious

















in   one   context,   there   are   plenty   of   examples   –   including   the   Kachin   –   where
communal identities are strengthened. Leach himself predicted that the American
creed   of   the   Baptist   mission   would   privilege   the   individual   while   eroding   the
communal   (1947,   629­630).   That   commitment   to   community   appears   today   the
principal   form of  Kachin Baptist  worship  illustrates   the need to appreciate  local





















remains   heterogeneous   both   in   its   denominational   structures   and   theological
debates.   Even   outwardly   monolithic   organizations   such   as   the   Kachin   Baptist
Convention   betray   lively   debate   around   interpretation   of   scriptures   and   local




Throughout   the   urbanised   areas   where   I   conducted   my   fieldwork,   religious
belonging is today a crucial existential marker.
This brings me to consider the ways in which Christianity in Kachinland  can  be
made   sense   of   in   certain   registers   of   modernity.14  Many   effects   of   evangelical
missions, such as emphasis on textuality over oral tradition, privileging of formal
education,   and   active   construction   of   trans­local   collective   identities   mirror










14 Here  as  elsewhere,  I  am  using  the  word  Kachinland  to  refer  to  an  area  roughly  overlapping  with  the
administrative boundaries of Myanmar’s Kachin State and the northern parts of Shan State. Insofar as the people I
worked with were increasingly employing the term Kachinland to emphasise their political stance, I have chosen to
include it in my own narrative. It denotes areas controlled by KIO, smaller armed groups, as well as the Burmese
central government irrespecitive of their current sovereign status. While lacking a legal correlate in international
discourse,  Kachinland  is  nonetheless  a  highly  invested  term  for  the  local  Kachin  communities  seeking  an
alternative to the official designation of Kachin State.  In large part, it is precisely because the latter is employed
officially by the Myanmar government that Kachinland has gained prominence it has in popular usage. It also
correlates more closely with  Jinghpaw Wunpawng Mungdan, literally Jinghpaw community land, that  is at the
centre of ethno‐nationalist ideology.
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claim   to   constitute   legitimate   social   identities   and   arenas   (2003,   200).   Likewise,





Sadan’s  Being  and  Becoming  Kachin  (2013).  Over  the  course of  writing  this  thesis,  I
found myself drawn into ever closer dialogue with this Sadan's work. Even if not‐
always explicitly stated, its breadth of historical knowledge and analytic became an
















While   the   book   follows   multiple   paths   of   inquiry,   its   main   argument   is   that
contemporary ethno­nationalist identities, and political institutions central to them,
were not colonial era constructs imposed from the outside. Rather, they have been
and   continue   to   be   generated   locally   in   response   to   their   changing   historical
conditions.
Sadan's   other   aim   is   disentangling   the   politics   of   Kachin   identities   from   their
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contemporary Christian manifestations. She argues that the ideology of pan­Kachin





subsequent   armed   conflicts.   Rather,   Sadan   suggests,   these   earliest   attempts   at
creating trans­local   identities  arose out of  colonial  and geopolitical  pressure  that






their   own   sake.   I   agree   that   Kachin   ethno­nationalism   cannot   be   reduced   to










–   in   contemporary   Kachinland,   cannot   be   reduced   to   historical   factors   that





















institutionalised  forms.  A  classic   formulation   set   out  by  Philip   H.   Coombe  and
Manzoor Ahmed (1974)   treats  informal  education as  a   lifelong process  by which
people acquire “knowledge, skills,  attitudes and insights from daily experience and
exposure   to   the  environment”.  This   is  differentiated  from  formal   education  as  an
“institutionalised, chronologically graded and hierarchically structured ‘education
system,’ spanning lower primary school and the upper reaches of the university”.
Nonformal  education   occupies   the   manifold   spaces   between   them,   being
programmatic and organised but conducted outside the formal, traditionally state‐
sanctioned systems to  target specific subgroups of  the population (ibid.,  8).  This
threefold   distinction   originally   aided   development     interventions     in     contexts
where,  for  example,  state schooling ‐ was failing to meet its targets or discriminated
against  certain  groups or  classes   in   the  society.   In  describing  existing education
apparatuses,  however,  these analytical  distinctions might be better thought of as
“predominant  modes  of   learning”  or  “emphasis”   rather   than “discrete  entities”,
existing   simultaneously   in   concert   and   conflict   (La   Belle   1982,   162).   Moreover,
anthropologists of education have noted the normative and value laden qualities of‐




education  to   refer   to   all   forms   of   institutionalised,   classroom based   schooling,‐
regardless   of   whether   they   were   run   by   state   actors   or   non governmental‐
organisations. Wherever I have wanted to distinguish one from the other, I refer to
state or non state schooling. I find this  justified on the grounds that many of the‐ ‐
social actors described in this thesis invested significant efforts into building lasting










educators,   I   am   generally   referring   to   people   engaged   in   a   multifaceted   set   of
pedagogic  activities   and   institutional  affiliations   in   the  Kachin  areas.  These   can
include teaching for government schools and colleges, private initiatives, church‐





Second,   conceptual   tools   for   describing   state  borders  have   been   subject   to
considerable debate in anthropological literature (see volume edited by Donnan and
Wilson 2012).   In distinguishing between boundaries,  borders,  and borderlands,   I
shall follow the usage employed by Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson (1999).
While a boundary denotes an imaginary line demarcating state territory,  borders are
used in a wider sense.  In addition to boundaries,   they comprise of bureaucratic,
military  and  political   institutions,   as  well   as  various   socio cultural  assemblages.‐
47
Borderlands  are   areas   loosely   defined   by   their   proximity   to   state   boundaries.
Recently,  Anastasia  Piliavsky  (2013)  has  drawn attention  to   the   fact   that  certain
authors   tend   to   overstate   the   uniqueness   of   “borderlands”   and   that   identical
processes  are  often  at  work  around  internal  borders  of  administrative  divisions
inside   countries.   In   some  respects,  Piliavsky s   critique  holds   true   in   the   case  ofʹ





the   most   obvious   example,   would   be   unthinkable   without   geopolitical





























Chapter   1   on   methods   and   rapport   further   explicates   my   theoretical   aims   and
practical constraints that led to the said design. I describe the progression of my














educators   described   here   are   trying   to   address   both,   while   advocating   new
paradigms   of   organisational   practices   and   values.   This   involves   complex
negotiation of national and religious allegiances, while working towards particular
visions  of  development  for  the  Kachin  society  defined  in  ethno nationalist‐   terms.
One of  the principal  aims of  this  thesis  is  showing that,  rather than being mere









function   of   a   single   unified   state.   Territorially   fragmented   and   institutionally
crippled, the Kachin State remains subject to central policies aimed at marginalising
ethnic nationalities both politically and economically. Through a permanent state of
exception,   justified   on   the   grounds   of   on going   armed   conflict,   the   governing‐
political elites have long benefitted from lucrative shadow economies while failing
to   meet   most   popular   grievances.   To   illustrate   this   state   of   affairs,   I   describe




prevailing   in   the   Kachin   borderworlds   today,   and   how   these   conditions   have
shaped developmental aims of people and organisations described in this thesis.
Importantly,   the   data   also   suggests   how   the   central   policies   perpetuate   local
perceptions   of   threat   to   ethno nationalist   survival   in   political,   economic   and‐
demographic terms.
Chapter   4   continues   the   line   of   inquiry   into   territoriality   and   sovereignties   by
looking at the historical development of an alternative apparatus of schooling in the
enclaves of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). The existence of the KIO
education   apparatus,   however   rudimentary,   from   the   early   1960s,   shows   that
devolution   of   state   power,   the   defining   feature   of   ethnic   politics   in   modern
Myanmar according to Mary Callahan (2007)), is not a recent phenomenon. Rather,
it existed in relatively complex forms from the beginning of the Socialist period. In
light of   the   theoretical  considerations presented  in   this   introduction,   the chapter
illustrates how ethnic identities have been central to local statecraft, and how the
political   elites   have   sought   to   control   the   content   and   expression   of   ethnicity
through   institutional   mechanisms.   The   partial   stagnation   of   KIO’s   independent
50





thesis   about   the   rationale   of   private   educators   who   have   chosen   to   work
independently of the KIO, despite being sympathetic to its political programme.
Chapter 5 will examine the organisational practices and status hierarchies in Kachin















abroad   and   wider  access   to   information,   is  working   towards   this.  However,   as
ethnographic material in the chapter demonstrates, private schools are still largely
implicated in the same order of things as the larger educational apparatus.
Chapter   6   turns   to   consider   the   religious   component   of   contemporary   Kachin






with   ethno national   identification   and   political   ideologies.   As   such,   notions   of‐




in   the   everyday   life   of   my   Kachin   colleagues   and   their   schools.   The   chapter
concludes   by   arguing   that,   for   the   contemporary   urban   intelligentsia,   Christian
organisations   present   a   crucial   resource   in   terms   of   networks,   legitimacy,   and




Christian visions  of  national  development   constitute  potent,   as  well   as  popular,
discourses  on modernity.  Historical  evidence  examined  here  suggests  that  the
Baptist  missionary enterprises were,  since their inception, deeply concerned with
social   development   of   the   communities   they   sought   to   convert.   They   also
propagated particular notions of Christian nationhood, legacies of which are still
present in the contemporary imaginaries. Equally salient were ideas of progress and
modernity,   of   which   the   Christian   organisations   were   portrayed   to   be   moral
guardians.   Inevitably,   these   ideas   also   carried   latent   contradictions,   as   tensions
emerged around protecting traditional social hierarchies and moral horizons. This
was particularly important because the latter have long supported the social status
of  clerical   institutions.  As with  the secular political  authority  of  KIO leadership,




dependent upon dominant Christian organisations,   just  as their moral  selves are
largely lived through Christian worldviews.
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borders  and ethno nationalism in Central  Asia’s  Ferghana  Valley.  While   I  knew‐
comparatively   little   of   Myanmar   aside   from   Edmund   Leach’s   classic   work   in
political   anthropology,   it   felt   like   a   challenging   opportunity   and   a   logical
continuation   of   my   prior   research   in   new   settings.   Like   many   young
anthropologists,   I   felt   drawn   to   the   anomalous,   contested,   and   repressed.   The
fragmented borderlands between Myanmar and China,  with their  long legacy of
civil wars and state perpetrated violence, were equally daunting and magnetic. In‐
youthful   enthusiasm   bordering   on   naiveté,   I   saw   a   place   where   committed
ethnographic research could make a difference to political calamities and human
suffering.15








15 Joel Robbins has recently argued that the “suffering subject” has, since the 1980s, constituted a surrogate for the
traditional  cultural  ‘other’ in  anthropological  discourse  (2013).  While  not  discrediting  the  socially  conscious
research, his assertion does suggest adherence to academic trends warranting further critical appraisal. In hindsight,
my own  case  might  well  have  been  an  example  of  overtly  optimistic  encounter  with  a  highly  complex  and
challenging research environment. That said, I believe that devoting myself to researching the Kachin State was





first   visit   left   an   indelible   impression   on   me.   What   I   witnessed   amid   the
uncertainties   of   borderworld   existence   was   unwavering   commitment   to   one’s
community,   devotion   to   one’s   religion,   and   sheer   human   resilience.   Here   were











in  that  moment.  We spoke of   the  possibility  of   studying a  people   in  a    distant
country and culture, of translatability of foreign meaning and lifeworlds. Much of




Tackling political communities and formal schooling
I returned less than a year later as a doctoral student with a keen interest in the
political   institutions   of   contemporary   Kachin   society.   In   particular,   I   wanted   to
understand   the   mechanisms   that   reproduced   ethno nationalist   sentiments   and‐
allegiances vis à vis dominant ideologies of the Burmese state. At this early stage,‐ ‐
my aim was  to supplement  existing studies  that  had predominantly   focused on
military elites and the armed struggle for political autonomy (South 2008; Callahan
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2005;  Lintner 1997;  Smith 1991).  What   I  sought  was  an understanding of  ethno‐
national   politics   and   development   from   a   different   perspective.   Following   the










to   know   during   my   fieldwork   had   lost   someone   in   the   conflict,     to     arbitrary
repressions, or incarceration. Everyday conversations around tea would inevitably
veer   towards   the   frontlines,   armaments,   and   casualties.   Among   elites   and
commoners alike,  the perceived failure  of  political  dialogue and democratisation
















My initial  plan had been  to   focus  on  formal  education provided by  the  Kachin
Independence Organisation  in  the   territories   they controlled.  Pace  Bourdieu and
Passeron (1977), I wanted to focus on the dynamics of reproduction and reform in
the context of Teachers Training College in Mai Ja Yang. Part  of the reason was




Sieburth   1998,   xiv;   see   also   Batallán   1998).   In   a   similar   fashion,   independent






first  meeting  in Mai  Ja Yang in 2010,  “We don’t  want newspaper coverage.  The
world needs to learn the real truth about the Kachin situation. What we need is
book   research”.   I   was   thus   reasonably   encouraged   to   build   my   research   plans
around the Teachers Training College that was situated in a crucial KIO enclave









to Mai  Ja Yang.  Throughout the week,  news of  government offensives had kept
mounting. The gravity of the situation was illustrated in an e mail from Nnye La‐
Raw, the acting vice principal of TTC. Accompanying his invitation were photos of‐
























the Kachin society vis à vis Myanmar as a whole, that were equally relevant, if not‐ ‐
more so, than what I had originally planned to ask.





16 Developments since suggest the latter to be closer to truth. At the time of writing, no  lasting cease‐fire has been
signed between the KIO and the tatmadaw and armed clashes are still frequent.
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tend to be as centralised as their Myanmar counterparts in the rest of the country.
Individual   teachers   have   little   say   in   changing   established   routines   or   making
amends.   In   contrast,   private   institutions   are   free   to   experiment   with   their   own
curricula and teaching methods. At the time of my fieldwork, no private school in




mainly  offers  English   classes   to   children   from well to do   families   (see  also  Lall‐ ‐
2008). While interesting in their own right, their syllabi follow a fairly utilitarian






only  of   their  particular  cases  but  of  wider   tensions   in   the  politics  of  education,
ethnicity   and   religion   in   contemporary   Northern  Myanmar.  Had   I   stuck   to   my
original research plan, I might well have overlooked the relevance of this small but
significant sector.




only   villages   but   towns   were   lacking   schools   for   want   of   teachers,   where
employment   and   status   would   have   been   guaranteed   to   specialists   with   their
credentials, were those educators opting out? One simple answer was undoubtedly
money.   KIO   schooling   pays   little,   even   by   the   deflated   standards   of   Northern
Myanmar. However, had salary been the sole rationale, many established private
17 It should be noted that, while sharing certain traits such as age group and educational background abroad, this
group is equally characterised by a  diversity of opinions and ethnic belonging to different Kachin subgroups.
Though largely sympathetic to the political aspirations of the KIO and identifying with communities of Christian




























diversity   of   opinions.   What   makes   such   programmes   compelling   subjects   for
ethnographic  study  is   the  subtle  but  persistent  critique they  level  against   larger
political movements through their practice. They exist as loci of ideas, catalysts of





below   seek   to   explicate.   In   so   doing,   I   concentrate   on   the   meanings   educators
attribute to events and personal histories, and the way their practices reflect their
beliefs and aspirations through the dominant paradigms.









narratives  and events  around private  schools  and  larger  educational  paradigms,
propagated   by   competing   institutions   and   social   fields,   is   the   preferred
methodological   approach   employed   in   this   work.   Considering   the   geopolitical,
ethnic and religious contexts of the region, as well as the heterogeneous nature of
the   formal   institutions   that  participate   in  pedagogic  practice,   switching between
different localities was arguably not only viable but a more lucrative a path to take.
This led me to consider the benefits and pitfalls of multi sited ethnography that,‐








18 As for more recent attempts to extend the concept beyond spatial referents, I do not find the need in my present






interested,   these   migrations   were   often   temporary   in   nature   but   relied   on
established   networks   of   support   (e.g.   religious   organisations,   ethnic   communes,







project   of   the   KIO   could   be   seen   as   a   disjointed   endeavour   in   that   individual
enclaves   remain unconnected  through any  juridical  or  de   facto  borders.  Despite
territorial fragmentation, there exists a lively traffic between them, even in times of
heightened political tensions and war. This traffic proceeds along shifting bounds
and  trajectories,  determined by  geopolitics  of   the  day  (Sadan 2013;  Dean 2007a;






predominantly   staffed   by   volunteers   who   travel   among   different   parts   of   the
country according to need. It was not uncommon for some of the younger teachers
to have taught in schools as far apart as Manhkring and Hpakant within the course
19 I am speaking here of my informants who travelled abroad mainly in search of higher education or training.
There exists a long‐standing and unremitting migration out of the Kachin State that is driven by poverty, search of
employment, political persecution, and often coercion (Egreteau 2012; Grundy‐Warr 2004). A growing body of
literature suggests that women are disproportionately affected by this (Ying 2013; Wright 2008). While a few of the
people I worked with had, at one point in their lives, followed similar reasons, they were almost invariably bent on
returning to the Kachin regions or had done so already.
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of a single academic year.20 A central role in this practice is played by extensive faith
based organisations   such  as   the  Kachin  Baptist  Convention   (KBC)  who  provide
limited monetary support, facilities and legitimacy. Likewise, transnational NGOs
such as the Pan Kachin Development Society (PKDS) (largely defunct now but very
influential   in   the  early  1990s),   its  outgrowth BRIDGE,  and the  Kachin Women’s
Association   Thailand   (KWAT),   have   long   supported   supra local   identities   and‐
practice. An increasing number of young Kachin acquire parts of their professional




In short,   losing access   to a  stable  field site   in Mai   Ja Yang and having to move‐
between several  different  locales  made me realise   that   there were  insights   to be
gained from those travels. As I argue in the chapters below, geographical movement
has had significant impact on the personal lifeworlds and political sentiments of the
groups   with   whom   I   worked.   It   has   often   helped   them   build   up   institutional






underlying   logic   is   irrefutable   in   its   simplicity.   You   familiarise   yourself   with   a
particular place and people and allow the latter to familiarise themselves with you.
Social relationships grow slowly. Neither professional rapport nor friendships in the
field   (most   anthropologists   I   know   rely   invariably   on   both)   can   be   cultivated
overnight; neither can cultural competence so integral to good observational skills
and “thick” descriptions   (Geertz  1973).   It   is  understood  that  by moving around
between different locales, I had to make sacrifices on both accounts. However, two
20 The meagre bird’s‐eye distance of around 200 km belies the difficulties of this transition, both in terms of rough
terrain and dangers on the road.  Mainly known for its jade reserves,  much of the fighting in recent years has










normally   established   through   a   prolonged   period   of   cohabitation   could   also   be
fostered by long roads travelled, and distant places dwelt in. Having visited Kachin
territories   in   Laiza   and   Mai   Ja   Yang   not   only   gave   me   insights   into   local
geographical   imagination   but   also   helped   establish   rapport   with   Kachin
communities in Myitkyina or abroad (e.g. living with Kachin expatriates students in
Chiang Mai had us sharing many of the same challenges one faces in new contexts,





of   my   fieldwork   in   Chiang   Mai,   Thailand.   I   kept   a   room   in   one   of   the   cheap
tenement houses  in  the  Wat  Kate  neighbourhood  that  Kachin  migrants  formerly
rented  and  where my Jinghpaw teacher was  living most  of   the year.   I  consider
myself  incredibly lucky for having the time and patience afforded me during those
lengthy meetings with my teacher. My days would usually start with lessons in his






others,  but we would sometimes visit   local  Kachin households after  our classes.
Apart  from my teacher,  I  became reliant  on a small  network of  Kachin contacts
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related to educational or religious organisations in the Kachin State, including the
NHTOI  private   school   in   Myitkyina   that   constitutes   one   of   my   primary   case
studies.21  Six   students   with   whom   I   had   formerly   worked   in   Myitkyina   were




formal   interviews and social  dinners.  On weekends,  my  teacher and I  generally
attended Wunpawng Christian Church on the outskirts of the city and participated
in social  activities  organised by  its  youth organisation,  which sported dozens of
members.   The   months   spent   in   this   expatriate   context   allowed   me   to   follow
transnational support networks employed by Kachin elites and commoners alike. It
was   my   close   acquaintance   with   several   students   who   would   later   return   to
Myanmar that gave me insights into the formative influence of foreign studies and
the effects these would have back home.
In  Myanmar,  Myitkyina,   the   capital  of   the  Kachin  State,   served as  my primary



















the   educators   saw   as   a   gap   in   state led   schooling.   I   did   not   participate   in   the‐
everyday life of the school to the same extent as with NHTOI. However, I was asked
to  conduct  a  weekly   seminar  on   teaching methodology  that  was  attended by  a
group of eight young teachers employed at English 4 Life. It was in semi formal‐





















a combined population of  around 15,000  inhabitants,  most  of   them women and
children.   This   put   considerable   strain   on   local   schools   and   welfare   institutions




would   be   filled   with   regular   students,   clad   in   green   and   white   uniforms   and
generally  engaged with their   lessons.  Along the back walls  were  lined a motley
crew of refugee children of various ages, lacking both the study materials and the
preparation of  their peers.  Private schools   like Nawng E Hku kept  their regular
classes intact but provided space for evening classes where local volunteers were












the   Central   Education   Office   of   the   KIO,   it   has   since   acquired   considerable
reputation   even   among   local   political   leaders.   Its   history   and   present   situation
illustrate the complexities found in even small and internally concordant political
spaces such as Laiza.














However,   I  also  heeded Herve Varenne’s   (2007)  suggestion  that  ethnography of
education should be open to  leaving the space of  the classroom and the school.










discussions.   In   any   case,   such   evenings   brought   together   Kachin     educators,




Certau  1984),  Christian   ritual   and  narratives  played  a   central   role   for   the   wide
majority  of  my   informants.  Over   time,   I  became   increasingly  aware  of   tensions
between   discursive   formations   of   secular   knowledge   and   traditional   clerical
authority.   Against   the   background   of   my   two   primary   interests   of   political
community and formal education, problems related to organised religion became











everyday rituals   that  were  held  in   individual  households and that  were usually
presided over by local reverends. In the chapters that follow, I do not aim to provide
a  comprehensive  account  of  Kachin  Christianities.  Each  would  merit   a   separate
study  in  itself,  which  is  beyond  the  scope  and  aims  of  the  present  work.23   When




From   the   early   stages   of   research   design,   my   approach   was   to   concentrate   on
teachers and adult students exclusively. Foremost, this choice was based on ethical
considerations for the safety of my informants. As a doctoral student with no prior
experience  in research with minors,  starting such work  in  the politically volatile
context   of   Northern   Myanmar   would   have   been   an   unfeasible   and   possibly
irresponsible   endeavour.   There   were   not   any   mechanisms   at   my   disposal   for
ensuring the physical safety and mental wellbeing of children in the context of war






instances,   I   wanted   to   understand   the   perspective   of   educators   and   how   they
compared to those of other local elites.
This is not to say that I was barred from students’ perspectives altogether. Apart
23 Herman Tegenfeldt’s (1974) history of the Kachin Baptist church is a shining example of such scholarship from
a theological perspective, as is the more recent book by Mandy Sadan that touches upon religious themes (2013).












that   I   wanted   to   understand   institutional   agency   in   relation   to   local   politics   of
identity.
The above is also tied to the question of how I presented myself as a scholar and
practitioner   of   education   to   the   people   with   whom   I   worked.   In   a   study   of
nationalism and schooling in Maharashtra State, India, Bénéï (2008) chose to keep





reach to a  foreigner whose presence  lacks a clearly  defined purpose.   It  must be
noted that this led to people often asking advice on running matters that might well
have   changed   the   way   they   performed.   However,   this   would   have   happened
regardless of how I presented my aims. Being partially involved in the discussions























this   researcher’s   self presentation   to   the   representation   of   others   that   rightfully‐
remains a highly debated issue in contemporary anthropological discourse.
Representing the unrepresented
A   fundamental   problem   confronting   any   researcher   who   works   with   societies
involved in struggles to preserve their identity and cultural practices vis à vis larger‐ ‐
nationalities is that of representation (Mookherjee 2008; Armbruster 2008; Pettigrew,
Shneiderman,  and Harper 2004).  This   is  particularly   true  in a globalizing world
where aid,   investment and political   leverage often transcend immediate regional





rights   and   other   benefits.   Others   have   won   concessions   for   regional   autonomy
through armed resistance. Nagaland (Chakraborty 2012) is a telling example in this
context,  not least because it  is  often referred to as a success story by the Kachin
elites.   International  agencies   can  also  play  a  weighty   role   in   conflict   resolution,
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2010,   109;   Jonsson   2005).   Issues   of   collective   representation   can   be   highly
consequential to all stakeholders.
In the context of political conflicts in Thailand, Alan Klima (2002) has shown how
elites  and general  population alike  have been  influenced by  international  media
imagery of the nation. According to Klima, this imagery draws its power both from
political sanctions and collective self esteem. It stands to argue that this becomes‐
even   more   salient   with   smaller   nations   like   the   Kachin   who   are   caught   in   a
territorial trap between assertive neighbours (Grundy Warr and Dean 2011; Dean‐
2011;   2007a;   2002).   Public   images   broadcast   abroad   through   media,   academic
publications and official reports can have considerable influence on the amount of
resources pooled into any particular region by national and international  donors
who,   as   Lorch   notes,   tend   to   hold   culturally   determined   conceptions   of
development (Lorch 2008; French 2006; Jackson 2007). As I learned through my own
interviews, the leaders of organisations like the KIO are acutely aware of this and
exercise   notable   caution   with   regards   to   their   public   image,   even   in   markedly
informal   circumstances.   Their   concerns   go   beyond   donor   funding,   involving
geopolitical legitimacy and authority sought to maximise diplomatic support and
justify continued use of violence to achieve political objectives.
In this  sense,   it   is   important to note  that  what is  presented in  this   thesis   is  one
interpretation of events,  groups and individuals  that make up its subject matter.
Moreover, I am often conveying local views and meanings at odds with one another
and with dominant   ideologies.  To   follow Mandy Sadan’s   favoured metaphor  of
ideologies as “maps of understanding for our social and political worlds” (2013, 21),




















outside   pressure,   the   Burmese   state   appears   to   have   increased   its   education
expenditure in recent years.  The bulk of  this  has gone into school  infrastructure






institutional   networks,   the   issues   of   representation   are   even   more   precarious.   I
recognise  that   in all  cases,   the results  of  my study can have  limited  impacts  on
institutional   authority   and   reputation.   However,   like   many   of   my   Kachin







Any   researcher   involved   in   studying   contemporary   Kachin   affairs   must   also
inevitably  confront  one’s  own political  allegiances.  The problem has   to  do  with
ethics  as  well  as  objectivity,  and  is   far   from new for  social   sciences,   least  of  all
anthropology. When I first visited the Kachin Hills in 2010, the society was already
disjointed along ethno nationalist and religious fissures. After the start of the war,‐











level,   I  had  no  doubts  as   to  whose   cause   I   supported.  At  no  point  during  my






and internal   tensions of  politics   in  contemporary Northern Myanmar.  The overt
distrust of Nay Pyi Daw forms just the most obvious of questions with which one  is
confronted   daily.   For   example,   the   Lawngwaw,   one   of   the   smaller   Kachin
subgroups, often feel that linguistic discrimination by the Bamar majority against
the Jinghpaw was mirrored in the way Kachin elites treat the Lawngwaw (Maru)
language.   Church   leaders   would   often   inquire   whether   I   was   a   liberal   or















facilitated   by   the   vice   principal,   who   acted   as   a   translator   and   discussant.   On












response   from   me,   something   that   the   student   later   admitted   in   private.   My
response was that the international community knew very little about the Kachin. I
explained that various ethnic insurgencies are viewed differently and that, unlike
some   of   the   others,   the   Kachin   Independence   Organisation   does   not   carry   a
reputation of a drug cartel. I also pointed out that the KIO is considered a political
organisation and is not equated with the Kachin as an ethnic nationality category. It
was   just   one   of   the   ways   in   which   I   found   my   presence   having   been   used   to
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(re)produce particular communal identifications. 








discoveries   for   everyone   involved   and   made   for   better   rapport   throughout   my
fieldwork and beyond.
Anonymity of informants and organisations
Despite  the increasingly  tense political  climate from 2011 onward,  I  managed to
continue   working   in   Myitkyina   relatively   unhindered.   I   took   all   possible
precautions to minimise suspicion by government agents  and, to the best of my









me to  archive field notes   in safe   locations   in Thailand.   In   the  case of  areas   like
Myitkyina, where all foreigners are formally registered (and potentially monitored)
by the authorities, this practice made my presence less conspicuous and lessened the
















CHAPTER II  Private Schooling in Laiza and 
Myitkyina: Negotiating Domains for Educational Work
We turned into a quiet side street in Myitkyina's Shatapru quarter. The afternoon rain had




































say,  the church,  they really  have autonomy.  So before,   the  central  organisation
didn't have much influence on them. Only recently the armed conflict has created









To some organisations  they have given  funding.  And they will  already have a
market because they announce them in their churches and the students will come.
They don't have to worry about facilities, renting again and again every year. They
will  simply have church properties.  Maybe they will   even receive  some human
resources. Sometimes the bishop can say: 'You, you will have to teach for them'.

















the   country   as  an   essentially   uncontested  whole   (e.g.   James  2009),   I   argue   that
education   amongst   the   ethnic   nationalities   in   Myanmar   remains   a   highly
fragmented and politicised  issue.  Looking at   the  rationale  of  developing private







elites.   It   is   within   this   context   that   educators   strive   to   negotiate   for   further
institutional autonomy and space for professional  activities.  One of the principal
aims   of   this   chapter   is   showing   that,   rather   than   being   mere   symptoms   of
unresolvable conflict and grievances, these frictions can also be productive,  leading
to     new     institutional     formations     and    debates     within      Kachin  society   and
Myanmar as a whole. Coming back to the theoretical considerations presented in the
Introduction,   this   chapter   draws   together   several   strands   of   history   and
ethnography that will be running through this thesis. I argue that the apparatus of





The   chapters   below   will   argue   that   Kachin   elites   have   long   been   aware   of   the
importance of formal schooling for their political projects. The same holds true for
local   Christian   organisations   whose   role   in   education   has   been   central   both
historically and in recent times. By the time mission schools were nationalised by
the Burmese state in the 1960s, a formidable base of Kachin intellectuals with strong
nationalist   leanings   had   emerged.24  However,   the   ensuing   civil   war   broadly
separated   this   group   into   two   categories   who   were   henceforth   only   partially
involved in the field  of formal education. There were those like the schoolmaster‐




Christian   organisations.   Importantly,   the   late   1970s   witnessed   a   gradual




limited exchange with  its  counterpart   in  Myanmar.   In  practical   terms,  however,
recognition   from   Yangon   equally   subjected   it   to   Burmese   control   through   the
adoption of  a centralised curriculum.  Concurrently,  several  private  educational













and  infrastructure   that  had been set  up across   the  KIO enclaves  and  the  world
outside Myanmar. Working under provisions made by the Burmese Private Tuition
Law   of   1964   that   enabled   teaching   of   limited   subjects   (but,   crucially,   not   full
curriculum),   others   were   able   to   extend   into   government controlled   areas   like‐
Myitkyina.  Supported by a gradual change inside Myanmar and an increasingly
favourable geopolitical  context   in  the early  years of  the new millennium, a new
generation of privately run educational projects gradually established themselves‐




constitute   more   than   profitable   business   ventures   or   community   development





generation  of  Kachin   educators   trained   abroad   choose   to  pool   their   efforts   and
resources  into  private  initiatives.   I   shall   begin  by  briefly  touching  upon  the




















privately run mission school in Laiza has recently opted to shift its long term goals‐ ‐







pushed  to   its   extreme,   can  eventually  give   rise   to   independent   formations.  The
agency behind these remains a productive force, able to challenge and transform the
larger apparatus of schooling of which it is a part.
Private schooling in Asia and Myanmar







25 It should be noted that these processes are in no way limited to Asian contexts. As Stephen Ball, among others,
has shown, increasing privatisation of mass education is a much wider trend in the contemporary world (2007).
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segments of the society or the emerging high middle classes. These institutions are‐
generally  able   to  afford highly  qualified  teaching staff,  better   infrastructure  and
teaching   materials.   This,   is   turn,   tends   to   lead   to   more   varied   and   progressive
teaching methodologies. Consequently, many schools in this segment outperform











While   I   recognise   the  value  of  an  economic  perspective  on   these  processes,   the
present  work seeks   to  expand on this  by examining  the  political  significance  of
emergent   private   schools   in   the   Kachin   State.   As   already   suggested,   formal
schooling is generally seen as the foremost institution for political socialisation. As
Bénéï succinctly notes, “the kind of nation desired by the state determines the kind






schooling.   This   is   why   it   is   crucial   to   fully   appreciate   the   complexities   of   the
educational  apparatuses of  contemporary Myanmar,  as  well  as  fields external   to
them that impart their own particular influence. Free from centralised control and
largely operating outside state gaze, private initiatives studied here are thus no less












worked with.  His  example allows me to sketch out  several  problematics  woven
through   this   thesis.   These   include   the   marginalisation   affecting  Kachin
communities  in  the  politically  fragmented  spaces  of  Kachin  State (Chapter 3); the
significant  (if  sometimes  contested)   role  of  Christian organisations     in   the social












the  mentality  of  many Kachin educators.  Like   them,  he  had  long been working
towards   independence   from   established   institutions   while   supporting   the
preservation   of   Kachin   language   and   culture.   His   formative   years,   too,   were
somewhat   typical   of   other   Kachin   intellectuals   of   his   generation.   His   family’s
poverty had derailed Samuel’s plans for securing a college education early on. Not
as   fluent   in   Burmese   as   native   speakers,   he   often   recalled   falling   behind   other
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students, a situation he saw as the principal educational inequality in the Kachin



















Not   only   were   entrance   requirements   more   relaxed,   but   he   could   count   on
employment   and   considerable   prestige   after   graduation.   Eventually,   Samuel
enrolled at the best seminary in the region, the Mandalay Institute of Theology or
MIT.   Things   changed.   He   stood   out   for   his   intelligence   and   experience   in   the
seminary.   His   performance   was   such   that   he   was   eventually   awarded   a   rare
opportunity   to   continue   his   studies   in   Thailand.   His   considerable   intellectual











return   home   to   Myanmar.   As   he   recalled   it,   this   decision   was   underpinned   by
several considerations. In his patriotism, he believed he could improve the Kachin
society “from the grassroots up”. He had failed his studies, yes, but he also felt that
life   in   Chiang   Mai   had   perfected   his   grasp   of   English   enough   to   grant   him
employment   as   a   language   teacher.   This   perception   was   shared   by   others   back
home. Rather than joining any of the established schools he began giving private
tuition   classes   and   soon   found   himself   teaching   small   classrooms   of   individual
students. It is important to note that, on one level, this outcome was due to official
limitations. Without a certified degree in the Burmese system, finding employment
in government schools  would have been  impossible.  Likewise,  his   row with  the
KBC   barred   him   from   seeking   employment   with   them   directly   even   if   he   had
wanted to.  Notably,  he also chose to stay out of  the KIO educational apparatus.
Thus,  while  his  choice was certainly made on  ideological  grounds that  saw him
fighting for the Kachin cause, his had also chosen to work independently of existing
institutional structures.













before   he   entered.   You   just   knew”   a   former   student   recalled.   The   day   would
proceed by  rote after  rote of grammatical  exercises and always end  with  hours  of











Nawng E Hku Mission School, Laiza
I now turn to another example wherein Kachin educators have chosen to invest in
separate   institutional   structures   in   order   to   realise   their   particular   visions   of
development. This case is particularly important because the school in question is
located   in   the   KIO   capital   of   Laiza   and   has   strong   ties   to   the   Kachin   Baptist
Convention (KBC). Yet its management has opted for autonomy from both larger
organisations   in   order   to   introduce   radical   curricular   reforms   that   may   have
significant   long term   implications   well   beyond   its   confines.   The   historical‐
emergence and present aspirations of Nawng E Hku Mission School illustrate that
even  in   the  territorially  compact  and outwardly homogenous KIO enclaves,  one








Nhkum Doi  La’s   falling  out  with   the  KIO  in   the  early  2000s,  one  of  his  many
professions was a secondary school principal. Among the thousands of intellectuals
who fled the SLORC controlled areas after the 1988 revolution, Rev. Doi La arrived‐






















26 Led by Gen. Zahkung Ting Ying, the New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA‐K) was a former splinter group of
the KIA that, on June 24th 2009, merged with tatmadaw’s controversial Border Guard Force (BGF) (see Map 3).
The group first separated from the KIA in 1968 as the Division 101 of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). On
December 15th 1989, shortly after adopting its new name, a permanent peace agreement was signed with the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The group was henceforth known to have shifted its activities to
mining and other business ventures. Significant parts of the territory under NDA‐K control are known to rely on
poppy cultivation for subsistence, a practice formally outlawed in KIO areas since 1990, but still common along the







































Hku had kept expanding.  Apart  for a week during the shelling of  central  Laiza
schoolwork followed its regular rhythm. Yet what makes Nawng E Hku such an
interesting  case   is  more   than  its   considerable  pedagogic   industry.   It   is  a   telling
example   of   a   striving   for   institutional   autonomy   in   a   highly   complex   political
landscape. Despite its size and central location, it remains outside the purview of
the   KIO   Education   Office.   This   fact,   emerging   from   complex   trajectories   of
individual and organisational histories, has allowed its current leadership to express
their   vision   for   educational   development   through   highly   innovative,   if   risky,
reforms.







that   the   KIO   was   fully   subjected   to   the   Burmese   curriculum   across   its   own
schooling.   Its   educational   apparatus,   including   the   newly   founded   Teachers
Training College in Mai Ja Yang, had few alternatives besides orienting itself to the
demands  of    planners   in   Yangon.  Thus,   while   the   KIO  could   exercise   de   facto
sovereignty over its territorial domains, the organisation had very limited control
over the curricular content of its nominally independent schooling system, adding a
further   layer  of  complexity   to   the   fragmented borderworlds.  This   fact   is   crucial
when discussing the subsequent emergence of alternative educational initiatives in
the Kachin society.
One   essentially   political   problem   that   confronted   Kachin   educators   in   the   new
millennium was wresting control of a system that had gained nominal autonomy
but, in actual practice, was still heavily dependent on its Burmese counterpart. As
















By early 2013, bomb shelters like this had become a common element in Laiza’s urban landscape. Pictured






the   political   aspirations   of   smaller   ethnic   nationalities   in   Myanmar.   This   is




systems of  formal  education must be understood.  Whether searching for greater
autonomy   from   the   Burmese   educational   apparatus,   its   influence   over   KIO









the   government   and   he   spent   months   living   on   his   own,   since   his   sister   was
studying in Myitkyina. “I think that this is when I lost my sharp mind. I used to be
very clever before that. But the shock of suddenly being all alone was too big” he





to Nawng E Hku,  he  recalled the effects  of   this  brief  policy change and how it
enabled him to continue upon his return.









































that   before   and   all   fails.   We   need   to   look   outside.   India   is   very   close   and   the







Naw Hkawng recounted.  Having met  opposition   from  the  Education Office,  he
reached out to the other major political force in the Kachin society, convincing the
local   KBC   committee   to   shoulder   his   project.   A   few   wealthy   relatives   further
supported him through patronage and individual donations. As with Samuel, his
theological   background   was   largely   instrumental   in   actualizing   his   plans.   He
commanded academic credentials from the Christian establishment that gave him

















broke   down,   such   a   change   in   orientation   is   highly   telling.   Considering   the
bureaucratic limbo current graduates of KIO schools find themselves in,  with no
chance of enrolment in colleges and universities inside Myanmar, there is perceived
need   for   viable   alternatives   for   the   future.   As   the   General   Secretary   himself
reiterated,  prolonged conflict  without  political  solution can only  further  alienate
schooling in KIO areas from the rest of Myanmar. It  shows that Nay Pyi  Daw’s
disproportionate use of force to quench political opposition in the Kachin State has
not   only   created   a   humanitarian   disaster,   but   is   also   transforming   institutional
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structures in ways that further undermine its sovereignty.
NHOI Education Centre, Myitkyina












should   be   seen   as   negotiating   for   authority   in   matters   pertaining   to   what   they
perceive   as   secular   dimensions   of   social   development.   Before   giving   a   brief
overview of   the   school  and  its  proclaimed goals,   I   shall  outline   the  position  of
Christian organisations.
Following   Jose   Casanova’s   argument   (1994),   Christianity   in   the   contemporary
Kachin society certainly remains a public religion without any seriously competing
alternatives,   apart   from   the   resurgent   but   still   relatively   marginal   neo animist‐
movement.   Institutionally,   it   is   highly   politicised   and   maintains   an   integrative
function for different social fields. It is in light of this that the current relationship of




working   towards   national   development   and   social   aims,   this   becomes   a   crucial
normative boundary.















credibility   and   connections.   Seen   as   morally   uncorrupted   and   safe,   such
programmes retain high appeal in the predominantly Christian society that has seen
surging levels  of  drug abuse and HIV infections in the last  decade (the latter at
roughly 16  times   the national  average)   (Mizzima 2010).   In  terms of  networking,
parishes   provide   valuable   publicity   amongst   their   respective   communities   and
beyond.   It   appears   that   religious   affiliation   can   also   bestow   some   bureaucratic
benefits   in   terms   of   more   relaxed   governmental   inquiries   into   their   activities
















the   Catholic   Church   into   both   guardians   of   and   an   authority   on   local   folklore,
customs and, most importantly,  language. Working under the wing of either the













English books,  and several  sets  of  heavy wooden desks with matching benches.
Though relatively modest by outside standards, NHTOI’s possibilities trump most
regular classrooms in the Kachin State.




were   also   those   from   other   parts   of   the   Kachin   and   Shan   states.   As   such,   the
programme   presented   a   crucial   bridging   effort   linking   the   students   from   KIO
enclaves   to   the   wider   world.   At   the   time   of   my   research,   around   twenty
participating students were selected annually through a loose competency test in
English. In addition to the test, a letter of recommendation from one’s local church








campus  and needed   to  apply   for  permission   to   leave  even  for   short  periods   (a
practice, as shown in the next chapter, which would often protect students without
proper identity documents).




the   constant   need   for   educators   to   negotiate   access   to   students   through   local
churches and vice versa. At its inception, NHTOI’s main programme was nominally
run under the auspices of the KBC’s Youth Department.  This  provided financial










rural   hinterlands,   Christian   networks   allow   for   greater   reach,   helping   draw   in




















American blockbusters.  Yet  it   is  the last move of the compound that bears most
relevance for the present discussion. I have elsewhere shown the extent to which
private   educators   would   cooperate   with   (and   depend   on)   dominant   Christian













The   forum was  attended by  a   sizable  and  mixed  audience,   comprising  of   local




learned   opinions   on   the   future   of   equitable   education.   Though   the   event   was
advertised as an open forum, my Kachin colleagues in attendance were struck by
the placement of the room that set the speakers against the audience, not unlike,
they   said,   ministers   in   front   of   a   congregation.   Telling   here   is   not   the   actual
organization of the room that hardly differed from most public events, academic or
otherwise,  that   I  visited in Myanmar.  Rather,   it  was the fact  that  my colleagues





from any chance of probing their questions further.  Often,  inquiries  into specific
plans   for   action   or   a   particular   change   in   policy   would   be   downplayed   by   a











Such   explicit   pronouncements   towards   elderly   clergymen   are   fairly   uncommon
amongst   the   Kachin.   Most   youth   do   not   necessarily   enjoy   the   long   winding
speeches, but they seldom argue outright against the content. Readily apparent in
Brang Awng’s disavowal is the malcontent felt by a newer, self assured generation‐
towards  the  old  guard.  There  was  a  clear  sense  of  preference   for   institutionally
certified academic knowledge, a common trump held by the younger generation,
101
against   experience   and   age   of   established   elites.   There   is   also   the   issue   of
inclusiveness   that   comes   up   in   so   many   of   the   current   arguments   against   the
traditional conduct of educational affairs. Most importantly, however, this rejection





toward   superiority   of   pedagogical   expertise  in   matters   of   education  against   the
morally premised   authority   of   religious‐   elites.   In   this   sense,   it   is   important   to
differentiate   the   attitudes   described   above   from   what   Harding   describes   in
representations   of   American   fundamentalist   “others”   (1991).   Rather,   the   Kachin
educators were negotiating for greater space for autonomous action while retaining






Kachin are presided over by the local  clergy.  The latter  initiate  the proceedings,
provide topical counsel and advice from the Scriptures, and bestow their blessing




presence   would   be   considered   an   affront   and   would   not   go   unnoticed   by   the
community or the church.







could the decision be explained away by the  fact   that   the  move coincided with
NHTOI’s   formal   separation   from   KBC   tutelage.   NHTOI   had   indeed   become   a






the   Reformed   Anglican   Church.   Though   the   afternoon   progressed   in   a   jovial








We   had   spoken   on   the   issue   of   church   leadership   in   the   society   on   numerous
occasions over the past years. Brang Awng had always maintained a critical stance
towards their unquestioned sway in what he took to be a rightfully secular sphere.
He   was   respectful   of   tradition   and   clerical   authority   in   what   he   perceived   as
“religious matters”. He argued, however, that the hierarchy based on age and social










church  men!  The   church  draws  young  people   because   it   guarantees   status   and
employment. But you know what? Those who go to KTC are mostly failures!
He proceeded to give an example of his close friend’s brother who, upon finishing





government?  This   is   the  only  medical   school  where  Kachin students  can study.
Anyway, students are lured into these shops and become addicted. It’s like drugs,
you know?
Having   allegedly   spent   his   nights   and   days   hooked   online   the   young   medical
student   eventually   failed   the   term   exam   and   was   promptly   expelled   from   the
school. Despite the shame he returned to his hometown and spent a jobless year






The  narrative  moves   along   two   tangents.   On   the   one   hand   is   the   fear,   already
alluded to in previous chapters,  of a government plot to marginalise the Kachin




the Kachin State.28    That its campus is surrounded  by  a ring of seductive internet
28 Up until the first decade of the new millennium, University of Medicine in Magway was reportedly the most
ethnically diverse in the Union. However, under new reforms, students need to follow strict rules of admission and
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shops was seen as part of a larger ploy. Yet falling into this trap was also a failure of
willpower   on   the   part   of   the   student.   His   further   ill success   as   a   migrant,   and‐
eventual homecoming with a non Kachin bride, served to underline this point. The‐
implicit message of the narrative that draws on these details is casting doubt on the








NHTOI.  The   latter  had originally  graduated with  a  bachelor  degree   in  political
science, but had taken a leaning towards theology shortly after. Acting as the school








































superfluous   institution,   nor   see   any   negatives   in   its   explicit   aims.   Rather,   their
worries were the allocation of scarce resources and unfounded authority in what
was   deemed  the   secular   sphere.   The   critique   was   always   framed   in   nationalist
discourse,  seeing  the  burden  as  hindrance  to  socio economic‐   development  of  the




Borrowed from Burmese,   the more   traditional  meaning of  saya  has  been for   the
church minister and Sunday school teacher, yet it can be employed for people of
authority more generally, including regular school teachers.  Brawng Awng's quote









Tensions   between   the   civil   society   and   ecclesiastical   institutions   in   the   Kachin
society are among of the most controversial issues in the present stage of transition.
Over  the last half  a  century, being a Christian has been inseparably woven  into
Kachin national identity, making churches appear indispensable for ethno national‐
survival.   Outside   the   spiritual   domain,   organisations   such   as   the   KBC   and   the
Catholic  Church  have  contributed enormously   to   local   education,   social  welfare
and,   most   recently,     humanitarian   relief   projects.  As   devout   Christians,   most
members of the society find it difficult to level meaningful and open critique against
the   clergy.   While   fun   is   made   behind   reverends'   backs,   it   is   the   two   types   of
communication   central   to   pedagogic   activity   –   personal   dialogue   and   public
speaking – wherein constructive critique is felt to be hampered by convention. 
The aim of   the ethnographic vignettes  above has  not  been to  paint  a  picture  of
irreconcilable   conflict   within   Kachin   society.   Rather,   my   argument   traced
throughout this thesis, is one of complexity and dynamism in the sphere of formal
education. Much like the leaders of Nawng E Hku Mission School in Laiza, and
Samuel  in his  private practice,  educators  from NHTOI were essentially  taking a
stand   against   the   status   quo   of   the   established   social   order   that   they   saw   as
insufficient   to   meeting   their   particular   visions   of   development.   Their   critique,
expressed  in  both  narratives  and  practice,  provides  an  example  of  how  the  social
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chapter   were   calling   for   a   clearer   separation   of   they   saw   as   their   professional
domain   from   that   of   religion,   and   arguing   for   greater   autonomy   from   the
centralizing   state.   In   so   doing,   they   were   trying   to   reinterpret   some   of   the
fundamental   ethical   norms   of   professionalism   and   intellectual   authority   in   the
Kachin society and Myanmar as a whole.  At  the same time,  the educators were




fields   upon   which   contests   over   development   take   place.   These   include   the
fragmented political territoriality of Myanmar and the internal hierarchies within
the Kachin society itself.
The emergence of privately owned Kachin schools   in the  late  1990s signalled an‐
important   fragmentation   in   the   educational   landscape   of   Myanmar.   Free   from
centralised   curricular   constraints   and   oriented   towards   neighbouring   countries,
these   schools   started   to   experiment   with   social   development   in   the   emerging
domain of  civil  society.   Importantly,   their  educational  programmes were  geared
towards   a   particular   type   of   Kachin   identity,   premised   on   shared   cultural   and
religious values but also having a secular dimension (thus setting them apart from
existing   theological   seminaries   that   also   exercised   relative   autonomy   from   the




The   skills   and   contacts   acquired   while   abroad   have   been   instrumental   in   this


































1994   ceasefire   fell   short   of   its   promise   of   bringing   change.   Against   initial
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CHAPTER III Fragmented Territories and 
Sovereignties: Contextualizing Formal Schooling in










































“In   fact”   the   teacher   claimed   to   several   nods   “they   were   simply   given   to   local   police
officers!”
The   competing   visions   of   pedagogy   and   development   in   Kachin   society   that   I
analyze   in   this   thesis   are   aligned   with   particular   sovereignties   and   aspirations
thereof.   The   short   vignette   above   drawns   out   several   themes   that   I   will   be
discussing   below.   Underneath   the   banal   reality   of   petty   bureaucrat's   attempted




inequalities.  More recently,   these  tensions  have become topical   in   the  context  of
electoral politics. It is symbolic and not altogether incidental that the exchange is








of   contemporary   Kachinland   that   lies   beneath   these   competing   and   graduated
sovereign domains. I then move to discuss how the state of Myanmar is experienced
through   its   military bureaucratic   apparatus.   I   draw   on   observations   and‐







this   in   mind,   one   might   expect   to   find   in   this   geographically   isolated   and
fragmented political space an absence of state power. Yet the opposite appears to be
the   case.   Fluid   politically   liminal   spaces   have   worked   as   catalysts,   resulting   in
multiple state like institutions vying over abundant but tightly controlled resources‐
and popular legitimacy. Historical  trajectories in the Kachin State confirm recent





unpredictable   configurations   of   political   authority   that   exercise   more   or   less










Schooling   and   ideas   of   development   more   generally   constitute   a   particularly




skills  have  assumed  an  increasingly  central  role  in  enabling,  or  curtailing,  social
mobility. It is on this latter effect that the present chapter focuses. In particular, I
look   at   documentary   practices   to   suggest   ways   they   can   influence   individual
chances and aspirations in schooling.30  Documents act as principal sites where the
symbolic   power   of   the   state   becomes   manifest   in   people s   lives,   extending,   inʹ











and   economic   interests.   Much   like   the   case   of   the   Mindanao   region   in   the
Philippines   analysed   by   Lorraine   Pe   Symaco,   physical   distances   can   be
superimposed by “geographies of conflict” and metropolitan bias (2013, 317). Local
readings of this multi layered landscape influence choices on the ethno nationalist‐ ‐
political arena. They are equally crucial for the choices of educators in charge of
inland to the purpose built city of Nay Pyi Daw.
30  By documentary practices I am referring to any bureaucratic procedure where individuals or organisations are
required to apply for, process, or submit documentary evidence of their identity or practices to state institutions.
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first   drew   my   attention   to   the   aforementioned   fragmentation   in   an  educational
context. Both strike me as introductions to wider issues discussed in this chapter,
exemplified through two life histories that bear similarities to many thousands.31
Paths made and broken
I   became   acquainted   with   Nang   Seng   during   one   of   my   earliest   visits   to   the
government controlled Myitkyina,  Kachin State.  At the time, I  was doing a pilot‐
study for my subsequent research and volunteered at different schools where my
two colleagues and I were invited as lecturers. During those early days, my image of

















31 Those two short life histories were reconstructed from several interviews conducted during 2012. In the interests
of the narrative, I have chosen to refrain from direct quotes in this instance.
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Daw s ideological apparatus. She graduated eleventh standard at the top of herʹ  class






State.   During   her   student   days,   Nang   Seng   worked   at   the   Myitkyina   State
Government Transport Department.32  At the same time, she was volunteering as a
















her  own person,   she  was  actively   supplementing   for   the   chronic  deficiencies   in
state schooling sector. The tuition based classes she was giving offered income, yes,‐ ‐
but  their  other  function,  no  less  crucial  for  the  society  at  large,  was  raising  the
standard of education to a level unattainable through the central system. Her later
endeavours assumed an increasingly social orientation. Equally important, she was
















support   three   sons  and   three  daughters.  Some of   their   land  had been  lost   to  a
plantation as part of a semi forced dispossession scheme headed by a local Burmese‐
army major. This led to his parents having to leave home for increasingly longer


















given.   It   was   at   this   point   that   Seng   Aung   dropped   out   of   school   and   started















or   effectiveness”   (2010,   87).   When   it   comes   to   the   formal   boundaries   of
contemporary Myanmar, divergence tends to dominate. In what follows, I aim to






administrative   division   of   the   Union   of   Myanmar.   It   covers   an   area   of   89,041
kilometres,   roughly twice  the size of  Denmark,  of   largely rugged hill   tracts  and









State is  populated by a diverse mix of ethnic nationalities.  The Kachin – itself  a
politically  loaded category denoting a contested set of smaller subgroups35  – make
up about half of the total population, together with Bamar, Chinese, Indian, Gurkha
and   others.36  Moreover,   as   I   show   in   Chapter   6,   this   variegation   is   further
accentuated  in the sphere  of  organised religion.  In  itself,   this  diversity is  hardly
unique to the region.  Many Southeast Asian countries exhibit  comparable ethnic
complexities,   characterised by strained and often  violent   relations  between state
actors and various ethnic ( minority ) nationalities (Snitwongse and Thompson 2005;ʹ ʹ
Brown 2003).  However,  as several authors have shown (Sadan 2013;  South 2008;
33  Full census results, including detailed data on ethnicity, remained unpublished during the writing of this thesis.
34 This figure includes an official estimate of 46,600 unaccounted people. However, given the latest estimates of
over 120,000 people displaced by the ongoing conflict and the difficulties of access to significant parts of the state
held by KIO and other armed groups, the former figure could thus be understated. It should also be pointed out that
the latest census figure is markedly higher than 1,433,000 that the government’s daily The New Light of  Myanmar
quoted in 2005 (Thiha 2005).
35 These most commonly include Jinghpaw, Lachik,  Lawngwa, Lisu,  Rawang and Zaiwa. While elites among
smaller subgroups, most notably the Lisu and Rawang, have sometimes contested their subordinate status in this
division, the inclusion of these six subgroups under the common denominator Kachin continues to be endorsed by
dominant local organisations like the KIO and KBC. Significantly, the 2014 Census listed a total of 12 Kachin
subgroups, leading to calls by Kachin elites to publicly decry prescribed categories by simply noting the“Kachin
101 code”, a higher level sub‐heading in the census form not relevant for that particular question (Kachin News
Group 2014).
36  Ethnic composition of this area remains subject to much controversy among locals and international observers
alike (BCN 2014; ICG 2014). Having said that, it is probably safe to assume that the 2014 census – the first since
1983 – promises more validity than previous attempts in recent history. The last two censuses, conducted by Gen.
Ne Win’s military regime in 1973 and 1983, had limited credibility due to lack of expertise, incomplete access,
poor transparency, and other inconsistencies (for an overview of results and limited critique see Khin Maung, 1986;
Maung, 1980). For discussion on censuses prior to the 20th century and their role in the construction of modern
Burma see Thant Myint‐U (2004).
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infrastructure   and   severely   lagging   telecommunications,   both   of   which   remain
significant in the settings of higher education.38
The Kachin State capital of Myitkyina is connected to the closest regional centre
Mandalay   via   a   single   rail   link   in   serious   disrepair.   An   average   journey   takes
anywhere between 20 to 30 hours. Both departures and stops along the way are
unpredictable and delays lasting 6 hours or more are not uncommon. The journey
itself   is   not   without   dangers.   The   dilapidated   state   of   the   railway   has   led   to
numerous accidents, and frequent police checks inflict an air of quiet oppression.
River transport  and patchy highways are highly dependent on seasonal  weather
37  Across its Western borders in India, similar legacies remain, for example, in Nagaland (Chakraborty 2012).
38 I  recognise  the fact  that  most  of  my informants  were urbanite  Kachin,  many of  whom had spent  time in
neighbouring  India,  Thailand,  and  China.  Their  perceptions,  and  the  ways  they  came to  be  articulated,  were
doubtlessly affected by the fact. Further work is required to make claims as to how issues described below are




















most  immediate business   interests.  Overall,   this  has contributed to    increasingly
vocal public opinion that the ceasefire years (1994 2011) brought no societal benefits‐




Kachin   State   have   seen   limited   infrastructure   development   driven   by   Chinese
extractive industries (O’Connor 2011; KDNG 2008; KDNG 2007a; KDNG 2007b). For
example, during the three years since my first visit to Myitkyina in 2010, a superior
paved highway has been installed between the regional capital and Mali N Mai‐ ʹ  Hka
39 I am grateful to Laur Kiik for pointing this out to me.
40 As mentioned in the second chapter, the critique advanced by some younger educators is more nuanced, touching
not only on Nay Pyi Daw s shortcomings but also scrutinizing choices made by political and religious elites in theʹ
Kachin society.
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confluence   to   service   Chinese   damming   projects   in   the   north (see Map 1). 41
However,   these  developments  have also included forced displacement of villagesʹ ʹ
and irreversible damage to the natural environment (Jat 2013; KDNG 2009). Despite
some   limited   change   in   Chinese   attitudes   that   see   them  reaching   out   to   localʹ ʹ
populations   through monetary support  in projects like the Myitsone Dam, their
benefits are aimed at servicing the industries themselves (see Map 1).42 This is a fact
hardly   lost   to   local  populations  who watched high voltage  power   lines   fly  over‐
darkened villages, carrying electricity – perceived as being produced at significant
cost to local ecosystems – across the border to China. It is within the context of this
“resource  grab”,  as  Kiik   (in  press)  has  noted  in  his   recent  overview of  Chinese
investment policies in the Kachin State, that acutely felt marginalisation fuels hyper‐
politicised discourses of resistance to encroaching powers of state and capital.
A  related  point   informing daily   conversations,  particularly  among students  and
educators,   is  the state of   internet connections  in Myitkyina and the surrounding
areas.43  It   is  another  example  of  how the   lack  of   infrastructure  deepens  existing
sentiments of territorial exclusion. The last decade has witnessed significant growth
of   interest   in   the   World   Wide   Web,   particularly   its   mobile   and   social   media
applications,  across  Myanmar sʹ   urban  centres  (PBC  2014).  2012 2013‐   saw  Nay  Pyi
Daw liberalise its telecommunications market, allowing foreign companies to start
joint ventures with the central government, a bid quickly followed by Telenor and





41 This and similar projects have been constructed by the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) for their own
limited use, largely disregarding the needs of local communities or the regional development plans of Myanmar as
a whole.
42 Kiik has recently argued that these changes are equally driven by local popular resistance in the Kachin State and
wider Myanmar that in turn has prompted policy changes dominant state and private sector actors (Kiik, in press).
43 My fieldwork locations were mainly constrained to urban Myitkyina and its immediate surroundings, as well as
the KIO enclaves of Mai Ja Yang and Laiza. It is very likely that this particular issue has little or no relevance in
most of rural Kachin State. However, it is certainly topical, and increasingly so, for the local elites.
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Less studied is its relevance to educational opportunities. In national contexts where
locally   funded   scholarships   are   virtually   non existent,   anyone   lacking   wealthy‐
familial relations – which is to say the great majority – is  dependent on support
provided  from outside   sources.  Skills  of   searching  for  and communicating with
foreign universities and funders, particularly secular ones, constitute an essential
resource.44 Use and development of these skills requires practice. It is not hard to see















accusations   of   deliberate   interference   by   the   central   government.   The   issue   is
conflated   with   topics   like   environmental   degradation,   crippled   transportation
infrastructure,   and   educational   underachievement   among   smaller   ethnic
nationalities. The point here is not to question the truth value of such statements but‐
to   illustrate  a  wider  climate  of  distrust  and  feelings  of   strategic  marginalisation
suffered by the Kachin populace.
For   most   practical   purposes,   then,   infrastructure   lags   behind   even   the   modest
standards of the rest of Myanmar, literally underlying marginalisation of a more
symbolic sort. Sadan (2013) has convincingly shown that the latter dates back to the
44 As I argue later on, this constitutes one of the many areas where younger private educators can, in fact, put into
practice new forms of cultural capital so central to the transforming field of education.
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British conquest  of  Assam in  the  19th  century,  when Kachin  elites  were  actively













late  1960s.  However,  grievances  also   include   the  use  of  Burmese  as   the  official
language   in   all   levels   of   officialdom   (an   important   example   being   the   2008
referendum that was disseminated to the public only in Burmese), discrimination in
the sphere of religion against non Buddhist believers (ratified in the Constitution),‐







such  as   in   the  work  of  Giorgio  Agamben.  The   latter  argues   that,  despite  being
relegated beyond the accepted confines of  juridical theory,  the state of exception
constitutes the “original means” by which law refers to and encompasses life (2005,
45 Having said so, Callahan also notes that, to an extent, the common narrative  of  the breakup of the Union could
equally have been an excuse, in 1962, for the military to take power. According to this view, inter‐army power
struggles were an equally salient reason for the coup, especially since the actual demands of the Federal Seminar of




strain   of   thought   that,   pace   Allessandro   Fontana,   finds   the   exception   in   the
“ambiguous,  uncertain,  borderline fringe,  at  the intersection of the legal  and the
political” (cited in ibid., 1). It holds relevance for the Kachin context, in which local





flashpoints   in  armed conflicts.  Yet   their everyday effects  reach far  beyond these
spaces. Even in population centres like Myitkyina that remain firmly under Nay Pyi
Daw sʹ   control,  both  daily  life  and  development  plans  can  be  subject  to  arbitrary







centrally, but by a private company Buga Co. Ltd. ( homeland  in Jinghpaw) withʹ ʹ
direct links to the KIO.























to   disrupt   government   services.   Ironically,   not   only   government   offices   but   the
tatmadaw bases relied on Buga power. Whatever the truth of these claims, the ones
suffering   the   biggest   hit   were   local   businesses   and   homes   unequipped   with
expensive backup generators. Even local hospitals and clinics were unable to afford










46 In addition to Buga Co. s Mali Hka power plant, the area is serviced by the two smaller plants of Nam Hkamʹ
Hka and Galai Jaung, built in the 1990s and operated by the central government. Larger projects in Chipwi (built by










the  breakdown  of  tacit  agreements  between  educational  authorities  in  Laiza  and
Nay Pyi Daw that had helped integrate KIO schooling to the rest of Myanmar from
1994 to 2011. During one of my last visits in 2013, a senior official working for the
State   Minister s   office   described   extensive   plans   that   had   been   made   for   theʹ




of   exception   that   has   prevailed   in   the   region   over   the   past   decades,   despite
temporary cessations of open hostilities. It remains a defining characteristic of state




most   of   the   country   appears   to   be   gradually   opening.47  In   this   connection   it   is




47 There remain significant parts of Myanmar, including Kokang, Wa State, and large areas inhabited by the ethnic
Rohingyia, who are equally excluded from these developments.
48 It should be noted that quasi‐formal arrangements have existed beneath the gaze of the central state at least since
early 1990s. These include aid from international religious organisations, foreign embassies, and various INGOs
whose largely personal networks have linked to Kachin borderworlds.  KIO enclaves have also benefited from
limited support of donors in China and India (see Chapter 4 below).
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while still central to modern states, have been “reconstituted and partly displaced”
into   supra national   arenas   governed   by   global   institutions   of   disproportionate‐
power and resources (1996, 29; see also Strange 1997). Trade regulations, conflict
arbitration, and  legal  regimes can and have been  forced on national governments,
thereby transposing their sovereignty. Seen through the lens of changing labour and
citizenship rights in Southeast Asia s fast growing economies, Aihwa Ong s workʹ ‐ ʹ
(2000) has drawn attention to the more negative effects of these processes. However,
change brought by greater awareness and accountability, as well as much needed
aid   and   investment,   can   also   be   positive.   Foreign   interventions   were   certainly
perceived as desirable by most of my informants.
By all appearances, Myanmar shares most characteristics of  weak  states destinedʹ ʹ
for increasing intervention from outside its territorial borders. Moreover, as noted
by the authors of a recent review on Myanmar s political and economic transition inʹ
the   new   millennium,   its   government   appears   both   open   to,   and   popular   with,
development and investment partners from the global North (Rieffel and Fox 2013).
Nay Pyi Daw s newfound willingness to engage in dialogue and limited reformsʹ
makes it an attractive destination for bi and multi lateral aid. Rich in both untapped‐ ‐
market potential and natural resources, it has long attracted prospectors from its
immediate   neighbours   (Bissinger   2012;   Haacke   2006).   Recent   easing   of   Western
sanctions and debt waivers have expanded its investment and trade potential even









(Il)legible identities and schooling
My discussion so far has touched on general outlines of the persistent political and
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economic marginalisation of the Kachin State vis à vis the rest of Myanmar. It has‐ ‐
its basis  in  the  lack of physical  infrastructure, as well as  fragmented territorialities







State   offers   numerous   examples   of   disparities   between   these   conceptions   and
realities, showing that people can and do find ingenious ways to work around the
state, by employing the proverbial “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1987). However,








The  following excerpt  from the educational  career  of  one of   the  students at   the



































in Mai  Ja Yang to help out with  the  household economy.  Any  long term‐   plans
outside KIO enclaves, however, would require him to secure proper documentation.
It has been easier here in Myitkyina because we stay in the boarding house most of
49  Zau Hkyen refers here to National Registration Card (also known as Citizen Scrutiny  Card) issued under the
1982 Union Citizenship Law. It is printed in three different colours to denote either full, associate, or naturalised
citizenship. The card records  a  photo, thumbprint, name of the holder, holder’s father, date of birth, ethnicity,









identification,   a   national   ID   card,   can   be   unattainable   due   to   lack   of   money,
connections,  or   the   threat  of  being  identified with  the  political  opposition.  Very
often,   the   fear   of   abstruse   and   corrupt   bureaucracy   is   in   itself   enough   to   limit
people’s  aspirations.  That  same semester,  another  student   told me how her  two
brothers decided to join the KIA after the eldest had repeatedly failed to procure
documents for moving to Mandalay. Throughout my fieldwork, I witnessed several
students   forego   educational   opportunities   solely   for   lacking   required   basic
documentation that they were unable to secure in time, or at all. These observations
should, moreover, be taken in the context that I mainly interacted with the younger
Kachin elites   in  activist  or  educational  backgrounds.  These groups  tend to  have
better  skills   in   interacting with bureaucracies  and attaining relevant   information
than the wide majority of Kachin population from the rural hinterlands. Small but




be  criticised,   the   fact   that   one   is   required   valid   papers   does   not   in   itself  make
Myanmar stand out. Scholars have looked at issues of movement and  classification
that  arise from identity and documentary practices in different contexts (see,  for





the   sustained   state   of   exception,   such   as   in   limits   on   personal   movement   and
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institutional   exchange,   is   curbing   both   aspirations   and   actual   possibilities   in
education and work.















point during their studies.   In Myitkyina,   I  worked with a middle aged educator‐
who had left Myanmar with a fake passport in the early 2000s. Like  many Kachin
migrants, he had initially travelled to Thailand where he enrolled at Chiang  Mai
University.  He  managed  to  continue  his  studies  for  two  years,  largely  thanks to
existing Kachin networks in Chiang Mai and individual sponsorship. From Chiang








50 Myanmar introduced electronic databases to its population register in 2005 but no implications for documentary






Counting and classification in the borderlands
In addition to bare bureaucratic challenges, attaining legal documentation issued by
the central government can be seen as tacit recognition of an illegitimate regime. As
Jeganathan notes,   the function of  identity documents transcends their  immediate
practicality   into   the  realm of  subjectification  (Jeganathan 2004,  75).  Many of  my
interlocutors   lamented   the   fact   that   dealings   with   government   agents   signified
compliance with an encroaching and dysfunctional state apparatus.
Institutions such as the census were viewed with particular mistrust. Prior to the
heavily   criticised   Constitutional   Referendum   of   2008,   the   central   government










was   widely   perceived   to   have   been   orchestrated   by   the   Union   Solidarity   and
Development   Association   (USDA)   without   much   pretence   to   impartiality   or
transparency.51 In terms of content, the National Convention neglected joint calls by
ethnic  ceasefire  groups   to   include  additional  constitutional  provisions   for  ethnic
affairs,  protection of  minority   languages  and traditions,  and regional  autonomy.
Fuelling discontent were several provisions that were seen as directly harming the
51 Widespread violations were documented by a local watchdog organisation, the Institute of Political Analysis and
Documentation (IPAD 2009).
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status quo in States.  For example,  §9 (c)  and §54 of the Constitution lay out the
procedure for changing names and territorial boundaries of existing States/Regions.
This raised widespread concerns about historical designations, such as the Kachin
State,   being   dropped   to   further   undermine   political   aspirations   for   regional
autonomy and  independence.52  It   is   thus   that   the  popular   imaginaries  perceived
institutions such as the census and referendum as belonging to a single device of
political  marginalisation.  They are   seen   to  work  alongside  more  banal   forms  of
political exclusion like the systematic withholding of elections in Kachin areas (see
Map 4).
Two   years   after   the   2008   referendum,   ahead   of   the   equally   controversial
parliamentary   elections   of   2010,   the   authorities   in   Myitkyina   ordered   another
population count. A number of households I spoke to about this during successive
visits   through 2012 remembered  the  procedure  somewhat  differently.  Seng Ja,  a
middle aged teacher in the Dugahtawn quarter, said her husband had to deliver
copies  of   their  Household Registration List   to   the   local   immigration officer.  The












Win’s  Burma Socialist  Programme Party  (BSPP),  “Burmese way to  socialism”,   it
crystallises   the   popular   denial   of   any   substantial   change   in   the   way   successive
regimes have governed the country since 1962.



















activists,   the   central   government   appears   more   interested   in   perpetuating   an







However,   as   with   supranational   corporations   described   by   Ong,   gradations   in
Myanmar s sovereignty are as much influenced by the central authorities as they areʹ
by competing political forces beyond their control. Despite official declarations to
53 A significant exception to this was the temporary suspension of the highly controversial Myitsone dam project
by President Thein Sein in late 2011. The geopolitical complexities leading to that decision, insofar as they can be
ascertained, remain outside the scope of the present chapter. For an excellent analysis see Kiik (in press).
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the contrary, Nay Pyi Daw s authority in the Kachin State remains patchy. In thisʹ
sense,   Callahan s   vocabulary   on   “devolution”   of   political   power   (2007,   xiv),ʹ
implying deliberate choice, obscures the fact that central policies have largely failed
in   their   territorializing   aims.   Integrating   the   borderlands   against   territorial
fragmentation is simply beyond the powers of both army and civilian cabinets in
Nay Pyi Daw.
Examples   given   in   this   chapter   suggest   that   Nay   Pyi   Daw s   exercise   of   itsʹ
sovereignty in the Kachin State continues to undermine its legitimacy in the minds
of  smaller ethnic nationalities.  Lack of  government services  and practically  non‐
existent accountability have only deepened this alienation. As in decades past, this
continues  to reproduce the  territorial  and  ideological  divisions  in society.   In  the






Sovereignty   in   the   Kachin   State   is   wrought   with   complexities   going   beyond
unbridled   violence   of   a   totalitarian   state   (cf   Skidmore   2004;   Fink   2001)   versus
rhizomatic subaltern resistance (cf Scott 2010; Malseed 2008). While I recognise the
value of both critiques, my own experience in the Kachin borderworlds confirms
what   several   important   studies   (see   Sadan   2013;   Grundy Warr   and   Dean   2011;‐
Callahan 2007) have previously suggested: a need for a more nuanced reading of





and   teachers   who   are   seeking   greater   integration   with   educational   institutions
inside Myanmar and beyond its borders. I now turn to discuss one of the key sites of
contest   against   Myanmar s   sovereignty   that   has   emerged   in   the   institutionalʹ
landscape of schooling.
136
CHAPTER IV Layered States and Education: 
















I   took   a   stroll   through   the   campus   grounds  hoping   to  meet   other   teachers.   In   the   big


















































































a   festive  one  –  of  what   is   the  highest   institution  of   learning   in   this  borderland
region.  I  use these scenes  to  introduce the  topic of  educational  apparatus of  the





have   largely   created   the   conditions   for   the   emergence   of   competing   state like‐
institutions, organisations like the KIO have long established themselves through
complex   means   of   statecraft   that   cannot   be   reduced   to   purely   military   means.
Second, more so than the central government that remains largely removed from the
local  realities, the KIO has been able to take advantage of physical distances from
the   central   state,   and   establish   their   reach   far   into   the   sparsely   populated   and
rugged highlands. Thus, when stating that the Myanmar state lacks presence and
authority   over   large   areas   of   the   Kachin   State,   this   implies   more   than   military
control. Third, an important means to this end has been the expansion of the KIO’s
autonomous   apparatus   of   schooling.   Though   its   scale   and   capacities   remained
negligible  up   until   the   ceasefire   period,   it   constituted  an   important   method   for
gaining popular legitimacy beyond the force of arms. Relating to theories of modern
formations of ethnicity in Southeast Asia set out in the Introduction (see Lieberman




education,   not   least   for   political   socialisation,   resource   scarcity   has   indirectly
subjugated   most   of   their   efforts   to   the   Burmese   system.   Largely   isolated   from
academic   institutions  abroad,   the  KIO would eventually  press   for  an agreement
with   the   central   government   to   allow   its   students   to   enrol   at   universities   in
Myanmar. This meant adopting a curriculum directed from Yangon (and later Nay
Pyi Daw). Moreover, KIO schooling tends to suffer many of the chronic problems
found   in   its   larger   counterpart.   Issues   such   as   scarce   and   outdated   teaching
materials, staunch centralisation, lack of teacher autonomy, and minimal salaries are
enduring   problems   on   both   sides   of   the   institutional   divide.   These   are   further
exacerbated by the semi martial administration of the KIO’s Education Office and‐














Legacies of pre‐independence schooling
The history of secular education in the Kachin Hills, as much as it has been recorded
to date, follows somewhat tangential routes. Several historians suggest that Kachin
communities  in  colonial Burma, at  least  those  who  lived  in  or  close  to population
centres like Bhamo, were conscious of the potential of formal schooling as early as
the first decades of the 20th  century (Sadan 2013; Tegenfeldt 1974). New forms of








realities   in   Burma   that   presented   opportunities   for   those   who   had   acquired   a
measure of formal education required for jobs in the military, civil administration
and private enterprises.54




Burmanisation,   but   by   the   aspirations   of   Kachin   elites   to   engage   the   changing
economic  and cultural  horizons.55  In  one  of  his   earlier  published works,  Kachin
anthropologist Maran La Raw pointed out that for the majority of Kachin society






54 In this connection it is useful to recall what Nicholas Tapp (1989) has noted in relation to the so‐called „“rice‐
bowl Christian“ among the early Hmong converts. While material benefits were certainly one of the more obvious
drivers, Tapp argues that this was generally accompanied by a „complex interweaving of indigenous with Christian
practices and beliefs where material and spiritual benefits ... were inectricably mingled“ (Tapp 1989, 70–71). In the
Christian, Cannell has more recently suggested that the “potential for meaning contained in Christian doctrine is in
fact demonstrably always in excess of any particular social situation to which it might be considered functional”
(2006, 38).  I am mainly pointing this out in response to Sadan’s materialist  reading of the incentives of early
Kachin mission schooling (cf. 2013, 374).
55 Rather than exclusively embracing so-called Western markers of modernity, as a reductionist view of missionary
contact might assume, early Kachin converts were equally experimenting with Burmese ones. For example, Leach
observes Kachin village teachers beginning to construct their houses I Burmese style, their wives wearing Burmese
dresses, their children drinking tinned milk (1947, 630). 
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In   the   secular   sphere,   the   primary   site   for   attaining   formal   schooling   before
independence   was   service   in   the   British   colonial   army.   Some   historical   ources




more   than  one   and  a   half   thousand   people,   the  Kachin   leaders   expressed   their
collective interest   towards serving in the colonial army. Enriquez says they were
“keen   upon   education,   and   regard[ed]   the   Army   as   the   best   school   for   the
enlightenment and development of their youths” (cited in Sadan 2013, 212). Three
years   later,   the   sole   petition   advanced   by   the   Kachin   leaders   to   Her   Majesty’s
Commissioner upon his visit to Bhamo was a demand for schools (ibid., 226). What
is important for the present analysis is not so much Enriquez’s suggestion in the


















from   university   backgrounds.   As   with   the   Burmese   independence   movement,
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student   associations,   both   theological   and   secular,   proved   a   fertile   ground   for
recruitment. But the pervasive influence of colonial military and missionary legacies
should not be underestimated and a dominant chain of command mentality persists‐ ‐
in the KIO education system to this day.
Limits to clerical agency
Before moving on to the emergence of the KIO schooling apparatus, I briefly outline








major   Christian   organisations   not   only   maintained   their   position   but   also
strengthened it throughout the Socialist period. A central theoretical argument in
Herman   Tegenfeldt’s   (1974)   missionary   history   is   that   the   expulsion   of   foreign
missionaries  by General  Ne Win’s  government  in  1965  in   fact  carried a positive
long term effect  on  the   institutional  capacities  and staying  power  of   the  Kachin‐
Baptist   Convention   (KBC).   This   development   was   by   no   means   predetermined.
Despite the number of  foreign missionaries  remaining among the Kachin at that






had   been   one   of   uncertainty.   It   was   notable   that   the   move   coincided   with   the
intensification of open hostilities between the newly formed Kachin revolutionary








Tegenfeldt   goes   on   to   argue   that   this   initial   shock   would   soon   lead   to
resourcefulness.  The churches were forced to strive for popular leadership in an
increasingly   oppressive   political   climate.   While   the   KIA   was   establishing   itself
through armed opposition in the uplands of northern Shan State and the Triangle
area (see Map 1), major population centres remained out of their shifting de facto
control.   For   a   significant   part   of   the   Kachin   population,   it   was   the   Christian
organisations, together with traditional clan structures and linguistic affinity, that
offered immediate institutionalised frameworks for constructing and maintaining
separate   communal   identity.  The   fact   that   churches  were  allowed  to  operate   in
tatmadaw  controlled areas throughout the Kachin State meant that they constituted‐
more than sites for religious observance.  As I show in chapters  below, churches
became   increasingly   central,   ideologically   and   in   practice,   to   the   politics   of
maintaining Kachin linguistic and cultural distinction. Christianity thus remained














self   and   community   employed   to   garner   legitimacy   for   particular   regimes   of
governance.   In   sum,  during   the  period  when  the  KIO had  begun   its  project  of
secular schooling, Baptist and Catholic churches still lacked the extensive presence
and popular support commanded today.
Moreover,   in   purely   practical   terms,   employing   clerics   in   the   service   of   jungle
schools was not an easy task. Following the start of the Kachin revolution, any links
to   the   KIA   or   other   armed   factions   carried   the   threat   of   arrest.   Teaching   and
preaching were hardly exempt. As several high ranking Kachin education officials‐
























the   1960s,   the   organisation   also   started   to   move   towards   greater   institutional
complexity. What had begun as a small uprising against a superior military force,
strictly limited both geographically and in numbers, would gradually branch out
towards   other   forms   of   statecraft.   While  always  marginal   to   its   central   aims   of
military control over territory and resources, schooling constituted a crucial site for
quasi civilian governance that added to the KIO’s growing popular legitimacy. Like‐
the   Burmese   state   and   missionary   enterprises   before   them,   the   KIO   needed
schooling   to   justify   its   claim   to   statehood.   It   is   quite   possible   that   the   leaders
consciously followed the example of the American Baptist missionaries for whom










mode   of   governance.   This   move   was   not   lost   to   political   elites   among   ethnic
nationalities  vying   for   local  power.  Equally   importantly,   toward   the  end  of   the
1970s,   several   geopolitical   developments   had   swept   the   region,   affecting   local
notions  of  statecraft  and political   legitimacy.  The main  influence  came from the
eastern border with Yunnan.
Michael Schoenhals (2005) has shown how in China, the five year period from 1966
to   1971   brought   new   draconian   measures   of   governance   against   the   minority
populations of Yunnan province, including Jingpo and Lisu tribes. As Beijing vested
all   meaningful   political   power   in   Yunnan   to   the   People’s   Liberation   Army,   the
Political   Frontier   Defense   (PFD)   plan   effectively   voided   existing   concessions
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towards the  minzu,  or ethnic nationalities.56  The ensuing wave of violent reforms
and pogroms sent an estimated 50,000 people seeking refuge across borders (ibid.,
29),   many   of   whom   were   absorbed   by   areas   controlled   by   the   KIA.   In   the
administrative sphere, these developments put additional strain on KIO leadership

















shift   in   its   policies   for   Yunnan   saw   a   far   stronger   emphasis   on   economic
development over ideological restructuring. The constitution of 1982 reinstated the
minzu  as   a   legitimate   category   in   the  body  of   the   nation.  As  Sadan   notes,   this
allowed local minority elites in Yunnan to once again establish limited cultural and
economic  autonomy for   themselves  and  their   enterprises.  Cross border   relations‐
with the KIO and other Kachin elites were tolerated and even allowed to strengthen,
but only as long as they remained strictly in the sphere of business and limited
56 In 1967, the civilian government of the Yunnan People’s Committee and the provincial Chinese Communist
Party Committee that had acted as the highest organ of political authority since the Cultural Revolution, came under
command of a military commission. This commission professed a new policy of forceful socialist modernisation.
The  effects   were  most  strongly  felt  by  the  national  minorities,  leading  to  further  economic  and  cultural
impoverishment (Schoenhals 2005, 28–28).
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cultural  exchange (2013,  356).  This  formative period can be seen to have further
driven the KIO to consolidate its educational apparatus. This move was to further
avoid Chinese or Burmese influence, both of which were seen to be at odds with
politics   of   autonomous   governance   and   self determination   of   ethnic   minority‐
populations in what were perceived as their indigenous territories.
Increased   self assurance   gained   through   foreign   relations   further   supported   the‐
consolidation  of  the  KIO’s  civilian  institutions.  Throughout  the  1970s,  the  KIO’s
diplomatic   profile   had   grown   considerably,   both   as   a   result   of   greater   political
foresight of its  leadership, and its increasingly lucrative trade opportunities with
cross border partners. In 1967, a KIO delegation had made their first official visit to‐
China;  in 1972 the organisation opened offices  in Thailand.  From 1975 onwards,
their  political  project  was   led under  the  chairmanship of  Maran Brang Seng,    a





failed ceasefire  talks was held with Yangon.  All  these developments  fostered an
image of statehood, but also pressed KIO leadership to expand its administrative
apparatus.




Hugawng   Valley   and   Hpakant   with   strong   KIA   presence.57  They   were   entirely
reliant  on  local   families   for  support.  Classes  were   taught  by the  more  educated
among the fighters, or their wives who wanted their children to gain access to basic
57 For much of the historical material that follows owes to discussions on the matter by Sumlut Gam, Tu Ja, Gum
Se, Kha Lum, James Lum Dau, Ja Gun, Brang Di and Hpung Gam.  I am extremely grateful to them for sharing

























58 This practice is sometimes followed even today. For example, the Nawng E Hku Mission School that I introduce
in more detail later employed a committed mathematics teacher who taught primary school classes in the mornings
and donned his All Burma Student Union (ABSU) fatigues to take up his post in a hillside military base in the
evenings.
59It is possible that this was a stated ideology with no real grounds. As I show later on, most areas under KIO rule
remained monolingual apart from variations in Kachin dialects. When KIO policy shifted in later years to include
Burmese as part of its curriculum,  finding teachers to even teach the language proved to be an impossible task, let
alone there being a threat of overt use among students.






much   a   matter   of   maintaining   ideological   and   physical   control   over   respective
districts. Even today, the district education officers – nominally a civilian rank –
tend to  come  from a military  background.   In   this   framework,   loyalty  expressed
through   years   of   active   service   remains   a   stronger   qualification   than   years   of
schooling passed (tensions around this shall be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter). The use of battle hardened veterans in school administration resulted in‐
chain of command   mentalities   that   are   still   visible   in   classrooms   and   teachers’‐ ‐
quarters today. This is important, for one can too readily attribute the patriarchal
relations   in   Kachin   schools   to   vague   notions   of   Asian   values   or,   as   is   often

















the Head Office  felt  was  a  failure   to adequately administer  and develop formal
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schooling.   However   –   and   this   is   particularly   relevant   in   view   of   succeeding
discussions on notions of hierarchy in schooling – the military political elites in the‐
KIO   maintained   a   firm   grip   on   schools.   The   officers   who   formerly   held
responsibility would continue to sit on the board of education as advisers, and their


















KIA   soldiers   taking   responsibilities   for   teaching   was   common   in   many   other
contexts. At times, they were simply the best educated in the community, or the
most  willing  to  shoulder  the  responsibility.  Hpung  Gam  recalled  a  year  near  the





















infrastructure.   If  anything,  the historic  vignettes  testify to a capacity  to adapt in
conditions   of   chronic   scarcity   of   resources   and   displacement.   However,   it   also
illustrates   that   what   is   meant   by   a   village   school   in   this   context   blurs   the
conventional boundaries of civil and military. During the period in question, the
whole system was characterised by a loosely structured curricular apparatus and
endemic   ruptures   in   the  daily   functioning  of   schools.   It  was  partly  due   to   this
realisation, and partly due to popular pressure,  that  the KIO began to revise its
educational policy towards the early 1990s.
Reaching out towards the Union, ceasefire of 1994‐2011
With no pedagogical alternatives to methods used in the Burmese curriculum and
even the older ones from the mission era, the KIO’s policy of radical self sufficiency‐
looked  increasingly unrealistic  even  to   its   strongest  advocates.   In  particular,   the
material demands of modern mass education proved impossible to meet without










government officials  lent their tacit  support  after the 1994 ceasefire by turning a
blind eye to shipments of school textbooks. While the flows of other merchandise
past   the   shifting   boundaries   of   Kachin   enclaves   were   closely   monitored   and
arrested, Burmese language print media intended for schools would, on occasion,
find its way past Burmese checkpoints. While it could be debated to what extent this
was really part  of  a conscious campaign of Burmanisation,  the fact  remains that
textbooks   thus   imported   were   produced   under   a   curricular   regime   with   very
different aims than that of the KIO.






centres  of  KIO  schooling.  Since  their  relocation  to  Laiza,  the  KIO  and  its  allied
organisations,   mostly   consisting   of   religious   and   humanitarian   initiatives,   have




61 KIO Central Education Department internal statistics as of April, 2013.
62 Given the scarcity of reliable data,  these figures should be taken as approximate.  It  is  not uncommon, for
example, for enrolment rates to be counted on the first day of school, after which attendance drops dramatically.
Moreover, during my fieldwork, archival material of the Education Department had been moved across the border
into China in fear of government offensives on Laiza.
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Primary school 166 810 18893 23,3
Middle school 31 203 5634 27,8
Secondary 
school
3 31 634 20,4
TOTAL 200 1391 25161
Table 1. Schools, staff, and students in KIO education system 2012‐2013




Primary school 1178 6106 174232 28,5
Middle school 86 2094 98451 47,0
Secondary 
school
49 909 25894 28,5
TOTAL 1313 9109 298577
Table 2. Schools, staff, and students in Myanmar education system. 2008‐2009
Up   until   1994,   the   KIO   education   apparatus   remained   nominally   self sufficient.‐
However, as already noted, the Burmese curricular material it inevitably relied on

















A Burmese language class in a KIO primary school in Mai Ja Yang
July, 2010







A crucial   addition   that   the  new arrangement   introduced was   the   requirement  of
Burmese  language  for passing  the state  exams. In  the  largely  monolingual   rural
expanse of upland Kachin State, this constituted a significant barrier and established,
from the outset, a notable inequality on the national level vis à vis native Burmese‐ ‐
students (and other nationalities that, by virtue of geography or linguistic affinity,
were better equipped to tackle linguistic requirements). Like the majority of Kachin










KIO students  had  taken  their  exams  in  Myanmar and 224 of   them had passed.
Though   the   numbers   might   seem   insignificant   compared   to   more   than   25,000
currently enrolled at KIO schools, the opportunity afforded by this agreement was




popular   activism.   Their   practice   and   ideologies   grew   out   of   multi layered‐
educational histories, incorporating institutional experience from KIO and Burmese
63 Here and below I am using the term “KIO students” to refer to those students, Kachin or otherwise, who passed




























the   Mai   Ja   Yang   enclave   in   1997.   Though   irregular   training   camps   had   been
organised   for   teachers   during   summer   breaks   since   1994,   there   had   been   no
systemic effort to standardise or improve pedagogic qualifications. By opening the
TTC, the KIO took the first  tangible step in that direction,  further cementing  its
image as a viable state actor in the territories it controlled militarily. In theory, being




actual practice  in  the  chapter below.  In  sum, however,  one  can  see a  notable  shift
through the 1990s in KIO governance over its territories. Outwardly, at least,  the
organisation sought more complex means of territorialisation, a move that proved




forced displacement has devastated schooling in  large parts  of  the Kachin State,
with no viable alternatives in overpopulated refugee camps. The town of Mai Ja
Yang   that   houses   the   Teachers   Training   College   has   been   severely   affected   by







developments   have   contributed   to   efforts   by   private   educators   to   provide
alternative paths for education and development. Though supportive of the political
aims of  the KIO, many remain critical  of  the  lack of  foresight  in civilian affairs.
These private educators’ own efforts can thus be seen as a form of critique, directed
against the governing elites on both sides of the conflict.
Political socialisation in the shadows
Before moving on to consider institutional practices in KIO schools more closely, I
would   like   to   point   out   an   important   implication   of   the   current   stagnation   in
schooling.   Both   long standing   discrimination   against   ethnic   nationalities   via‐
curricular means, and the more recent physical breakdown of communication and

























for   transport,   and   all   information   being   closely   guarded   until   the   start   of   the
programme.   A   testament   to   the   resilience   of   kinship   and   church   networks,   all
communication moves by the word of  mouth on very short  notice,  a precaution
taken  to  avoid  government  suspicion  that  might  endanger   the  participants.  The
numbers have almost doubled over the years, particularly after the start of the   war.
In   2012,   around   1560   students   participated,   aided   by   hundreds   of   volunteers,
leaders,   and   alumni.   The   impressive   list   of   speakers   includes   prominent   public
64 The information below was compiled from interviews conducted between 2012‐2013. I am grateful to several




Another  former  student   told  me how the  decision  to   include non governmental‐





leaders   in   different   areas.   So   now   they   invite   many   speakers”.   Here,   too,   the
distinction between the army and civilian institutions is blurred to the extreme. The
paramilitary training alluded to before has been part of the EEDY curriculum from








Myanmar   offers   a   salient   example   where,   dominant   ideologies   and   normative
discourses  of   international   law notwithstanding,  post colonial  nationalisms must‐
necessarily be referred to in the plural. Much like Charles Walker has demonstrated
in the Peruvian case (1999), in placing the local indigenous populations at the centre
of   analysis,   the   history   of   nationalist   movements   in   Myanmar   appears   one   of
complex   heterogeneity,   divided   along   the   shifting   lines   of   regional   and   ethnic
difference.   On   the   level   of   military political   elites,   the   primary   agents   of   these‐
centrifugal  trajectories   have  been  well  documented  (Smith  2007;  Smith  1991).





KIO   education   apparatus   presents   a   compelling   example   of   one   such   project.
Evoked   by   practical   necessities   and   concerns   for   popular   legitimacy,   formal
schooling   became   an   increasingly   instrumental   tool   for   political   socialisation
through  the  civil  war  years.  The   fact   that   the  KIO  leadership  negotiated  for  an
informal agreement to integrate their schools with those working in the Myanmar
system   suggests   crucial   commitment   to   civilian   governance,   while   having
contributed to a general mood of optimism that pervaded the immediate aftermath
of the ceasefire deal.
Despite  these positive endeavours,  however,  the KIO educational  apparatus was
hampered  in   its  progress  over  the   following decades  by a  number of   structural
constraints.  Foremost  among  these  were   its  continued  formal   isolation  from the
Union and wider international context, and the chronic lack of resources (cofounded








Suffice   it   here   to   note   that   both   the   lack   of   professional   outlook   and   the   rigid
practices of employment have discouraged many among the younger intellectual











larger   international   community  who  has   tended   to   focus  on   the   recent  positive
changes on the Union level without sufficient attention to regional disparities  in





CHAPTER V Obedience and Progress: Status 











about   school's   food   supplies.   Having   invested   in   a   couple   of   chickens,   the   latter   had







behind   two   rows.   The   topic   was   civic   education,   delivered   in   English   with   Jinghpaw
explanations.   Like   most   faculty   members   at   NHTOI,   Brawng   Awng   held   a   foreign
university degree that he had finished in Hong Kong. His expatriate track had brought him





single   lecture   room which   accommodated  all   the   students.  After  an  hour   and  a  half   of
reading exercises, I found Brawng Awng in his small room, typing a funding application. I
helped with proofreading  the  draft   and did  some edits   to  a  student's  application.  Some























fish.  David   suggested   beer.   We   spoke   a   little   of   NHTOI  and  what   their   plans   for   the
following semester were. David said his school was both bigger and more modest in its aims,





































In   relation   to   the   central   question   posed   by   this   thesis   –   what   has   driven   the
emergence of private schools in the contemporary Kachin State and what informs
the   choices   of   the   educators   –   this   chapter   sketches   several   institutional
characteristics   that   individual   educators   with   whom   I   worked   indicated   as
problematic. These characteristics include rigid centralisation and consolidation of





formal schooling must necessarily be seen as embedded    in  a larger complex of
social norms and values. Scrutinizing pedagogic methods from a purely technical
perspective that treats all problems as essentially universal misses the fact that, in
actual   practice,   they   are   always   situated   within   existing   cultural   norms   and
conventions.  Second,  in understanding the emergence of private schools and the
aims of the younger generation of Kachin educators, their resistance to established
status hierarchies  forms only part  of  the picture,   leaving further questions to be
asked.   In  an  even  wider   perspective,   this   chapter   underlines   the   importance  of




relationships,   classroom   organisation   and   teaching   methods,   and   recruitment
practices for staff and students in the KIO schools. It is drawn from fieldwork in the
KIO enclaves of Laiza and Mai Ja Yang, as well as several private schools located in
Myitkyina.  This  data   is   complemented by   interviews  with  mature   students  and
educators   relating   stories   from   wider   areas   of   the   Kachin   State   than   were
immediately available to me.
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Learner‐centred method and the politics of schooling
The questions explored in this chapter first emerged from perceived discrepancies
between   the   local   discourses   on   reforming   teaching   methods   and   the   actual
practices   in   the   schools   I   visited.   Tensions   around   the   so called   progressive‐
methods, most notably the learner centred approach, are by no means unique to the‐
Kachin context (for a review on comparative literature see Schweisfurth 2011). What
started   as   a   trend   of   curricular   reforms   in   many   post World   War   II   Western‐
economies gradually shifted towards countries on the receiving end of development
assistance   towards   the   later   half   of   the   20th  century.   Since   the   late   1980s,   local
governments,   transnational  aid organisations,  and NGOs have  laboured towards
the popularisation and implementation of learner centred educational paradigms in‐
disparate   global   settings,   often   with   little   appreciation   for   local  complexities.
Mainstream development discourse has tended to treat teaching methods used in
formal schooling in utilitarian and apolitical terms. For example, one panel study on
developing   Asian   economies   concluded   that   “human   capital   formation   through
school expansion is best thought of as an unevenly applied world wide process,‐
with   little   importance   attached   to   regional   cultural   uniqueness”   (Baker   and
Holsinger 1996).











65 An important strand of this critique, the so‐called indigenous knowledge perspective, also scrutinises formal
mass schooling as practiced by the modern nation state per se,  arguing that it involves particular processes of
culutral effacement and destruction of traditional practices and memory (see Kapoor and Shizha 2010).
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half   a   century   has   Myanmar   experienced   a   more   significant   transition   towards
integration with the neighbouring ASEAN countries  and the larger  international
community.   This   has   both   encouraged   and   been   fostered   by   internal   political
reforms.   Democratisation,   while   still   a   buzzword,   has   become   a   legitimate   and
often cited term in local political debates. Yet in the conflict ridden   borderworlds‐ ‐
that   daily   experience   very   different   realities,   these   outward   changes   have




wider   liberal democratic   ideals,   are   frustrated   by   existing   cultural   norms   and‐
hierarchies, these wider societal tensions remain significant.






potential   for   change.  This  goes   for   the   ideological   aims  of   schooling  as  well   as
cultural values of a less political, more technical nature. As noted, my proposed way
of analysing these tensions is to look at how the status hierarchies underlying social















Almost   invariably,   reference   to   such   methods   by   educators   presented   them   as
desirable and a necessary prerequisite   for developing  local  schooling.  Acronyms
like RWCT (Reading, Writing, and Critical Thinking) or CCA (Child Centred Approach)
were   circulated   with   enthusiasm,   particularly   by   school   administrators.   In   KIO
areas,   the Teachers Training College (TTC)  in Mai  Ja Yang,   led by a Newcastle‐
educated Kachin principal, was labouring to modernise their methods over those in
the Burmese system. The Nawng E Hku Mission School with which I worked in




crafting   their   own   approaches   from   scratch.   What   most   people   agreed   upon   –




against   ethnic   nationalities,   in   particular   their   languages   and   historical
consciousness (see also Metro 2011). On the level of theory, their stance was thus
supportive   of   the   majority   of   tenets   of   the   learner centred   paradigm.   This   was‐
further   supported   by   ethno national   concerns,   framing   out of date   teaching‐ ‐ ‐
170
methods as  a  wider political   issue.  Yet  underneath  this  discourse,  actual  classes
proceeded in much the same way they had in the past.
Material constraints to reform
Many of the difficulties faced by teachers in implementing learner centred teaching‐
methods   are   due   to   material   constraints.   Perhaps   most   obviously,   spatial
arrangements of schools and classrooms makes it extremely challenging to conduct













spent   last   night   prepping   some   simple   individual   activities.   We   were   to   read
yesterday’s story once more but give everyone a couple of sentences as a warm up. I
would then explain new vocabulary.  After that,   the plan was to ask students to
draw a word or character from the story and tell others about it. We barely got past
the   first  part.  There  were   those  who  stood  up  and  got   through   their   sentences
without   too   much   ado.   But   several   students,   three   girls   and   one   boy,   really
struggled to make themselves heard at all. The real issue, though, was the class next
door. About ten minutes into the bell they started their own reading exercise and I













often more   than 60 pupils  per   teacher at   the  Laiza  Middle  School.    Classrooms
tended to be loosely separated in two. Regular students, clad in green and white
uniforms,  were   sitting   in   the   front  and a  more   ragged  looking  group  of   recent





also   under   popular   pressure   to   maintain   services   for   the   society   it   claimed   to






already mentioned,   even  their   classes   remained   less   than conducive   to   student‐
centred   teaching.   In   both   cases,   teachers   were   in   a   very   difficult   position   to
implement changes, both in terms of physical space and their own training. This








been  taught   in  Myanmar  for  decades   (see  Thein Lwin 2007).  Occasionally,   local
teachers were offered a chance to attend workshops in urban centres like Mandalay
or Yangon,   largely conforming to  trends of   learner centred education mentioned‐
above. Since the late 2000s, teachers’ associations across the Union have been active
in   calling   for   collective   action,   capacity   building   and   greater   autonomy   in   the




millennium.66  Yet   such   initiatives   exert  only   indirect   influence  on   the   politically
marginalised   borderworlds.   Due   to   limitations   described   in   the   preceding   two









lack   of   resources,   existing   values   and   status   hierarchies   worked   against   the
seemingly  technical problems of teacher training and curricular methods too.  The
following sections will look at these issues in more detail, first through the example







Putting methods into practice: Hierarchies at the Teachers
Training College
The  very   first  Kachin   school   I  visited  was   the  Teachers  Training  College   (TTC)
already mentioned above. Located in the town of Mai Ya Yang, the once vibrant‐
centre  of   the  second most  important  KIO enclave on  the  border with China,   its
institutional significance cannot be overstated. Though largely deserted now, the




of   a   wider   set   of   socially   oriented   projects   by   the   KIO   through   which   the






them   had   prior   experience   working   in   KIO   schools   and   were   completing   their
degree   for   further   qualifications.   They  were   thus   in  a   good   position   to  discuss
questions around teaching methods and wider mentalities in schooling. Over time,
we   delved   into   the   power   dynamics   in   KIO   schools   and   how   the     teachers
envisioned they should work.
Since my first longer visit to the TTC, I was housed in one of the five rooms on
campus  intended for  guests,  directly  facing the  teacher’s  quarters.  My mornings
were  spent  rehearsing  the  ever elusive‐   Jinghpaw  intonation  with  a  teacher  I  had
been assigned by the principal. She spoke almost no English, a perfect match for my
Jinghpaw at   the   time.   (Unlike  me,  however,  her  grasp of  English grammar and
vocabulary in writing was anything but sparse.) For the most part, our Jinghpaw
lessons centred upon repeating combinations  of  vowels.  She would write     them






The   ubiquitous   centrality   of   teachers   in   the   classroom   was   mirrored   in   the
administrative hierarchy of the college itself. Almost all decisions from curricular
issues   to   classroom   disputes   would   have   to   be   taken   upon   by   the   Principal.
Principal Sau Seng, of whom I talk more below, was himself openly critical of the
arrangement.   Yet,   he   had   not   managed   to   institute   any   real   changes,   despite
uncertain plans to start a  teachers’  council  at  the school.  In a valuable study on
educational leadership in the KIO schools, Kachin scholar Khun Seng concludes that
the   working   environments   are   overwhelmingly   characterised   by   “high   power
distance” leading to passive acceptance of orders by the junior staff (2013, 7). Our
regular  breakfasts   in   the   school   canteen  were  usually   spent   in   long discussions
about higher education in Europe and the world. As already noted, he had studied
in   the   UK   for   his   Master’s   degree   and   thus   possessed   a   considerably   wider


























quote  above suggests,   the blame for  not  understanding the   teacher’s  message  is
almost   invariably  placed on   the  recipients   in  what  constitutes,  as  Bourdieu and





on   the   issue.   Many   agreed   that   physical   punishment   should   not   be   necessary.
However, as one experienced mathematics tutor told me, “in Kachin schools, we can
have no choice because Kachin students are still very weak and undisciplined”. This









67 As the subsequent chapters will argue in more detail, the parallels Bourdieu and Passeron draw with the priestly
office in this context remain highly topical in the Kachin case.
68 Here,  as  elsewhere,  I  shared my time between participant observation and interviews with the school,  and
















teacher  in  his   late   thirties  ensured me that   this  was   the  only way.  “Maybe  it   is
because  we  Kachin  are  still not  very  developed.  Our  children  do  not  listen  so  we
have to use the bamboo stick. Even parents ask me to do it because they know their
children are  not  obedient”.  A  further  comment  was  added by Esther,  a    young
female teacher in the sciences. “They [the parents] want us to be strict. We need to
act like them. Otherwise the children become unruly. They want them to behave at

















the   nation   is   still   developing,   still   growing   up.   This   resonates   with   missionary
discourse on collective development (see Chapter 7), and also the ranking hierarchy
of   the   local   military   traditions   where   the   individual   (and   collective)   is   always
implicated in existing structures of subordination. In the local political debates, in
which private educators are invariably involved, the issue of whether or not the
Kachin society should embrace,  or  is  ready for,  processes of democratisation are





Moral authority and status hierarchies in schooling
The following vignettes offer examples of status hierarchies in schooling from the





involved conceptualise   this  process.   In   late  2012,  Roi   Ja,  a   long time  friend and‐
colleague of mine was finishing her TESOL Master’s degree in Thailand. She had
invited me over for the Sweet December dinner and to ask for some advice on her
studies.69  After   everyone   had   finished  eating,  we   sat  on   the   floor  of   her     room
sipping green tea amid stacks of Xerox copies and lecture notes.
The   problem   was   the   end of term   project   that   Roi   Ja   had   picked.   Interested   in‐ ‐
69 In the Kachin Baptist context, Sweet December is celebrated on the first day of December.  It is generally a
communal event for relatives to gather together for shared worship, sometimes lasting into the early hours of the













trying to  encourage her  not   to   fear  retribution,  her  arguing that   she  had gotten
herself   into serious trouble.  Finally she threw up her hands in despair,  “We are












While   certainly   part   of   a   dominant   paradigm   in   schooling,   rooted   deeply   in
particular  institutional  histories,  status hierarchies regulating  interaction between
teachers and students should not be taken as a static cultural legacy. Rather, they
are continually  maintained and guarded through minute   interactions  inside  and
outside formal classroom settings. While the above instances might be read as an





The   following   events   that   took   place   though   November   and   December   2012   in
Chiang   Mai,   further   illustrate   the   way   cultural   hierarchies   are   enacted   and
perceived in pedagogic settings. Sara Lum Dau was leading a small evening seminar
for a group of four reverends who had been sent by the Kachin Baptist Convention




to walk  into  a  seminar  for  which  the  elderly   teacher  had prepared me,   I    soon
realised he would be  the only one talking.  He begun by relating several  stories
about the Biblical judges and asked the class about the judges’ geographical origins.
His probes were met with silence. Visibly satisfied, he proceeded to draw on the
blackboard  the   location  of  Bethlehem and asked about   its   surroundings.   Jericho








he would spend the entire   time reading grammar exercises  to a dozen nodding
pupils who occasionally repeated a string of sentences in unison. Often, the stated
subject of the lesson changed into a lecture on morals, history or daily politics, all
presented  in Biblical  garb.  The class  would listen,  often amused,  but without as
much as a whisper in reply. At lunchtime, students would occasionally challenge
the   issues,   yet   most   facts   seemed   to   be   accepted   without   further   reflection.   In









some   rice   cakes  and  dried   fish.   I  had  asked  him what  he   thought  about   inter‐











tradition   determining   cultural   hierarchies   according   to   age,   experience,   and
established social roles. It is these hierarchies and their role in the wider political
context of the Kachin society that the next part of this chapter explores.
“The political aims of education”: Diverging visions in KIO
schooling
A key figure to have emerged in the civilian administration of the KIO is Sau Seng,
currently   the  principal  of   the  TTC,  of  whom I  have briefly  spoken above.  Both
intelligent and highly ambitious, Sau Seng belongs to the privileged class of Kachin
secular   educators   who   received   most   of   their   higher   education   at   universities








his   lips,  whether  scolding a   failed student  or  courting his  superiors   in  the  KIO.
Notably, Sau Seng is one of the very few local educators who have benefited from
direct funding of their studies by the KIO. After spending some years studying in
Bangalore,   India,   he   was   given   a   KIO   scholarship   to   get   a   Master s   degree   inʹ
















characterised   themselves   as   highly   patriotic   and   supportive   of   the   KIO   as   the
legitimate   representative   government   of   Kachinland.   What   they   criticised   was
centralisation in the hands of people with limited formal education. While people
seldom voiced mistrust about their political leadership per se, they were seen out of
touch with the needs and realities  of  school related work,   including educational‐
planning. This is crucial, as I argued in Chapter 2, for such critiques form part of a
larger   shift   in   perceptions   among   the   younger   intellectual   elites   of   legitimate











Education Department  in  Laiza,   the  men holding these  posts  come from strictly
military backgrounds, some lacking secondary school education. At least formally,
all held a termless tenure.




my   meagre   knowledge   on   the   topics   of   golf   and   fly fishing,   popular   pastimes‐
70 Interestingly, people with clerical background appear to have been excluded from this office at the time of my





























The anecdote  described above  conveys   the  often discordant  visions  held  by  the
71 A conspicuous presence on the outskirts of Laiza, for example, remains a well‐tended golf course, neighboured
by refugee camps for the people displaced by the latest conflict.
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increasingly  vocal  civilian elites  and the  older  military   leadership  in   the  Kachin
society.   It   also   illustrates   the   debate   on   the   function   of   those   institutions.   The
aversion   felt   by   some   educators   towards   treating   schools   as   sites   of   political
indoctrination is not necessarily shared by the political elites,  including the KIO.
“Schools must make Kachin!” as one senior officer from the 3 rd  Brigade told me.
However,   it   would   be   a   mistake   to   see   the   KIO/KIA   and   their   subordinate
institutions  as   following a  single  political  paradigm.  As  the  example  above also
suggests, the internal workings of the system are more complex than the explicitly
stated ideological goals would suggest. That said, when it comes to the everyday
management   of   schools   under   KIO   jurisdiction,   there   is   often   little   room   for
individual choice or opinion. The following paragraphs further illustrate the power
dynamics within schools, as well as between teachers and KIO administrators.
Coercion and initiative in the KIO education apparatus
The   tensions   referred   to   above   go   beyond   the   ideological   debates   around   the












and   other   public   events.   Fairly   confident   and   of   demanding   intellect,   she   was
considered   exemplary   for   a   young   female   teacher   and   was   expected   by   her
academic superiors to make a good career.
Yet despite being evidently well suited for her, teaching had not been her calling for‐






























72 Over the course of my fieldwork,  I  heard several such accounts from teachers.  It  should be noted that the
importance of these should not be exaggerated. By and large, the application process to the TTC is voluntary and





















don’t  earn enough to support  my younger siblings.  How can I  ever get  enough
money  to  marry?”  Before  enrolling  at   the  TTC,   the   teachers  at  Patrick’s   former
school had worked unpaid for more than six months. They received some support
in   rice   from the  KIO and additional  help   from  the  villagers,   remaining  entirely
dependent on both. Several teachers told me how these issues would be exacerbated
the   further   into   the  hill   regions  one   travels.  The   teachers   themselves  have   little




73  Both Burmese kyats and Chinese renminbi circulate in Mai Ja Yang but the latter currency tends to be used for
reference. This stands in marked difference from the majority of the Kachin State, further stressing the importance
of the border economy for this particular area.
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send one of their children to study at the TTC. As Seng Ja’s account exemplifies,
even wealthier  families  must often submit   to those demands due to relations of
patronage underpinning local economies. While easier for many locals than dealing
with   the   corrupt   Burmese   bureaucracy,   trading   in   the   KIO   areas   requires   set




These   constraints  affect  girls  and  women   in  a  disproportionate  manner,   further
underscoring local gender norms in the context of masculine histories of military
and ecclesiastical institutions. Illustrative was Seng Ja’s choice of taking the burden











contributes   to   pervasive   professional   hierarchies   whereby   junior   teachers   are
expected   to   follow   instructions   rather   than   take   initiative.   For   example,   at   the
Nawng E Hku Mission School that was in a much better position, due to its location








how   to   teach   young   children”,   she   laughed   when   I   asked   about   her   previous
background. “I do it out of duty, for now. I go back to India after this semester,
maybe to take another degree in theology”. Maiji, another young teacher from the
northern   Shan   State   had   recently   travelled   to   Laiza   after   graduating   from   the
University of Yangon. He had come to see the situation of the IDP camps and to
help in relief work. Upon arrival, he was assigned to take up teaching at the Nawng












It   should   be   stressed   that   the   overall   effects   of   such   mobility   are   not   merely
negative.   In   particular,   it   has   made   some   aspects   of   social   development   in   the
Kachin  State  highly  flexible  and  has  led  to  quick  and  adaptive  responses  to  the
recent humanitarian crisis. The extensive reach of religious networks has meant that
people – mostly volunteers – can be rapidly shifted between areas in need. Likewise,
non state schooling working on meagre resources has been able to attract temporary‐ ‐
staff   to  quickly  fill  vacancies.  However,   this  climate  has  also  contributed  to   the
existing   hierarchies   in   schooling   by   both   drawing   upon   and   perpetuating   the
expectations   of   subordination   by   junior   teachers.   A   2009   report   of   the   KIO
Education   Department   estimated   that   a   mere   third   of   KIO   teachers   currently
employed had received any formal teacher training (cited in Khun Seng 2013, 8). In
short, professional training remains minimal. Attempts to institute reforms such as














KIO   territoriality   offered   valuable   evidence   of   how   the   apparatus   of   schooling
works   outside   the   urban   contexts.   As   with   most   other   teachers   with   whom   I
worked, Michael’s sense of duty and commitment to KIO’s authority were strong.
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At   the   same   time,   he   remained   critical   towards   several   aspects   of   that   same





































Armed KIA escort returning students to their villages after a semester at the Teachers Training College
Mai Ja Yang, February 2011
Zau Lat, another young but experienced   teacher I met at the TTC in 2011, gave a


















remote   mountainous   villages.   Given   sufficient   institutional   standing,   individual
reformers   such   as   Sau   Seng   can   make   some   difference,   even   if   their   ideas   are
frowned  upon  by   the   majority.   Likewise,   teachers   like  Michael   command some
influence in their immediate localities. However, it would be naïve to assume that



















water,  now drained  to   the  waist   level,  was  dotted with  students  splashing and






















for  the  students,  particularly  in  the  impoverished  and  marginalised  rural  areas  of
the Kachin State. Yet it is equally indicative of the fact that there is also a class of
educators who perceive faults in the educational apparatus and local practices of
governance.   In  the context  of  emergent private schooling  in  the Kachin areas,   it





the KIO areas.  I  now turn to a case of a private school  in Myitkyina to provide
further   examples   of   the   cultural   tensions   presented   above.   This   is   particularly
relevant,   for   one   would   expect   to   find   a   less   rigidly   structured   institutional
hierarchy here. The staff are largely made up of foreign educated activists whose‐
cultural   horizons   have   been   significantly   broadened   by   their   past   careers.   The






with   one   of   the   older   well respected   teachers   to   give   English   classes   in   the‐






For   the   extra   course,   a   small   group   of   advanced   students   had   been   assembled
outside  of   the  main  term time,  most  of   them  looking  to  apply  for     competitive
foreign   scholarships.   Helping   people   like   them   was   NHTOI’s   central   aim.   The
composition of the class made it both promising and challenging. The school    stood
to gain some reputation from a batch of potentially successful applicants. However,














he threw up his  hands in hopelessness.  “How could it  be? This   is  not  what we
agreed to at all”. Since I was also teaching the same class, a few of the older students
eventually approached me one night asking for help. “We have been through all
this  before,” pleaded Philip,  an activist  and trader who owned a sizeable motor
shop.  “I am worried for my exam and this is no use to me at all! Please tell Thom
we should be doing advanced grammar, not speaking exercises”.








students   skipped   the   final   weeks  altogether.  It   gives   some   idea   of   the   moral
cosmology that  almost  everyone  involved continued    to hold  the  old  teacher  in
highest esteem, even in private, and would hardly have chosen to dispense with his
help.   These   events   also   exemplify   the   often   tense   dialogue   between   competing
cultural paradigms that characterises the current educational landscape. Everyone,
save   for   the   old   pedagogue,   appeared   anxious     and   frustrated   in   the   face   of
convention  that  kept   them from voicing  their  concerns   in  a  way  that  would be
deemed acceptable and, more importantly, practically  viable. This led to a situation
where   the discourse on  inclusiveness  and dialogue    that   the  school s   leadershipʹ
professed and taught remained impracticable in real life. It would seem from the
preceding discussion that these tensions exist primarily in intergenerational settings.















From   our   frequent   conversations,   it   emerged   that   whenever   Roi   Ja   returned   to
Myanmar, she was struggling to stand on equal grounds with her male colleagues
who were slightly older but lacked her formal qualifications. I had noticed as much
when sitting  in on curricular meetings and the rest  of  our  time on the campus.
Additionally,  she  would  join  the  students  in  menial  tasks  around  common  rooms
and the school kitchen, a deeply ingrained cultural expectation to which she seldom
objected. More worryingly, though, was that she had very little say in her academic
responsibilities.   There   appeared   to   be   a   similar   barrier   in   communicating
suggestions for change as had existed between male staff in the previous example.
Every   now   and   then,   Roi   Ja   would   complain   about   the   drawn   out   sessions   of
reproach that her seniors levelled against her. Most commonly, these reprimands
were based on her devoting less time to school affairs than they felt appropriate.











cultural   norms   and   expectations.   What   Zau   Lat   was   chastising   Roi   Ja   for   was
forgetting her  duty for   the community,  a  reproach  to  which Kachin women are
particularly   vulnerable.   A   crucial   element   of   contemporary   ethno nationalist‐
sentiment   is   the   idea   of   personal   sacrifice   in   the   face   of   larger   society.   The
reprimand could thus be read as a well calculated attack at the moral self. What is‐
crucial is that the tone used in this encounter precluded the possibility of dialogue.
That   Roi   Ja   had   taken   offense   is   an  example  of   tensions   of   this  kind;   changed








the   complex   paths   that   led   to   the   emergence   of   the   relatively   autonomous
institutions discussed in Chapter 2.












present   discussion,   was   educational   and   would   eventually   shoulder   such
programmes   as   the   Pan   Kachin   College   (PKC)   that   opened   in   Mai   Ja   Yang   in
October 1999. I first met the former collective of PKDS on my pilot research trip to
Mai   Ja   Yang   in   2010.   We   were   welcomed   in   their   unpretentious   office   on   the
outskirts   of   the   town,   shortly   before   it   was   dismantled   as   part   of   a   larger
institutional transformation.75 Physically, the latter meant the organisation changing
its   location,  moving  into a smaller bamboo compound in a different part  of   the





already   made   acquaintance   with   some   of   its   staff   before   entering   the   Kachin
enclaves. A week before, I had met Tu Ja, a broad shouldered Lawngwaw activist
who would eventually become one of my closest Kachin friends and colleagues. We
were  introduced  in a small  Burmese restaurant  in Chiang Mai,  Thailand.  Under
peeling   dissident   posters   he   handed   us   a   stack   of   English   and   human   rights








PKDS   and   had   drudged   his   way   through   great   difficulties   since   then.   I   have
74 These efforts fostered significant cultural  ties and have been observed to have led to a measure of cultural
homogenisation in the trans‐border spaces. For example, Sadan notes how Singpo areas in India that had formerly
used an odd number of posts for manau rituals, started using a six post plan under influence of ethno‐nationalist
businesspeople like Bawmwang La Raw who was highly influential in the PKDS (2013, 447).
75 As noted in the introduction, on that first visit I was accompanied by two other Estonian researchers working on
Kachin issues.
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previously   described   how   he   left   Myanmar   with   false   identity   documents   to
eventually finish a Bachelor’s degree in Hong Kong. During that first meeting, he
was  leading the precarious  life  of  a  Kachin migrant   in Thailand while   trying to











notable   that   English   language   figures   here   as   a   crucial   component   in   the
preservation of Kachin culture and literacy. Rather than belief in the innate virtues
of   English,   however,   this   association   signifies   an   effort   to   break   out   from   the
confines   of   established   institutional   structures   and   geographical   constraints.   As
already   mentioned,   prior   to   1994,   no   college   or   university   in   Myanmar   would
recognise certificates from KIO schools. Though this would eventually change, there
were   those   who   sought   means   for   developing   formal   education   outside   the




then bring them back as a new class  of   leaders.   In  that  sense,   its  goals  differed
markedly   from   other   local   programmes   such   as   the   Education   and   Economic
Development   for   Youth   (EEDY)   discussed   earlier   who   were   primarily   oriented
towards   cultivating   Kachin   national   character   and   maintaining   ideological
uniformity at home.
Importantly, the PKDS started as an institution formally autonomous from the KIO.















country was Bawm Wang La Raw.  A  fervent  Kachin nationalist,  he  became  the








Meanwhile,  a  series  of   internal  power struggles   in  the KIO followed.   In 2001,  a










authoritarian.  A decade of  uncertain peace was beginning to cast  doubts on the
precise   function   of   the   KIA   whose   rank   and   file   were   said   to   be   increasingly




intelligence   chief   Col.   Lasang   Awng  Wa,   Bawm   Wang   La   Raw   was   commonly
accused of being the coup’s mastermind. By the time loyalist forces retook the Pajau
headquarters, forcing the usurpers to surrender, Bawm Wang La Raw had already




January 2004,  a  few weeks after the attempted coup,   the KIO ordered all  PKDS
offices to be shut down. The Pan Kachin College in Mai Ja Yang was “taken over”
by the KIO and the school renamed as Economics, Education and Computer (EEC)
[sic].   The   compound   was   later   given   to   the   prestigious   Intensive   English
Programme (IEP) that still operates there today. While the executive reach of KIO
could not dispose PKDS’s main office in Chiang Mai, inside Myanmar, the PKDS
was  labelled a political  platform of  a  powerful   turncoat.  By a similar   token,   for




nature  of  the organisation itself.  “We didn’t  want a separate  institution,  we  just
wanted Bawm Wang La Raw to  step down as  a  chairman and as  an  executive
director”, Tu Ja recounts.
KIO [saw] PKC [students] as recruits for Bawm Wang La Raw. So they cut all the 





renounce his  nominal   leadership.  Quite   tellingly,   the  latter  maintained that     the
PKDS should not be evaluated by outside norms (referring to donors) and that the










The eventual  dissolution of  PKDS  in  late  2000s   illustrates  many of   the  endemic
problems   faced   by   civil   society   initiatives   in   the   post ceasefire   era,   and‐
organisational hierarchies in the Kachin society at large.76   Its downfall was sealed
by political  infighting amongst the Kachin elites,  incessant pressures of post war‐
economic realities,  and virtual  isolation from transparent and sustainable foreign
funding.  Most   importantly   for   the   central  problem of   this   thesis,   it  hints  at   the
reasons   behind   young   intellectuals’   reservations   regarding   political   elites   and
making their projects overtly dependent on the latter.
I have no doubt in my mind that Bawm Wang La Raw is very passionate Kachin






76 Though nominally active, PKDS is presently leading a shelf‐life of sorts, being discredited by most of its former












argued   that   teacher student   relationships   and   classroom   methods   cannot   be‐
understood outside the wider cultural and historical context. As Amanda Datnow





As   I   argued   in   my   introduction,   formal   education   remains   one   of   the   key
institutions   of   modern   statecraft.   Not   only   are   Kachin   classrooms   a   site   where
existing  cultural   expectations   around  age,   gender,   and   other   social  markers  are
enacted  and  (re)produced,  but  they  are  also  a  target  of  intentional  projects    of
political socialisation, not  least by the KIO. Seen in this  light,   forms of authority‐
prevailing   in   KIO   and   Myanmar   classrooms,   whether   between   students   and
teachers or different staff roles, also reflect something of the ideological projects of
governing elites. As I argue in Chapter 7, the contemporary national imagination of
the   Kachin   is   built   upon   and   maintained   through   narratives   of   youth   and
adulthood, upbringing and care.  The roots of the discourse stretch back into the













CHAPTER VI Brass Buddhas and Leaden Crosses: 
Religious Plurality & Christian Practice in 
Contemporary Kachin State
I was sitting with Ja Nu in a large Burmese tea shop not far from the clock tower in central
Myitkyina.   In   the   past   few   nights,   someone   had   spray  painted   the   letters   KIA  on   the





























face.   “That   is   one   of   the   big  problems   in   the   Kachin  State”   she   said,   squinting.   “The
misunderstanding about religion. The abbots, they so powerful! The Burmese respect them
so much and they make many decisions. Even the government, they listen to the abbots, you












living   side   by   side   in   the   Kachin   State.   The   perspective   is   that   of   a   young,
progressively minded Baptist intellectual who is grappling with issues of equality
while questioning the religious claims of Buddhism. It serves as an introduction to




the   heterogeneous   religious   landscapes   of   the   Kachin   State,   embodied   in
architecture,  material   culture,   and   ritual   events.  My  aim  in   this   is   to   draw  out
religious   and   political   symbols   that   saturate   spaces,   places,   and   geographical
207
imaginaries. These symbols are inextricably bound with issues of territorial control
and  constitute   important  elements   in  ethno nationalist   identification,  and  in   the‐
threat   felt  by smaller  ethnic  nationalities   like   the  Kachin  vis à vis   the  dominant‐ ‐
Buddhist  organisations  and Myanmar state.  These  symbolically  saturated spaces




the Kachin society itself.  As noted by Shampa and Sanjoy Mazumdar,   religiousʺ
place attachment , that is, one s relationship to particular spaces and places throughʺ ʹ
religious   registers,   is  driven  both  experientially  and   through active   socialisation
(2004).   I   aim  to   show that   the  Christian  organisations  –  key  agents  of   religious
socialisation – remain central to the daily life and national imagination. This helps to
understand why the particularly Christian visions of development, discussed in the
next   chapter,   hold   such   an   important   sway   over   social   life   of   people   and
organisations, particularly in the sphere of formal schooling.
I   begin   by   offering   several   ethnographic   vignettes   on   religious   diversity   in   the
contemporary   Kachinland.   My   goal   is   to   show   that   the   existing   landscape   of
religious institutions is ridden with tensions, which both mirror and contribute to
the   wider   political   contests   in   the   country.   In   relation   to   Kachin   Christianity,
perceptions of external pressure form a crucial point of reference in the construction
of contemporary ethnic identification. Symbolically invested landscapes commonly
















played in  the construction of  Kachin moral  universe(s)  and ethnic  identification.
Specifically,  I  explore how ethnic identities are largely premised on exclusionary
categories   that   are   commonly   employed   to   construct   and   nurture   a   moral
community of shared Christian values and practices.
It   should   also   be   noted   that   I   am   here   deliberately   focusing   on   the   Christian
traditions in the Kachin society, particularly the dominant Baptist one. The present







contemporary   geopolitics,  borderworlds,   and  ecologies   (Grundy Warr   and  Dean‐
2011;   Kiik   in   press;   Kiik   2012;   Dean   2002).   Rather,   my   own   work   seeks   to
complement and develop their insights by adding another layer of analysis to the
existing complexities.   I   thus   feel   that  my  focus  on  the  Christian context   is  both
justified and necessary.
Lastly, it should be noted that the studies cited above generally tend to treat the





means  transcends  their  use  –   I  maintain  that   their  distinction should always  be
taken  to  be  an analytic  device.  For  most  Kachin with whom I  worked,  political




argue   in   greater   detail,   in   the   historical   imagination   of   contemporary   Kachin
Christians, images of literacy and modernity are closely associated with evangelical




Religious territorialisation in the Kachin State
Travelling at length in the Kachin State, one thing that strikes the eye and mind is
bound  to  be  the  way  the  landscape  is  saturated  in  religious  structures.  Distances
between towns and cities are spotted with glittering stupas, pagodas and temples.
Somewhat   less   lustrous   but   nonetheless   imposing   are   the   churches   of   various
denominations  reaching heavenward  through palms and banyan  trees.   In  urban
settings, these are complemented by fine mosques and colourful steps of Hindu and
Sikh   temples,   as   well   as   by   the   Kachin  manau  squares   with   their   characteristic
painted poles.
This   heterogeneity   belies   the   popular   images   of   Myanmar   as   an   essentially
Theravada Buddhist country. Bamar elites, both robed and uniformed, have long
sought to foster that image locally and abroad (Schober 1997; Spiro 1982). This rings







1983). The on going expansionism is also driven by Nay Pyi Daw s policy to assert‐ ʹ
Theravada Buddhism as the dominant cultural lineament of the country, whether to




history.  On a superficial  level,   regimes like the SPDC have fostered an ideology
whereby the “state,  Sangha, and laity are united” in their aims (Philp and Mercer





Manau square in the Mai Ja Yang enclave
March, 2012
This battle for appearances remains highly conspicuous in the Kachin State.  The
state capital  Myitkyina,   for  example,  has recently witnessed the completion of  a
lavishly renovated temple complex, complete with enormous reclining Buddha, in a
popular location on the banks of the Irrawaddy River. Even more conspicuous is the
recent  construction  site   in   the  confluence  of  Mali  Hka and Mai  Hka rivers   into
Irrawaddy less than 30 miles from Myitkyina. It would be hard to find an area more
loaded with historical meaning and contemporary dispute in the whole of Kachin






While   the   Chinese backed   development   has   been   halted   (but   arguably   not‐
terminated), the picturesque  confluence  between  the  two  tributaries  continues  to
serve  as  the  chief tourist attraction near Myitkyina. And while the rate of visitors is
sporadic at best, the local authorities have seen it prudent to erect a gilded concrete
stupa on the site.77 Given the local history and lack of residents new or old, this plan
appears   absurd   but   is   less   so   in   light   of   the   wider   programme   of   cultural
appropriation through Buddhist landmarks.









handlooms   in   the   night.   Tellingly,   their   rhythmic   clatter   from   an   adjoining
sweatshop turned unbearable only after he learned that the looms were worked by
young Burmese girls weaving traditional Kachin dresses.
It   is   important   to   note   that   in   popular   discourse,   symbols   of   faith   are   often
inseparable   from   the   political   grievances   about   territory   and   economic





77 While  foreign  visitors  amount  to  an  odd  pair  of  backpackers  a  month  who  manage  to  negotiate  military
roadblocks, local people like to embark on the trip during holidays and social occasions. A handful of food and
drink vendors have erected a chain of dwindling restaurants to serve these sporadic visitors.
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The   identification   of   the   Burmese   military   with   the   construction   of   religious
structures   that   this   excerpt   illustrates   is   significant.   According   to   this   view,   the
agency of Buddhist Sangha is nigh coterminous with that of the tatmadaw. Both are
implicated in encroachment upon Kachin territories and Kachin self determination.‐
It   is   also   illustrative   of   the   feelings   of   frustration   experienced   at   the   sight   of
Buddhist edifices. A temple or a shrine becomes much more than a place of worship




























Prayer mountain in the Mai Ja Yang enclave
June, 2011









first   delegation  had   earned  a   largely   amiable   welcome   by   the  KIO  and   Laiza’s
populace alike, the second party was met with more ambivalence. Part of the reason
was   the  choice  of  medium for  passing   their   symbolic  message.  For  weeks,     the











Moreover,   while  nominally   independent,   the  KIO  remains   tightly  knit  with   the
Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) in practice, and the latter would have doubtlessly
used   their   influence   against   a   material   symbol   of   Buddhism.   What   is   more
interesting   is   how   the   matter   was   later   debated   in   popular   circles.   One   of   my
friends,   a   young   but   high profile‐   Kachin  peace  activist  and  a  devout  Baptist,
reasoned  on  his  Facebook  feed whether the gesture might not have been a “Trojan
Horse   to   Laiza”.   Implied   here   was   that   the   highly   charged   symbol,   though
presented as a gesture for peace, was actually intended to foment tensions between
the Christian Kachin and their Buddhist allies in the area (such as the All Burma
Frontier of  Student Unions (ABFSU) that  has a military base on the outskirts  of











The   above   fragment   illustrates   the   anxieties   prevalent   in   the   popular   discourse
about religious territoriality. In this context, even the presence of a statue invested
with   Biblical   idolatry   is   seen   as   contradicting   the   spatial   integrity   of   a   Kachin‐
Christian domain (to a lesser extent, the cross was said by some to have been an
essentially Catholic  symbol,  a  connotation the marching monks might well  have
overlooked).   It   also   shows   how   different   ethnic   or   religious   communities   can
interpret   same   symbols   in   a   radically   different   light,   particularly   if   these
interpretations are reinforced by vocal advocates of Christian political ideology. The
object, Keane has noted, “is mute” (2006, 311). The intepretations of even charged































From   the   perspective   of   the   youth   in   attendance,   there   was   considerable   peer
pressure to attend. One the way back to town, I asked some of my younger friends
whether they felt it was important to maintain distance from the Buddhist festivals.



























Daw just  support   the  monks  to  be   in  every  place!”  These  passages  might  seem
exaggerated but are, in fact, illustrative of a shared feeling of siege characteristic of
the  contemporary  Kachin  ethno national  imagination.  Boundaries,  both‐   physical
and symbolic,  are felt   to be  tightening around the already constrained collective
body of the nation. Not only that, but critique against the religious other is cast in an
idiom of national development, linking existential anxieties with utilitarian concern.
Popular   interpretations   of   these   tensions   are   firmly   embedded   in   the   historical
imaginary, particularly the events directly preceding the British transfer of power
and the two decades of uneasy parliamentary power that followed in their wake. In
terms   of   religious   territoriality,   two   events   are   commonly   emphasised   in   local














A pastoral view on the hills surrounding the town of Mai Ja Yang. Note the juxtaposition of a Buddhist shrine
on the left, a Christian cross in the centre and a traditional Kachin house on the right hand side of the photo
July, 2010




































Inherent   in   this   historical   imaginary   is   an   attempt   to   reconcile   the   perceived
backwardness of the traditional mountain dwellers with a primordial strength that
is   literally   rooted  in   the  hills.   In   so  doing,   it   employs  nationalistic   language   of
morality   which,   as   Michael   Herzfeld  notes,   is   essentially  one  of   “inclusion   and
exclusion”   (1997,   46).   In   the   resulting   narrative,   the   fierce   independence   from





























Religious ritual in the everyday life

















Christian   institutions.   Regardless   of   individual   preference,   most   social   and
professional   circles   were   dominated   by   attested   believers.   Almost   all   of   my








Christian ritual,   I  suggest   that  part  of  their efficacy derives from their collective
nature that both legitimises and produces particular communal identities. For the
devout,  Christian temporality  permeates  everything  from collective  life  down to
individual  existence via recurrent events  expressed in a familiar religious  idiom.
Even those Kachin only loosely associated with Christian worhip spiritually and
78 I recognise here that my fieldwork was still confined to a relatively small group of intellectuals and activists who
often had significant links to religious organisations by virtue of their educational and professional careers. While I
made significant attempts to gather my data from a cross‐denominational perspective, certain bias towards Baptist






drawing   from   local   traditions   and   various   global   influences.   These   include
dominant Catholic  and Protestant positions but also more radical   ideas of   tribal
theology. However, most, if not all, converge around particular representations of
collective   identification   through   which   an   affective   link   to   a   larger   imagined
community   is  constantly  maintained and  nourished.   In   this   sense   it   is  not  only
possible to theoretically generalize across multiple Christianities in Kachinland, as
Cannell  and others have suggested (2006,  7;  Howell 2007).  Members of different






then recirculate   their   ideas   in   the  wider  society.  Rather,   the   sites   for  producing
Christian   sentiments   –   often   aligned   with   ethno nationalist   ideologies   –   are‐
dispersed throughout various layers of the society. The following section looks at
several of the more common collective rituals.
Collective  rituals  and  the  making  of  Kachin  Christian
community






took   place   in   the   summer   of   2012,   during   a   regular   Sunday   service   at   the
Wunpawng Christian Church in Chiang Mai, Thailand. About midway through the
sermon, the reverend invited members of the congregation to step up and relate
stories   that   would   fit   into   the   general   theme   of   individual s   monetaryʹ























79 This custom is something I rarely observed inside Myanmar. One explanation that was given to me by some
members of the congregation was that it was due to the wealth of the Chiang Mai Kachin church in relation to the
size of the congregation. Given the location of the church on the outskirts of the city, this popular gesture would
also help attract people to attend services. I also spoke to some poorer labour migrants for whom this was the finest




Through   answering   the   call   to   participate,   narrating   a   chance   event   in   his   life
through particular Christian idiom, the man was perceived as having served his
duty for the congregation in affirming its collective identity in faith.  As Lambek















I   feel   I  need to share my experience  to  uplift  others.  When I  was still   living in
Waimaw,   you   know,   our   reverend   asked   us   to   contribute   as   much   as   we   can.
Sometimes I   listen  to  other  people  and I  hear  something and I  think,  aah!,   that
person must be right! And every day, I notice something is like they tell us. For










friend s   sister   got   better.   So   when   my   brother   shared   this   story   at   the   churchʹ
everyone feel encouraged.
From   this   follows   another   thread   that   makes   Christian   language   so   central   to











evoking   both   ethnic   boundaries   and   Biblical   morality   to   respond   to   an   act   of
bureaucratic corruption. This illustrates the everyday dialectic between structural





imaginary   and   political   grievances   are   voiced   in   less   formal   –   but   even   more
frequent – settings of common prayers.
War and community in prayer
The long table had been set for lunch at NHTOI and a dozen students lined benches
on either  end.  As  usual,   I   sat   together  with   the   teachers   in  one  of   the   corners.
Nobody had yet touched their food that lay steaming in the midday sun piercing
through the woven bamboo blinds.  “Seng Nan!” a  few of  the girls   laughed and
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pleaded, pointing teasingly at one of their peers. Seng Nan hid her eyes and kept






usual   shyness   in   class.   I   kept   shaking  my  head   in   turn,   smiling   (and   probably
blushing). Seeing that Seng Nan was off the hook and none of the others could be
counted on,  Sara  Yawbawm, the head of school, finally shrugged and rose to say
grace.   In   a   split   instant,   laughter   fell   silent   and   everyone’s   head   bowed   low.
Eloquent and melodious,  Sara Yawbawm would continue for several minutes, first
describing  us  gathered at   the   table,   then  making grateful   reference   to   the  daily









had  lost   faith   in   the   rhetoric  of  peace  negotiations  still  dominant   in   the  media.
Instead, troop movements and reports of incessant clashes formed the central   point
of reference in daily conversation. A further mention was made to two local youths





















grace  preceded every  single  meal.  Some more  zealous   theology students  would
even insist on saying one when served a cup of tea. “For our Kachin people, grace is
like chilli, we cannot take food without it!”, my Jinghpaw teacher liked to joke. More
often than not,  eating also  tends  to  be a shared enterprise.  Thus,  shared prayer





example,  Chris  De Wet  has  shown how it   served to  promote  cohesion between
Palestinian and diaspora Jews, and promoted anti Hellenic sentiments (2009), much‐
like it has among the Kachin tribes of different regional origin (see Hanson’s quote
in   the   following   chapter).   Common   prayers   are   also   important   sites   of   agency,
dissipating, as it were, the power of the utterance from the domain of elites (the
pulpit)   to  more  egalitarian  settings.  This   is  particularly   important   in   the  Kachin
Baptist   tradition   that,   at   least   in   theory,   prioritises   the   autonomy   of   churches,







Rather   than  repetition,   prayer   in   the   contemporary   Kachin   society   is   better
understood as   (re)production  of  one s   relationship  to   the   transcendental   that  alsoʹ
animates   the   communal    aspects  of   social  existence.  By   referring   to  both actual





oratorical skills not only sought  to sway God with many words , but constructedʺ ʺ
experience and tangible links between people and the world (1991, 226), the Kachin
prayers constitute crucial sites for relating experiential social realities through the




together   the   religious   and   the   profane   life   of   the   community,   animating   both
through its supreme referent, and reproducing collective affinities of the faithful. 
In   the   Kachin   schools   at   which   I   worked   throughout   my   fieldwork,   mealtime














I   began   this   chapter   by   introducing   the   divergent   religious   landscapes   of
contemporary Kachin State, and providing several examples of how contests over
religious  symbols  have manifested  in   the  public   sphere.  These   tensions  have   a
strong   ethno nationalist   dimension,   transcending   both   particular   symbols   and‐
denominational   boundaries.   In   local   Kachin   perceptions,   they   are   necessarily
imbued with references to historical time and struggles over self determination and‐
self preservation   in   the   secular   political   sphere.   Thus,   interpretations   of   these‐




of  the centrality of  Christian beliefs  and practices  in the  lives of  the people and
organisations with whom I worked. Collective devotional rituals were  a  common























































efforts  were  embedded in   the   larger  evangelical  discourse,  and remain a   lasting
legacy of Kachin Christian organisations that later appropriated them. Insofar as the
wide majority of educators studied in this work define themselves as Christians,
and   insofar   as   their   initiatives   are   closely   linked   with   the   dominant   religious
organisations in the Kachin State, these historical trajectories remain highly topical
today. Thinking back to Bénéï's (2008) notion of schools always existing in dialogue
with   the   society,   this   dialogue   was   commonly   held   on   religious   grounds,   both
literally and metaphorically. In the activist circles I worked in, moral horizons and
professional   aims   were   commonly   expressed   in   the   Christian   idiom.   Biblical
references were used to interpret daily events and political developments. Christian





progress.   On   one   level,   their   interventions   were   certainly   tied   to   the   religious
paradigm   in   which   the   foreign   missionaries   worked.   The   later   not   only   saw
themselves   as   modernizing   agents   but   also   actively   sought   to   maximise   the
developmental impact of the mission outside the sphere of faith, strictly speaking.
While Leach laments the “anti­British” sentiment of American Baptist Mission, he
also   notes   that   the   colonial   government   increasingly   addressed   its   “uplift
campaigns” to Kachin church leaders over traditional chiefs (1947, 630). Missions
were seen as credible – if often problematic – partners, both by colonial authorities
and   post independence   governments.   This   appears   to   have   been   true   up   until‐
General Ne Win’s reforms in the 1960s that forced all  foreign mission staff to leave
80 As I have already shown, this in no way implies that the Christian narratives of modernity are the only ones
available. Perhaps the most influential alternatives come from the fast growing NGO sector, as well as businesses
both local and foreign. However, as enthographic examples presented throughout this thesis suggest, the latter are
often interwoven with Christian cosmologies.
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the country. 
The   problematic   of   missionary   contact   has   been   observed   by   anthropologists
working   in   other   colonial   contexts.   For   example,   Rutherford   traces   comparable
agendas  among  the  Dutch  Protestant  missionaries  working  in  early  20th  century
Indonesia (2006). One insight emerging from his work is that the local appropriation
of missionary discourse can diverge significantly from their original purposes. In
this   context,   the   present   analysis   asks   how   ideas   of   modernity   came   to   be
appropriated  by   the   ‘indigenised’  Christian  organisations  and  the  wider  Kachin
society.   While   the   initial   efforts   to   ‘modernise’   the   life   of   Kachin   villages   were
carried  out  unilaterally  by  the  mission,   the   changing  geopolitical   and  economic
climate   brought   increasing   numbers   of   villages   to   petition   for   the   churches   to
provide benefits such as education (see Leach 1947, 629; Tegenfeldt 1974, 164, 313).
The legitimacy of the clergy thus gradually came to depend on their ability to act in
a   role   of   leadership   in   delivering   certain   social   services,   in   addition   to   their
evangelic aims and pastoral care. Equally important in comparative perspective is












importance   of   these   writings   seems   to   have   been   overlooked   in   one   important
regard. Namely the extent to which the missionary scholarship, as the single widely
accessible   English   language   source   to   the   students   of   theological   seminaries   in





historical   memory.   For   example,   uneasiness   in   the   face   of   what   is   felt   to   be   a
‘primitive and wild’ past forms an important element in the contemporary national
sentiments while simultaneously legitimizing the authority of religious elites.
While   the   primary   intent   of   Western   missionaries   was   spiritual   conversion,   the
institutions   they   founded   would   affect   the   development   of   the   contemporary
Jinghpaw Wunpawng  nationalism, particularly in the decades following the 1960s.
Not only were novel  ideas about national belonging and geopolitics brought along






national   development.   Part   of   their   success   lies   in   the   way   they   were   able   to
navigate   the   changing   social   landscape   of   new   Christian   morals   and   colonial
encroachment while still retaining legitimate claim to indigenous traditions.
To   sum,   the   central   aim   of   this   chapter   is   thus   to   understand   the   historical
emergence of the Kachin Christian discourse of modernity that animated the early
missionary encounter and was later appropriated by the local religious elites. To
that   end,   I   am   drawing   on   Baptist   missionary   publications   and   other   sources
contemporaneous with the early formative period of Christianisation. To illustrate
how these early visions have been expressed in more contemporary discourse on
modernity   in   the  Kachin  ethno nationalist   register,   the   final  part  of   the   chapter‐
analyses  visual  artwork   from  several  Christian   journals  published   in   the  1990s.
These images depict visions of national development as well as perceived tensions
81 Theological  libraries  often  carry  either  original  publications  of  American  Baptist  Mission  Press  or  their
photocopied reproductions. Southeast Asian publishing houses like the White Lotus Press have also issued reprints
of several important missionary publications on the Kachin. The latter are widely available to Kachin expatriate
communities living in Thailand and elsewhere and I have observed numerous copies on bookshelves in Myitkyina




“Their fathers were brigands”: Early mission and modernity
in the Kachin Hills
Ever   since  Max Weber’s   classic   thesis  on   the   role  of  Protestantism  in  economic
development   (2001   [1904]),   there  has  been   a  growing   body  of   literature  on   the
Christian  organisations  as  influential  development  actors  in  colonial  (Byam  1997;
Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Håkansson 1998; Savage 1997; Latukefu 1967; Ajayi
1965) and post colonial (Ngo 2010; Sherman 1997) contexts. One common point this‐
variegated   corpus   outlines   is   the   fact   that   neither   the   worldviews   nor   the
institutions that the Christian missions introduced were limited in their impact to
their   evangelical   aims.   The   context specific   outcomes   of   these   efforts   remained‐
necessarily dialectical in that they were equally shaped by the plans of missionaries
and the  local  demands and  judgements.  Likewise,   in  forcing the missionaries   to










82 This  is  due  to  most  of  my  data,  both  historical  and  ethnographic,  being  based  on  the  Baptist  sources.  I
acknowledge that developments on the Catholic and other denominational contexts might have differed somewhat
and that further research is needed on the topic.
83 I have already noted on Asad's critique of Geertzian conceptualization of religion as a category (1993). My
discussion  here  focuses  more  on  the  institutional  and  technological  power  of  Christian  organisations.  Asad
subscribes  to  a  similar  line  of  argument  following  Skovgaard-Petersen  and  Schulze  in  his  discussion  on  the
modernizing state and Islam (2003, 225).
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sufficient   expertise,   popular   legitimacy,   and   territorial   reach.   As   Robert   Hefner
points out, the advantage dominant world religions have over existing alternatives
is ultimately premised upon their ability to create and maintain a “linkage of …
transcendental   imperatives   to   institutions   for   the   propagation   and   control   of
religious knowledge and identity over time and space” (Hefner 1993, 19). As for the
German Protestant  Rhenish mission working among the  Toba Batak  in  Sumatra
(Chandler et al 1987) or the American Baptists among the Karen in south eastern‐
Burma (Keyes 1977, 21), for the early Baptists in the Kachin Hills the propagation
and control  of  religious knowledge was primarily  served by the mission school.
Hence   the   words   of   Rev.   Ola   Hanson   that   the   latter   had   always   constituted
missionaries' “strongest evangelic agency” (cited in Tegenfeldt, 1974: 151). 
Among   the   Kachin   tribes,   as   elsewhere   across   colonial   Southeast   Asia,   the
missionary   encounter   introduced   novel   institutions   for   disseminating,













whose   extent   was   subject   to   much   debate   and   exploration,   that   the   individual
missions   started   building   local   alliances   that   would   eventually   grow   into   self‐
sustaining ‘indigenised’ organisations like the KBC.













developments   already   under   way   in   Assam   and   to   refrain   from   destabilizing
provocations towards China (Sadan 2013, 164–165). 
From   their   meagre   beginnings,   the   position   of   Christian   missions   was   almost
diametrically opposite. While the colonial administration largely treated the local
Kachin populace as mere means, the missionaries took them as an end in and of







social   institutions”   (Comaroff   and   Comaroff   1997,   233).   This   reshaping   of   the
individual in pursuit of evangelical aims allowed the American Baptist missionaries
to envision a more or less complete social transformation in the spheres of religion,



















The   first  of   these  was,  of  course,   tightly   related  to   the  evangelical  aims.  Writes
missionary Geis,  “There  is  nothing  in  this   [nat   jaw]   religion which has   the  least
moral power over man, nothing to make him better; but on the contrary, it has a
most degrading influence, for like the spirits they propitiate, they lie, plunder and
kill”  (1902, 174). What  the missionaries believed  to be  innate passions of an entire
race were seen to be at odds with the project of building a sustainable Christian
community. While notable differences remained between Catholic and Protestant
missions   (such as   that   concerning  the  prohibition  on alcoholic  beverages),   there
appeared   to   be   a   common   obsession   with   a   sort   of   moral   hygiene,   including
monogamous family life and law abiding‐  professions.




However,   this   was   seen   as   merely   the   first   step   on   the   way   to   becoming   true















becoming   one   of   the   most   able   preachers   and   a   personal   assistant   to   Hanson
(Roberts 1901, 668–669).84







in   Tegenfeldt   1974,   104).   While   in   this   instance   the   reason   was   the   lack   of
understanding of the Gospels, the most common measure of successful conversion
was moral conduct, particularly abstinence. Even in the period following the Second
World   War,   Tegenfeldt   records   pastors   expressing   their   concern   for   “unworthy
motives”   behind   superficially   spiritual   commitments   (ibid.).   On   the   level   of






84 In relation to Robert’s passage, it is interesting to note how it illustrates a complex  interplay of missionary
practices with local cultural norms. The reverend readily admits having been guided in his choice of disciplinary
action by an elder member of the localcongragation. In reference to the central theme of this thesis, it shows how
local agents influenced and appropriated institutional practices in the earliest days of the mission.
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life   for   the populations  for  whom they  laboured.  For example,  Tegenfeldt  notes
how,  apart   from a “strong devotional  emphasis”,  Geis’s   influence   in  the Bhamo
Bible School was characterised both by “an interest in the whole life of a village,
including the provision of good drinking water and mosquito control  (1974: 175).ʺ
In   addition   to   Biblical   subjects,   the   early   curriculum   consisted   of   basics   in
agriculture,   healthcare   and   pedagogy   (ibid.,   176),   all   of   which   were   seen   as
beneficial for raising local economic opportunities and social welfare. Speaking of
the   Bible   Churchman’s   Missionary   Society,   even   Edmund   Leach   notes   that
“whatever may be thought of their Bible punching methods of evangelism, one   can
have nothing but admiration for their efforts in the medical field” (1947: 627). To be
sure,  attempts  at  achieving  what   the  Western missionaries  saw as   improvement
might not always have been such for the target population. But it is safe to say that
their   early   efforts   in   the   Kachin   Hills   surpassed   strictly   evangelical   concerns.
Moreover, missionary concerns for social development were not unilateral. I have
already shown that there was considerable demand by the local communities for the
missionaries   to provide services such as education (see also Sadan 2013,  374).   It




The   three   images   below,   printed   in   the   1906   and   1902   editions   of   the  Baptist


























colonies (see 2006,  244­246).  Characteristically  for  the period that believed  in  the
capacity of  modern  institutions to shape individuals and races – not least through
labour   –   the   indigenous   communities   are   commonly   referred   to   as   an   almost
inanimate   “material”   to   be   moulded   through   care   (a   metaphor   still   very   much
present in the parlance of Kachin clergy and lay people alike). Apparent is also the
extent   to  which   the   missionaries’   concern  went   far   beyond   the   strictly   spiritual
advancement. Not only has the new “material” been dressed in the modernised garb
of   Lower   Burma,   their   “heathenish”   drums   exchanged   for   hymnals,   but   their








The   importance   of   such   records   extends   beyond   interest   in   the   world views   of‐
foreign mission staff.  It must be borne in mind that the institutions they created,
particularly that of Christian leadership [ningbaw], were soon appropriated by local
religious  elites  whose  numbers  were  growing  steadily.  While  at   the   turn  of   the




registers   for   thinking  of  modernity,   as  well   as   the   changing  national   imaginary
introduced by the mission,  were  thus circulated  in  an ever expanding territorial








break with the former authority of  jaiwas  and  dumsas.86  While Leach suggests that
conversion allowed Kachin elites to forego material and ritual obligations towards
the community (1947, 634), it must also be remembered that, within the emerging
Christian   cosmology,   the   new   religious   elites   were   more   responsible   for   the
betterment of society than lay people.
Historical   imaginaries   constitute   another   arena   where   the   lasting   legacy   of
missionary   institutions   is   readily   apparent   today.   The   published   writings   of
missionary scholars such as Ola Hanson and Herman Tegenfeldt exerted far  bigger
influence  on successive  generations of  Kachin  intellectuals   than,  say,   that  of   the
85 As already noted, Tegenfeldt s statistics have come under much needed scrutiny in recent years, most notably inʹ
the work of Sadan (2013). However, while he likely overstated the extent of mass conversion among the Baptists,
church registers on clerical membership offer more trustworthy data.
86 Traditional nat jaw religious offices (see Leach 1954, 190).
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relatively unknown (and controversial)  Edmund Leach.87  Apart from certain elite
circles   involved   in   local   ethnological   research,   such   as   the   contributors   to   the
Wunpawng   Sawk   Dinglik   Lik Laika  ‐ or   the  Kachin   Research   Journal,   the   main   non‐
Kachin sources of information about the colonial past are constituted by the early
clerical   writings.88  For   example,   a   common   answer   to   my   questions   on   Kachin
history   elicited   either   mythological   narratives   or   those   directly   lifted   from   the
missionary texts. For the majority of Kachin elites I conversed with on these topics,
historical time was primarily anchored in two events, one mythical, another dated.
First of these was the loss of writing through the  shanhpyi laika  or the animal hide‐
book,   that   Scott   has   employed   in   his   popular   theory   of   state   evasion   (2010).
Although Sadan has   largely  dismissed his  claims on  historical  grounds  (or   lack
thereof), the idea of the Lost Book exists as one of the foundational myths for the
contemporary Kachin (2013, 227, see also fn. 135). In Baptist circles, it is commonly




Middle   Place   of   the   World.   ...   We   believe   that   in   the   ancient   times,   we   were
inhabitants   of   the   Middle   East.   But   when   –   I     forget     the     era     –     Muslim




Israelite   peoples   loved   very   much...   Then,   according   to   our   Kachin   forefathers’
legend, they took the parchment Bible… from that temple. On the way they are very
hungry [and so] they ate it! So from that time we had no letters. We forget all our
history,   our   beginnings,   except   only   by   the   word   of   mouth.   At   that   time,   we
87 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  when  Maran  La  Raw  was  appointed  as  the  “first  Kachin  State  research
anthropologist” in 1960, his foremost mission was testing out Leach's theories as an indigenous scholar – a project
sadly disrupted by the onset of the revolution that forced him to exile in the US (Maran La Raw 2007, 33)
88 An important exception to this would be Chinese language sources (for bibliographic references see Wang 1997).
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in   Gow's   ethnography   have   narrativized   the   initial   contacts   with   the   Summer
Institute of Linguistics as  a pivotal  point   in their collective history.  It  marks the
beginning   of   “civilized”   life   for   the   Piro,   having   emancipated   them   from   debt
service to the haciendas and aquiring their own land titles,  villages,  and schools
(ibid.   213).   At   the   same   time   the   memory   of   conversion   as   an   event   appears
curiously missing from Piro historical consciousness. The reason, Gow suggests, is
that   for   the   Piro,   traditional   cosmology   was   not   conceptualized   as   a   “parallel








Piro   perceived   their   'civilizing'   escape   from  the  worldly   power   of   the  hacienda





601).  Traditionally,   the disputing parties had a choice whether or not to seek an
arbiter. The British administration sought to make its legal procedure compulsory in




secular   legal   framework  liberated subjects  –  particularly  Christian chiefs  –   from




central   trope  in  contemporary re­tellings  of  history.  As  several  examples   in   this
thesis   suggest,   conversion   among   the   Kachin   is   dwelt   upon   quite   regularly.   In
Gow's   terms,  missionary  contact  and   the   spiritual   turning  certainly   constitute  a
“historical event” (as opposed to mere “action”) (2006, 237). In other words, it is
experienced   as   a   discontinuity,   a   shift   from   one   type   of   collective   existence   to
another, even if many roots of pre­Christian customs were never fully severed. As
Olivia   Harris   notes   in   her   study   of   Bolivian   Laymi,   discontinuity   produced   by
conversion –  whether  collective  or   individual  –   is  not  something  that   is   simply
89 Leach insists that this made possible the settlement of disputes between Christians and orthodox nat worshipers
that, in the traditional customary law, had been impossible. From the customary standpoint, however, no cases  had







youth  addiction,  where   the  young  are   seen  as   turning  away  not  only   from the
church but also Kachin languages and traditions.
The   historical   consciousness   of   discontinuity   does   not   preclude   collective










can tell.  Still  the Creator  (Hpan wa Ningsan),  the Omniscient One  (Chye wa
Ningchyan),   the  One  Higher   than the  Clouds,   (Sumwi Sumdam),   ...  and the














seeking  for   those   lost.  Although  the   loss  of  writing   is  attributed  to   the   folly  of
humans,   the  agency behind conversion  is   fundamentally  attributed to   the  deity.
Seldom is the presence of early missionaries explained through colonial expansion
or other, worldly, factors. While the personal willpower of individuals such as the
Roberts   and   the   Hansons   is   often   commended,   the   ultimate   cause   for   their
perseverance is divine grace. Insofar as this legitimises the mission, it also sanctifies




evangelical  organisations,  most  notably the KBC, as  crucial  agents of  intellectual
advancement.  In  this  context,  mission schools  and seminaries  occupied a central
place alongside state colleges and universities. Unlike the former, early seminary
graduates came to possess new forms of cultural capital and ritual language that





90 It  it  worth  repeating  how  this  notion  constructs  a  people  (or,  as  more  fundamentalist  Baptist  reverends
sometimes told me,  the  people,  God's chosen flock).  In either case,  what is of essence is the unitary national
community – the reference is not to Christians or even Christian Kachins but the Kachin.
91 It should not be assumed that acquisition of literacy or the religious meanings it opened up for the studious were
in any sense straightforward processes. Cannell has shown how, among the Bicol, both the original choices made
by the Catholic missionaries in translating Biblical terms, and the subsequent readings by the converts, left open
numerous possibilities for modified meanings despite best attemts at orthodoxy (2006, 159-160). In the Kachin
context, Leach notes how Hanson's influential translation appropriated “a luxurious, elaborate language of dumsa
ga (rituals) and jaiwa ga (sagas) for his Bible” that were incomprehensible to ordinary lay people already at the
time of their writing (1947, 632). It remains beyond the scope of the present work to trace the full implications of
this but anecdotal evidence from my own fieldwork suggests that many Kachin Christians, particularly among the
younger generation, admit difficulty comprehending the language of the Jinghpaw Bible. If nothing else, this shows






every   walk   of   life,   including   pastors,   teachers,   government   clerks,   inspectors   of





















its   images   of   Christian   leadership   and   the   territorial   outreach   of   religious
organisations.  During   the  school  break  of  1961,  we  are   told,   two girls   from  the
Shahpwi middle school, L. Lum Nan and B. Hawng Nyoi, were sent to do mission
92 Sadan cites Enriquez s diaries that lament “the conservatism of [Kachin elders] who cannot bear any changeʹ


























he perceived as  the  young bride  moving  into  life long slavery at  her  husband’s‐
household   (1909).   More   importantly,   missionary   wives   and   single   female
missionaries   were   instrumental   in   running   the   schools   and   organizing   various
communal activities in the Kachin State from the earliest decades of the mission.
They encouraged local women to assume increasingly public roles in church life










instances,   it   is   the   possession   of   privileged   doctrinal   knowledge   and   formal
membership in the KBC that signifies the new social status for these women.  While
the two girls venturing out from Shahpwi were only school  students,   their status
made   “young   and   old”   listen   to   their   message   of   salvation.   It   is,   of   course,
questionable  how much embellishment  the authors  wove  into   the  narrative.  But
even   allowing   for   certain   fictional   content,   its   stated   –   and   printed   –   message
remains significant.
Equally   important   is   the   sense   of   territoriality   the   narrative   implies.   As   I   have
already indicated, the mission was constantly working to bring remote communities
into   the   larger   Kachin   Christian   polity,   and   consolidating   its   existing   territorial
reach.  Regardless of their  limited readership,  Kachin Christian publications have
historically worked to create a stronger sense of geographical unity, incorporating
isolated   highland   tracts   into   the   popular   imagination.   In   the   process,   they   also
established   a   hierarchy   between   different   areas   of   the   Kachin   Hills,   setting   the
pristine but  ‘raw’ homeland of the hill   tribes against  the enlightened population
centres that harboured bigger mission compounds. The authors of the article end
with   a   customary   salutation   to   the   KBC   that   implicitly   sets   the   terms   for   this
difference. The association (meaning the congregational institution responsible for
that particular area) started out as “agitated, unknowlegable, and harsh”– terms still

























low as  the human race  can go.  Their  priests  are  not  concerned with their  gross




that   the   missionary   softens,   commenting   on   Kachin   tact   and   etiquette,   good
manners and consideration for the fellow man. “[T]heir most charming traits”, he
concludes,  “are   their willingness   to  learn and their  openmindedness” (ibid.,  41).
Taking   up   the   proverbial   ‘white   man’s   burden’,   the   missionaries   pictured
themselves as sympathetic protectors or loving parents of a whole society. The latter
they   sought   to   represent   as   simple,   verdant   mountain folk,   oppressed   and‐








Myihtoi Ma [Prophet Youth], 1990-1991
254
As   their   colleagues   did   across   similar   settings   (Woodberry   2011,   120–   122),
contemporary sources commonly depict the early Baptist missionaries to the Kachin
Hills as standing for the legal rights of the indigenous tribes vis à vis the distant and‐ ‐
indifferent colonial bureaucracy (e.g. Sword 1954, 51). In land disputes, feuds, and
other court settlements, the missionary played the role of guardians over tribesmen
who lacked comprehension of  the legal codes of  the Empire,  which were forced
upon them with increasing territorial zeal.   “In  many cases   the  Kachins   did not
know their constitutional rights, and only after we told them did they learn that the






Talking   to  Kachin  Christians  about   the   status  of   religious  organisations,   I  often
encountered   the   narrative   of   growing   up   and   attaining   proper   upbringing   and





we   touched   on   these   topics   many   times   over   the   course   of   my   fieldwork.   A


















local   church   life   and   clerical   authority.   It   is   the   acquisition,   then,   of   Scriptural
literacy, a watershed passed with the completion of Hanson’s Jinghpaw Bible, that
marks the point of tentative adulthood for the nation. Yet, from the standpoint of
Baptist   Christians,   that   adulthood   is   inextricably   tied   to   organised   religion,
institutions of which must guide the rest of the society on the singular path they
came.   Importantly,   these   ideas  also  presuppose  an  “imagined    community”     in
Andersonian sense (2006). I now turn to several historical conjectures linking Baptist
missionary activities to the emergence of  Jinghpaw Wunpawng  nationalism. This is
not   to   suggest   that   the   movement   could   be   attributed   solely   to   the   Christian
missions or that the latter were even its central agents. However,  their influence
should not be overlooked, particularly in view of the present day prominence of‐
organisations  such as   the  KBC,  and  their   intimacy with  the  ruling political  and
military elites in Laiza.
Christian organisations and Wunpawng nationalism
That Christian conversion patterns and extends communal identity has been long
recognized. As noted by Harvey Whitehead, Christianity presumes “commonality









[1983]),   based   on   shared   linguistic   and   literary   identity,   a   canonised   system   of
beliefs  and  religious  hierarchies,  and  an  expanding  geographical   imagination
transcending   the   locality   while   simultaneously   incorporating   it   into   a   larger
geopolitical realm.
This   is   not   to   suggest   that   the   Kachin   tribes   had   historically   lacked   a   wider
geographical   awareness.   Both   scholarly   and   tell tale   evidence   exists   of   Kachin‐
tribesmen raiding,   trading and serving   in  arms   far   from the  Kachin  heartland.93
However,  I  am following Whitehead's  argument in Melanesian context  when he
suggests   that  what  Christianisation  introduced over  existing  territorial  networks
was   religious   canonisation   and   centralization   that   did   not   exist   in   traditional
cosmologies (2006, 300­303). Whitehead notes how this process vastly expanded on
traditional   communal   identities   to   include   an   anonymous   body   of   fellow
worshippers. I would add that, on the level of ethno­national imagination actively
propagated   by   the   missionaries,   that   body   was   even   larger   insofar   as   it   also








In her 1932 manuscript  on the Kachin Jubilee of  1927,  she records the following
exchange between  two Kachin women who spontaneously  grabbed each other’s




This  reference  to  the “Book” and its   influence on community formation  is  well‐
93 For some examples Sadan 2013, 43–44, 96–97, 152; Leach 1954, 20–22, 186, 240
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supported by theorists of nationalism, who have long stressed the importance of the














As early as 1915,  the potential readership of  Jinghpaw Shi Laika  was estimated at
1500. Moreover, as Tegenfeldt points out, this figure did not count the significantly









that   those  who speak  it  are  a  minority,   so   long as   it   is  a  minority  of   sufficient
political weight” (1990, 60). In other words, given sufficient time and resources, the








colonial  modernity.  Speaking of   the  prevailing situation shortly  before   the  War,
Leach   notes   that   “the   intelligentsia   of   the   hill   peoples   is   now   almost   entirely








tendency   towards   Christian   conversion.   Leach   (1947)   notes   that,   in   theory,   the
Kachin levies were permitted animist worship and were occasionally given patches
of land close to encampments to erect ritual aids. However, in actual practice, this







The   above   examples   are   far   from   exhaustive   in   their   scope.   However,   they   do









“All  things  are  become  new”:  Imagery  of  progress  and







article   or   reference   in   English.   Importantly,   it   was   never   meant   for   circulation
outside   the   tightly knit   communities   of   faith.   Unlike   the   wide   majority   of‐
periodicals published in Myanmar at the time, the authors of  Myihtoi  Ma  would
have been able to work outside the conventional bounds of Burmese censorship. As
such, they present a unique insight into Kachin Baptist aspirations of development
and   modernisation.   At   the   same   time,   they   hint   at   tensions   around   cultural
preservation and religious piety vis­a­vis the changes and effacement introduced by




educators   with   whom   I   collaborated   through   my   fieldwork   occupy   today.   As
already noted, the KTC has long seen itself – and not without reason – as one of the
centres of Kachin intellectual life and is certainly perceived as such by the general















a   settled,   centralised   polity   who   has   emerged   from   the   nostalgic   mountains
drowned in sunset on the horizon. This recalls the distinction between urbanised
(mission) centres and wild hinterlands alluded to earlier.  In the background, the
advertisements   and   logos   on   buildings   bearing   Jinghpaw   inscriptions   talk   of
booming trade, as do shipping terminals lining the Irrawaddy River in the shade of
skyscrapers overlooking the  Manau  Park in central Myitkyina.  The central visual
theme, however, is the long line of university graduates circling around the manau
poles  in  traditional  dance procession brandishing their swords.  The  manau  posts
have been decorated for the occasion,  nine in total  (instead of  the common six).
Significantly, the central post symbolising sun and masculinity is here depicted with
a pattern of open textbooks crowned with a Christian cross, while the pole to its left






also   long  been  an  extension  of   foreign  political   and  military  domination  of   the
Kachin areas.  For  most of my friends and colleagues  in Myitkyina,  the officialdom
94 The history and significance of manau has been extensively analysed in Sadan 2013, 406‐69, see also Leach
1947, 156‐158, 270
95 For  a  brief  ethnographic  account  of  the political  concerns informing the design of  manau posts  in  central
Myitkyina in the late 1990s, see (Sadan 2013, 424‐425). Among other things, Sadan shows how Christianity has
long been a point of tension.
96 Despite the tatmadaw and KIA signing a formal ceasefire in 1994 any overt expression of political allegiance to













in   charge  of   the   rail   services  was  commonly  perceived  through ethnic  markers.







Myitkyina   station   and   its   surroundings   are   felt   to   harbour   various   social   ills





centre   of   State   capital   altogether   (2013,   312).   Then,   like   now,   these   perceptions
resonated with wider political and economic grievances of inequality and regional
marginalization.   It   is   in   this   light   that   the  image of  a  train above Nawng Nang
College  assumes  a  more  complex  meaning  than  that  of   linear  progress   towards
modernity. What the author depicts, and what the wider discourse of Kachin Baptist
discourse purports, is a qualitative change – not unlike that envisioned by the early
American missionaries  –   in   the  socio political   landscape of   the  Kachin State.  By‐
superimposing the train on the Kachin Theological College, the artwork can be read
as   both  a   political   statement  and   a  visionary  dream.   In   either   case,   the   Baptist





ethno national self expression, linguistic primacy of Jinghpaw and greater regional‐ ‐
integration   under   enlightened   Kachin   leadership.   Tacitly,   they   engage   with   the
collective insecurities  about  the economic backwardness of   the Kachin State and
lack   of   competitiveness   with   larger   regional   economies.   Grievances   about   the
natural environment described in Kiik s work (2012) are addressed through imagesʹ
of   untouched  landscapes  beyond  the   emergent  modernity   (a   future   once  again,
under   management   of   Kachin   elites).   While   the   overall   tone   of   the   artwork
presented here  remains staunchly optimistic,   it   is  also capable  of  perceiving  the
deep seated tensions between these visions and the existing social‐  realities.
Pahtau  [Horn]   journal   (Illustration   17)   is   published   by   the   Kachin   Jehovah’s
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growth   that,   as   noted   earlier,   occupied   a   prominent   place   in   the   missionary
discourse on the Kachin polity. The following excerpt from a focus group conducted
in late June 2011 in Yangon shows how this imagery is employed in contemporary
discussions  of   national  development.   In   light   of   the  artistic   imagery  above,   the








As  was  customary,   the  meeting was  chaired by  the  participants  on a  voluntary
97 Full references stand as follows: “Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed
away; behold, all things are become new” (2 Cor 5:17). “But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the
hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory” (Cor 2:7). “And be not conformed to this
world: but be ye  transformed by the renewing of our mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable,





as  well  as  several  young professionals  who had  landed prestigious employment
with a foreign NGO or in the rapidly growing business sector. The majority referred
to themselves as Kachin,  though a few were of other ethnic nationalities. As the















internet savvy   and   consumers   of   foreign   media,   but   many   also   had   already‐
participated in training workshops run by NGOs and activists at home or by the
neighbouring   ASEAN   countries.   They   were   attuned   to   a   particular   rhetoric   of
development.   Words   like   ‘grassroots’,   ‘community’,   ‘inclusive’   and   ‘dialogue’
would often figure in their conversation that was usually a mixture of Jinghpaw,
English   and   Burmese.   Last   but   not   least,   with   few   exceptions,   they     were
passionately nationalistic, standing for what each of them perceived to be in the best
interests of the Kachin cause. Notably, the young woman who had first protested














argument   I   had   already   heard   elder   Kachin   use   to   illustrate   their   distrust   of
democracy, one of the boys replied, “We give a thousand kyats to every Burmese






friends  and colleagues.  “It   is  a  difficult  problem because  we need development




















carried.   Most   notably,   I   had   greatly   underestimated   the   weight   that   clerical
authority carries in the secular affairs of the contemporary Kachin society.
This chapter has sought to trace the historical trajectories that have endowed the
Kachin Christian organisations,  most  notably  the KBC, with  their present public
authority in matters of national development. In the first part, I looked at the early
missionary   sources   that   talked   about   the   socio economic   context   of   their‐










agree  with  Kachin   scholar  La  Seng  Dingrin   (2013)   in   that   there  has  historically
existed a strong link between Christian conversion and political aspirations of the
Kachin   tribes   in   Myanmar.   Yet   while   his   argument   emphasises   pre existing‐
animosity   that   found an outlet   in  Christianisation (Dingrin  2013,  133),   I    would
rather suggest, with Sadan (2013), that religious antagonism towards Buddhism was
as much part  of   the moral  universe introduced by the missionaries  as  it  was of
economic and political events contemporaneous with Christianisation.
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The present  popularity  of   the  KBC,  along with other  Christian organisations,   is
significant both from the point of view of formal education and of ethnic politics in







and  its   future   in  Kachinland.  It   is   through Nawng E Hku,  NHTOI,  and similar
establishments that local critiques have emerged, not only towards the ideologies of
Christian   organisations   but   towards   those   backed   by   state   actors.   Rather   than
merely pointing to deficiencies in the present system, however, their programmes
constitute effective assemblages within the larger apparatus of schooling. As noted
in   the   Introduction,   the   latter   is   always   potentially   capable   of   producing   new
discourses   and   practices.   All   civil   society   organisations   working   in   the   field   of
private schooling that this thesis studies owe their beginnings to various Christian





areas,  both historically  and  in   the  present,   that  operate  on  the  margins  of   state
powers and with the ever present threat of armed conflict. My primary focus has‐
been on organisations and activists working outside the sphere of political elites in
order  to bring to  focus developments  in  the Kachin society that have heretofore
largely eluded ethnographic scrutiny. In so doing, I have concentrated on the nexus
of   schooling,   religion   and   ethno nationalist   politics,   which   remain   closely‐




practices  and  ideologies  of   schooling;  Christian world­views   in  close   relation  to
modernity;  and encounters  with  the  state.  Through each successive  chapter,  my
analysis has gravitated around the question of what animates the efforts of reformist
educators in different areas and organisational settings. I have argued throughout





Together,   they define   the boundaries  of   the  political  community  towards whom
their   efforts  are  directed,  and  bestows   their   efforts  with   legitimacy both   locally
(among the KIO and Christian organisations) and abroad (among aid organisations
and diaspora communities). I have also shown how ethnicity constitutes more than
a   national   ideology   or   political   resource,   influencing   institutional   practices,





changing political  and economic  order  of   the  Union of  Myanmar.  The resulting
grievances have only accentuated the geographical isolation and existing ascription
of   ethnic   boundaries   that   continue   to   be   central   to   local   nationalist   ideologies.
During my first  fieldwork visits   in 2010,  the majority  of  popular sentiments ran
against the central government and, in particular, the Myanmar Army, who were
seen as responsible for both historical injustices and contemporary deprivation. By
the  end  of  2013,  my   field  notes  had  seen   far  more  numerous   references   to   the
negative sentiment against the Bamar as an ethnic category,   defined on religious,
moral and linguistic grounds. The follow­up visit in mid­2015 confirmed my earlier





rampant   destruction   of   natural   environments   and   symbolic  buga  homelands,   so
central   to   the   contemporary   ethnic   imagination.   Central   drivers   have   been   the
invasion of foreign extractive industries; the banning of most Kachin parties from
the parliamentary politics on the Union level;  continued symbolic and structural








next  few decades...  First,  how much is  the government willing to give  in to the
98 It  is  possible  that  the 2015 parliamentary  elections from which Aung San Suu Kyi's  National  League for
Democracy emerged victorious will usher in significant changes in this complex landscape. However, the outcomes
of these processes will remain subject to further research.
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agreements, like Panglong agreement, that were made before independence? Second,







































modernity.   Across   the   Kachin   State,   corrupt   state   bureaucracies   and   military
authorities   continue   to   exercise   arbitrary   and   often   unchecked   powers   over   the
populace. In the KIO areas, to say nothing of smaller armed groups, governance is
essentially martial law. Administrative decisions are taken in the Bamar dominated
state government   or   in   distant   Nay   Pyi   Daw   with   practically   no   recourse   to‐
inclusive   dialogue   or   transparency.   Most   importantly   from   the   perspective   of
schooling,   an   all Burmese   curriculum   remains   the   norm   from   primary   through‐
secondary   levels.   For   the   great   majority   of   school   graduates,   devalued   and
internationally  discredited  college  programmes   in  Myanmar  are   the  only  viable




private   initiatives   described   as   pervasive   status   hierarchies   and   institutional




source   of   socialisation   than   intentional   pedagogy”   (1988).   Conventions   and
traditions   under   which   most   teachers   have   been   schooled,   and   the   lack   of
established programmes for professional development, have meant that even those
99 The event is quoted here in verbatim. This popular story was later widely circulated through hearsay and Kachin







and   often   eagerly   employed   by   the   local   agents,   are   always   also   contested,





the   British   colonial   Burma.   Apart   from   resistance   by   the   established   elites,   the









influence that  larger structural  forces,   including regional  economies and political

























Kachin   areas   calls   to   mind   a   classic   assertion   by   Paul   Willis,   that   “cultural
reproduction … always  carries  with  it   the  possibility  of  producing    indeed  in  a‐
certain   sense   it   really   lives  out     alternative   outcomes   (1977,   172).   The  Kachin‐ ʺ
educators with whom I worked, whether in smaller private schools or the KIO state‐
education, were implicated in highly restrictive structural constraints. The physical
marginalisation   and   lack   of   infrastructure,   together   with   the   authoritarian
governance  of  distant  Nay Pyi  Daw have  been   further  aggravated by   limits  on
movement imposed by the war. The field of schooling has been particularly hard hit‐
by   these   structural   conditions,   not   least   because   national   and   international
connections   form   a   vital   form   of   symbolic   capital   in   this   field.   Despite   this,
important trans border connections have been established;  institutions have been‐
built   through  individual  and collective  struggle;  and new paradigms have  been
constructed and experimented with through much of the past  decade. The same
could be  argued for   the  contemporary Christian registers   through which people
think   about   and   act   upon   the   world.   As   an   integral   part   of   the   apparatus   of




the   chapters   above   have   acquired   their   own   education   in   diverse   institutional
settings: Myanmar and KIO state schools, international colleges and workshops, as
well as theological seminaries and Sunday schools. This is true whether they are
working   towards   new   educational   paradigms   within   the   existing   systems   (like
Principal Sau Seng of the KIO’s Teachers Training College) or towards creating new
institutional networks with organisations abroad (like leaders of the private schools
in Myitkyina and Laiza).  Perhaps most  of  all,   this  underlines  the significance of
trans local connections, but also the lasting effects of the post ceasefire changes that‐ ‐
allowed for greater mobility of people and resources beyond the immediate Kachin












useful to recall   its  rendition by Gilles Deleuze (1991).  In Deleuzian verbiage,  the
apparatus   is   a   “tangle,   a   multilinear   ensemble”   (ibid.,   159).   It   traces   curves   of
visibility and expression, granting certain agents visibility and voice, while casting
others in obscurity. By breaking out of the geographical and institutional isolation,
the   post ceasefire   generation   of   Kachin   intellectuals   who   acquired   (secular)‐
education  in  foreign universities  overcame structural  marginalisation that   made
their predecessors literally invisible to institutions outside Myanmar, and curbed
their agency locally. To be sure, the other quality of Deleuzian apparatus, namely







everyday   it   orders,   filters,   represses   and   ultimately   creates.   Historically,   the
American Baptist missionary schools contributed to the rupture that gave rise to
distinct moral worlds in the Kachin Hills. In so doing, they did more than implant
pre existing   meanings   into   a   new   context.   Rather,   the   missionary   encounter‐
combined   particular   Christian   cultural   tropes   with   indigenous   repertoires   of
knowledge and values, creating conditions for the emergence of new institutional
structures   and   meanings   in   the   process.   Thus,   another   way   to   understand   an
apparatus is through its “newness” and “creativity content” (Deleuze 1991,  163).
Throughout the chapters above, I have tried to keep in focus not merely the negative




contexts,   the   organisations   they   have   founded   have   already   changed   lives   and
created vital debates around pedagogic practice, political institutions, and religious
authority. At the time of writing, NHTOI has significantly expanded its enrolment
figures,   employed   new   teachers,   and   opened   several   alternate   tracks   in   social





negotiating   expanding   its   syllabus   to   cover   subjects   beyond   pedagogy.   People
dream of Kachin universities. What can be stated with certainty is that vital grass­
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